I wasn't really sure where to post this, but I figured NANOG would have some
insight or at least experience here.
I was curious if anybody would share what they consider to be average or
acceptable transatlantic ping response times over a T1.
I know there are tons of variables here, but I am
Should be around 70ms RTT for London to NYC on an E1, so maybe a little
more or less for a T1.
Regards,
Neil.
--
Neil J. McRae - Alive and Kicking
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Pistone, Mike wrote:
I was curious if anybody would share what they consider to be average or
acceptable transatlantic ping response times over a T1.
I know there are tons of variables here, but I am looking for ballpark
figures.
Assume that utilization on the circuit
### On Mon, 25 Mar 2002 09:13:20 -0600, Pistone, Mike
### [EMAIL PROTECTED] casually decided to expound upon
### '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' [EMAIL PROTECTED] the following thoughts about
### Transatlantic response times.:
MP I was curious if anybody would share what they consider to be average or
MP
Mike:
Our web site at http://sla.cw.net/ provides you with real time RTT
measurements on our network. That should give you a good picture
of typical large network response times.
Regards
Peter Jansen
Global Peering
Cable Wireless
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 10:13 -0500 (EST)
From: Pistone,
On Mon, Mar 25, 2002 at 09:13:20AM -0600, Pistone, Mike wrote:
Is there any equation to estimate response times? For example, if your
circuit from A to Z has a 500ms avg response, than that equates to a circuit
distance of aprox. 5000 miles or something?
As I'm sure you remember from your
Jeremy,
We have been a T3 customer of PacBell for 3 years. We have had a few DOS
attacks over the years which required intervention by our backbone providers
which included PacBell.
In every case their policy was to not help. They refered us to their abuse
email address or phone number
At 02:30 AM 3/25/02 -0500, you wrote:
Speaking for extensive personal experience
as a former Verio employee (full disclosure, Doug :)
- Verio has a heck of a
backbone. And if you're in one of the cities they plan on continuing
to provide access in, then they'd be a viable option - If you know
Hello,
Could someone from sprint dsl group or netops please contact me offline.
This is in regards to sprint business class dsl and routing legacy IP
space.
Thanks,
Michael
More specifically I belive this is a Distributed Reflection DoS
like what hit GRC.COM back on Jan 11th... Basically a flood of SYN
packets to well known ports from IPs which appear to be spoofed. I've
actually been riding it out now for over 2 weeks...
The tech support is
Title: RE: PacBell Security/Abuse contact
Does anyone have an opinion on a decent ISP out there that's proven to work with the customer during a DDOS storm?
Rick Cheung
-Original Message-
From: Jeremy T. Bouse [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2002 2:46 PM
To:
UUnet, excellent responsive abuse team IMHO.
jm
On Monday, March 25, 2002, at 12:12 PM, Cheung, Rick wrote:
Does anyone have an opinion on a decent ISP out there that's
proven to work with the customer during a DDOS storm?
Rick Cheung
-Original Message-
From: Jeremy
Regarding securiy issues, I'd suggest working with
UUNet/Worldcom (or whatever AS701 is called lately).
I've seen some of their folks work closely with
aggrieved victims of DDOS attacks.
-David Barak
Quis custodes ipsos custodiet? - Juvenal
Rick Cheung wrote:
Does anyone have an
I agree.
-Original Message-
From: Jon Mansey [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2002 12:17 PM
To: Cheung, Rick
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: PacBell Security/Abuse contact
UUnet, excellent responsive abuse team IMHO.
jm
On Monday, March 25, 2002,
db == David Barak [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
db Regarding securiy issues, I'd suggest working with
db UUNet/Worldcom (or whatever AS701 is called lately).
db I've seen some of their folks work closely with
db aggrieved victims of DDOS attacks.
I was going to say the same thing, but I'm
How's Cogent looking these days? They, along with Yipes, were always trying
to get meetings with me.
-carl
Daniel
UUNet, by far is the best. I've had mixed results with Sprint. A couple
of years ago I had to deal with Hurricane Electric and the tech was really good about
it - he added in the ACL I needed right over the phone.
Also, I know of a couple providers in the upper midwest that are pretty
good
db == David Barak [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
db Regarding securiy issues, I'd suggest working with
db UUNet/Worldcom (or whatever AS701 is called lately).
db I've seen some of their folks work closely with
db aggrieved victims of DDOS attacks.
Historically, BBN/Genuity/GTE/Verizon/Genuity...
I realize this is not necessarily the most appropriate forum to search for a
used five(5) or ten(10) ton Liebert AC Unit but it may be the most
effective. I am looking for a used 5 and 10 ton unit for raised floor Data
Center - anyone know of any recently closed Data Centers looking to
Anyone out there ever witness an attack were you received several RSHPORT
attempts (5 per second) on a cisco router from different spoofed source
addresses. It was capable of taking out BGP and OSPF sessions on the router.
