Glen Kent wrote:
Do ISPs (PTA, AboveNet, etc) that unintentionally hijack someone
else IP address space, ever get penalized in *any* form?
The net only functions as a single entity because sp's intentionally
DONT hijack space and the mutual trust in other sp's rational behavior.
Tony Li wrote:
On Dec 26, 2007, at 8:26 AM, Leo Bicknell wrote:
It's unlikely that it will matter. In practice, ICMP router discovery
died a long time ago, thanks to neglect. Host vendors didn't adopt it,
and it languished. The problem eventually got solved with HSRP and its
Scott Weeks wrote:
Disclaimer: I'm still very much an IPv6 wussie... :-)
-
But even in 2000 the policy was and still is:
/128 for really a single device
/64 if you know for sure that only one single subnet will
ever be allocated.
/48
Hex Star wrote:
On 10/23/07, Leo Bicknell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-10-23-verizon-fios-plan_N.htm
20 Mbps down, 20 Mbps up, fully symmetrical for $65.
That's pretty sweet, now all they have to do is start laying the fiber
over here...
And stop
Mark Andrews wrote:
Someone has succeeded in pulling the wool over the court's
eyes if it has been convinced that there is a technical
mechanism to do this. A ISP does not have access to enough
information to determine this. The same file can be both
What should I expect?
I am seeing ~350 from a vendor provided mpls cloud to a site in
Sukhrali Chowk, Gurgaon, Haryana, India
Thanks,
Joe
Justin M. Streiner wrote:
On Wed, 16 May 2007, Joe Maimon wrote:
What should I expect?
I am seeing ~350 from a vendor provided mpls cloud to a site in
Sukhrali Chowk, Gurgaon, Haryana, India
Where are you running your tests from? USA (east or west coast)?
Europe? Elsewhere in Asia
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
On Wed, 16 May 2007 09:20:48 -0400
Joe Maimon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What should I expect?
I am seeing ~350 from a vendor provided mpls cloud to a site in
Sukhrali Chowk, Gurgaon, Haryana, India
Thanks,
Joe
What does traceroute show?
traceroute shows me
Scott Weeks wrote:
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Lincoln Dale [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Joe Maimon' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The standard control plane arguments dont apply
when the pattern holds all the way through to
equipment under your {remote-}control.
:
: it most certainly does. lets
Jo Rhett wrote:
On May 6, 2007, at 6:07 PM, Joe Maimon wrote:
Of course, and thats why I have cut down ip mtu and tcp adjust mss
and all the rest.
Not making much of a difference.
Um.. sorry if you mean more than you said, but where did you cut down
the TCP MTU? If you did
Lincoln Dale wrote:
Lower than 1500 mtu always requires some kind of hack in real life.
That would be the adjust-mss which is the hack-of-choice
note that using 'adjust-mss' only adjusts the MSS for TCP.
it won't do much good for already-encapsulated IPSec traffic with protocol 47
or
Joe Maimon wrote:
This is obviously not best effort. Best guess would be managed
bandwidth differentiated by ip ranges and that the change was a
different pool assignment.
I suspect the stellar icmp echo performance is also intentional.
Or it could just be some QOS policing/shaping.
Adrian Chadd wrote:
On Mon, May 07, 2007, Joe Maimon wrote:
Joe Maimon wrote:
This is obviously not best effort. Best guess would be managed
bandwidth differentiated by ip ranges and that the change was a
different pool assignment.
I suspect the stellar icmp echo performance
I was wondering if someone could shed some light on this little curiosity.
US ping (sourced from different networks, including cable customer in
NE) to the consumer grade residental israel dsl cpe (currently cisco
871) look really nice and sweet, gotomypc works alright, consumer is
enjoying
Lincoln Dale wrote:
traceroute/tcptraceroute show packet loss and MUCH higher rtt than the
corresponding direct pings on the reported hop entries.
Is this some sort of massaging or plain just faking it? Or is such
things merely net-urban myth?
the vast majority of routers on the internet
I did include icmp echo directly to each hop as a comparison.
Right, but from what you posted you didn't send 1500-byte packets. My
reaction was the same as Lincoln's -- it smells like a Path MTU
problem. To repeat -- ping and traceroute RTT from intermediate nodes
is at best advisory,
Lincoln Dale wrote:
I did include icmp echo directly to each hop as a comparison.
i guess what i'm saying is that you can't read much from the backscatter of
what a either:
- ping of each hop
- eliciting a response from each hop (as traceroute does)
as the basis for determining much.
Simon Leinen wrote:
* Current Path MTU Discovery doesn't work reliably.
Please, let's wait for these more robust PMTUD mechanisms to be
universally deployed before trying to increase the Internet MTU.
I think this is the proper summary of where we are at: Trying to restore
one of
Joe Shen wrote:
error 691 is a ms chap extensions to ppp error code that means auth failed.
Its in response to the access-reject from the radius server most probably.
There really isnt any room here to do more.
client device. In my experience there are almost
no client devices that
Philip Lavine wrote:
I have 2 data transmission scenarios:
1. Microsoft MSMQ data using TCP
2. Streaming market data stock quotes transmitted via a TCP sockets
Philip
TCP stack tuning works very well for applications with large sized
network reads and writes.
Applications that will
Hey all,
I am looking for a product I have seen in the past but dont recall its
name or anyother information other than
- it was windows based
- it tracked which services were up on which ip address with rules/policies
- it performed DDNS updates based on tracking results.
