> > preventing DDoS and IP source address forgery each also break what the
> > IAB calls "the end-to-end model".
>
> How so?
I was thinking of RFC 1958:
An end-to-end protocol design should not rely on the maintenance of
state (i.e. information about the state of the end-to-end
communi
Jeremy Kister wrote:
Hi Matthew,
I highly appreciate your time in replying to my emails. I further
appreciate you removing 64.115.0.0/16 from the sorbs duhl.
One of my partners in crime sent the first email (via web-form) to sorbs on
April 6th. On april 10th, I repeated. both were addressed from
The power at the Bellagio failed for about three days. The failure
involved about 1,000 feet of internal primary power cable. Although
the Bellagio had emergency and backup power, because it was an internal
cable, the backup generators couldn't supply power either. The Las Vegas
Sun has one of
Sean Donelan wrote:
On Sat, 10 Apr 2004, Scott Call wrote:
My point was that my $20 GE telephone cannot be made into a liability for
my telephone provider without my explicit participation, whereas a $20 a
month dialup (or $50 a month DSL, etc) customer can be a liability for me
just by being tur
John Curran wrote:
> incidents from almost every router vendor on the planet (and simply
> don't buy from the ones that fail to correct the problem).
Yep, that's the important one to me. Most of the time I don't really care
when a "brand" makes a stupid mistake, what I judge the company on is the
JD> Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:16:46 -0700
JD> From: JC Dill
JD> We need to stop whining that it's "hard" or "expensive" do to
JD> the right thing and close loopholes that are abused by
JD> spammers. It's much harder Aand more expensive long term to
JD> NOT do the right thing.
Leave it for futur
JA> Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2004 10:07:30 -0400
JA> From: Joe Abley
JA> There's a slight wrinkle with that for people who want to
JA> submit mail over SSL.
JA>
JA> Several graphical, consumer-grade mail clients let you select
JA> a port for "outgoing mail (SMTP)" and also have a checkbox
JA> for "use a
--On Thursday, April 15, 2004 2:10 AM -0500 "Stewart, William C (Bill),
RTSLS" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
or by using a blocking list that blocks the same users.
Unless you're using an AT&T nameserver it seems...
On Thu, 15 Apr 2004, Joe Maimon wrote:
> Speaking about whitelistingcomp.mail.sendmail google
> link...Reproduced below..
>
> http://groups.google.com/groups?q=sendmail+whitelist+dns&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&c2coff=1&selm=ac4e9990.0311250514.65c4e614%40posting.google.com&rnum=9
ok...you'v
Jeremy Kister wrote:
I became aware that just about all of 64.115.0.0/16
In this same email, I also stated:
1. exactly which 64.115 networks were dynamic
Ok now I have settled into another night of fixing things... I see no
mails from yourself in the ticketting system which indicate dynamic
r
Matthew Sullivan wrote:
You will note my post before Christmas about the up and coming
whitelisting mechanism - I am still collecting details for people
wanting to use it - unfortunately for a variety of reasons the
whitelisting mechanism is still not ready to go public.
Yours
Matthew
Sp
Jeff Kell wrote:
Jeremy Kister wrote:
[... giant snip ...]
We are a former user of SORBS. Our issue was not that of dynamic IPs,
but rather their spamtrap listings. A few weeks ago, at least two of
Comcast's legitimate mail servers was blacklisted. As Comcast has a
majority of the cable serv
In case you didn't know, SORBS admins do populate this list from time to
time, so I might be worth going through a few things...
Jeremy Kister wrote:
I became aware that just about all of 64.115.0.0/16, a network that I (among
others) run, has been listed as "dynamic ip space" in sorbs as of Apr
On 15-apr-04, at 2:45, Paul Vixie wrote:
preventing DDoS and IP source address forgery each also break what the
IAB calls "the end-to-end model".
How so?
(dunno if you heard, but in spite of 128 bits of
address space, the enterprise user community is now asking for IPv6
NAT.)
I hadn't, pointer p
As far as your own incoming mail is concerned,
you get the same results by either requiring almost every ISP in the world
to block outgoing SMTP from almost all of their users,
or by using a blocking list that blocks the same users.
The blocking list approach preserves the end-to-end behavior of
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