It was probably a large packet flood to random destination ports. Some of
them happened to hit rshell. What really took out your routing procs was
likely a huge packet flood, but due to volume you may not have been able to
access normal interface counters (i.e. MRTG doesn't get any SNMP packets
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Jon Mansey wrote:
UUnet, excellent responsive abuse team IMHO.
Too bad they don't seem to have a spam abuse department anymore. I've
been complaining about a continuing flood of spam from jumpjive.com
(another lying you-opted-in-to-receive-our-crap outfit) with nothing
The new 15540 is a much better box, not much more $ either. There are some
other people making extremely killer products, ONI being one that is very
popular. I wouldn't invest in a 15454 anymore with all the new products out
there, we still use them, but anything new will be a better box.
Title: RE: PacBell Security/Abuse contact
Pacbell's Abuse/Security Depts are totally useless with regard
to assisting its own customers, let alone defending them.
For the better portion of a few months now, I've
emailed/called many times with regard to CodeRed boxes (On
their netblocks)
One person I know that gets hit on his home box with CR and nimda...well, he
goes the extra mile and patches their stuff for them...and leaves a note on
the console. Doesn't SBC own PB now? Why not go through the SBC side
and see what you can shake loose?
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Joe Blanchard
Len Sassaman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Prior to Bernstein's discovery the row-reduction step in
factorization
could be made massively parallelizable, we believed that 1024 bit
keys
would remain unfactorable essentially forever. Now, 1024 bit RSA
keys look
to be factorable either presently,
On Mon, Mar 25, 2002 at 03:32:08PM -0800, Len Sassaman wrote:
What is most concerning to me is a few discoveries that were made while
looking into the problem of widespread use of 1024 bit keys:
Personally I'm not too concerned (yet). You're probably worse off due to
implementation flaws.
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Travis Pugh wrote:
Out of curiosity, was there any indication that Bernstein's
improvements might apply to the discrete log problem, DSA in general,
Bernstein's paper was geared toward RSA, but I believe he makes the claim
that discrete log based algorithms are
Since you are mentioning Verisign here, and CA authorities in general, has
anyone considered that factoring the CA authority's key is far simpler than
breaking the underlying key [no matter how large?]. Based on the
implementation, the CA's key cannot be changed often or easily. Key
revocations
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Deepak Jain wrote:
Since you are mentioning Verisign here, and CA authorities in general, has
anyone considered that factoring the CA authority's key is far simpler than
breaking the underlying key [no matter how large?]. Based on the
Well, that's not really the case.
Exactly. Why think $2B is some insurmountable barrier when there are far
cheaper ways of getting what you want. Most computer people think of
security only in terms of computers. Bribing a few night security guards is
far cheaper than even cryptanalysis and will give any sufficiently
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Deepak Jain wrote:
Exactly. Why think $2B is some insurmountable barrier when there are far
$2B isn't an insurmountable barrier. It is well within most intelligence
agencies' budgets, and that price will only get lower.
At present, if you have the sophistication to
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002 18:05:53 -0800 (PST)
Len Sassaman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A machine that costs $2 billion today, according to Moore's law, will
cost about $200,000 20 years from now. Not counting inflation. That will
be well within many people's budgets.
Hmm. Something very
uchicago.edu
At 03:05 PM 3/25/2002 -0600, you wrote:
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002 11:18:23 -0800
Daniel M. Spielman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I've had a similar experience with their tech team. I was
being dos'd from a college in Chicago so I contacted them to
Mind telling me what
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Daniel M. Spielman wrote:
uchicago.edu
At 03:05 PM 3/25/2002 -0600, you wrote:
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002 11:18:23 -0800
Daniel M. Spielman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I've had a similar experience with their tech team. I was
being dos'd from a college
According to a recent salary survey telephone companies have some
of the lowest paid information security professionals in comparison
with other technology corporations, federal government, or financial
companies. When the US Transportation Security Administration (aka,
the agency in charge of
Does NSA need compromising US-based CA's private keys ? Probably not, because they
either
(a) already have the private keys, obtained thru a combination of political, financial
and intelligence resources.
or
(b) already have proceedings with the CA's in order to issue valid look-a-like
On Mon, Mar 25, 2002 at 11:05:21PM -0500, Deepak Jain wrote:
That is a falicy. Moore's law is most certainly not accelerating -- in
fact:
1965-1990 Moore's law stated that the number of transistors per square
inch on integrated circuits (and therefore, the speed) doubles every 2
years.
On Mon, 25 Mar 2002, Richard A Steenbergen wrote:
On Mon, Mar 25, 2002 at 11:05:21PM -0500, Deepak Jain wrote:
That is a falicy. Moore's law is most certainly not accelerating -- in
fact:
1965-1990 Moore's law stated that the number of transistors per square
inch on integrated
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