With the
Rick Kunkel wrote:
Hello all,
Being relatively new to the colocation business, we run into a fair number
of issues that we've never run into before. Got a new one today, and
although I can think of kludgey ways to accomplish what he wants, I'd
rather get some other ideas first...
We
Bill Woodcock wrote:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070112/tc_afp/asiaquakeinternet_070112170621
A few numbers to help understand the scale of the effort being applied.
-Bill
But that was so long ago! Everything should be fixed already.
customers
Joe Abley wrote:
On 27-Dec-2006, at 18:22, Mark Newton wrote:
On Thu, Dec 28, 2006 at 12:13:07AM +0100, Leo Vegoda wrote:
My driving license doesn't have a photograph on it, so using it as an
identity document is pointless.
There's no way for a minimum-wage security grunt to verify
Marshall Eubanks wrote:
Here is a true story. Pardon me for being a little vague about details.
They should have retained his id. That would have helped.
Randy Epstein wrote:
throughout the US. In recent memory, I can think of two large collocation
centers that retain your ID. One is in Miami and one in New York (I don't
think I need to name names, most of you know to which I refer). All others
(including ATT) have never asked to retain
Does that equate to a take it or leave standpoint?
Suppose you dont need a key cause your client is already there?
Owen DeLong wrote:
Savvis wants to retain your ID if they issue a cage-key to you.
Owen
On Dec 27, 2006, at 8:52 AM, Joe Maimon wrote:
Randy Epstein wrote:
throughout
Edward Lewis wrote:
But, I always thought that the purpose of most security was psychological
reassurance anyway...
Reacting to this and the story of just walking through the backdoor to
get in -
I think there's an element of self-fulfilling prophecy here. If the
Classical NANOG
Patrick W. Gilmore wrote:
On Sep 25, 2006, at 9:06 AM, Ian Mason wrote:
ICMP packets will, by design, originate from the incoming interface
used by the packet that triggers the ICMP packet. Thus giving an
interface an address is implicitly giving that interface the ability
to source
Matthew Palmer wrote:
I've been directed to put all of the internal hosts and such into the public
DNS zone for a client. My typical policy is to have a subdomain of the zone
served internally, and leave only the publically-reachable hosts in the
public zone.
This sounds like you have
Danny McPherson wrote:
On Aug 17, 2006, at 10:57 PM, Joe Maimon wrote:
If A tries to peer with B, and B sends a BGP capability 64 to A, if A
does not support that capability what would proper and/or reasonable
behavior for A be?
Speaker A MAY send a NOTIFICATION message with Open
If A tries to peer with B, and B sends a BGP capability 64 to A, if A
does not support that capability what would proper and/or reasonable
behavior for A be?
(a published source for it, if you could possibly do so.)
a) send
unsupported capability code 64 lengh 6
## 2006-08-17 19:17:05 :
Matthew Sullivan wrote:
Mark Andrews wrote:
Actually there can be false positive. ISP's
who put address blocks into dialup blocks
which have the qualification that the ISP is
also supposed to only do it if they *don't*
allow email from the block but the ISP's
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
I just submitted an I-D on TCP-MD5 key change. Until it shows up in the
official repository, see
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/draft-bellovin-keyroll2385-00.txt
Here's the abstract:
The TCP-MD5 option is most commonly used to secure
Robert Bonomi wrote:
TTL-E messages _do_ have legitimate function in network management.
TTL-E messages _can_ originate from RFC1918 space, addressed to 'public
internet' addresses. Usefully, and meaningfully. Ever hear of 'traceroute'?
Ever use it where packets went across a network
Brian Johnson wrote:
In the Cisco world, I thought that the source would always be the interface
that replies to the ICMP packet. That seems to be good form to me.
Where am I going wrong?
You are correct, however it could be usefull in regards to the topic at
hand if this was
Robert Bonomi wrote:
Date: Tue, 23 May 2006 11:14:53 -0400
Translating those addresses is a *BAD*IDEA*(TM). That obscures who
the reporting machine was _if_ you have to actually communicate with that
network operator.
These are the options:
Construct the network so that icmp is
Joseph S D Yao wrote:
Folks are sounding as if they'd never 'traceroute'd THROUGH a set of
unroutable IP addresses. I have seen cases where my 'traceroute' looked
like this [when I've had the patience to not hit Interrupt at the first
sign of stars]:
1 1 ms 1 ms 1 ms router.here
2 10
Joe Shen wrote:
Can you indicate in more detail what the problems
were with the L4
switch?
We seperate our Radius servers into two farms, each
farm has a L4 switch in front. To our understanding,
radius authentication info. and accounting info. of a
PPPoE session should be processed by
Jim Popovitch wrote:
Matthew Black wrote:
I've been dealing with this too for 6 days now (2 of them while away on
vacation).
My sympathies.
Sure there are spam
problems, but to block requested email from reaching interested users
(some of them being AOL employees
Miquel van Smoorenburg wrote:
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Matt Ghali [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
.or do you think that TCP/IP connection
should be held open until the message can be scanned for spam and
viruses just so we can give a 550 MESSAGE REJECTED error instead of
silently dropping
Matthew Sullivan wrote:
Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
On 4/11/06, Matthew Black [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Are you suggesting that we configure our e-mail servers to notify
people upon automatic deletion of spam? Frequently, spam cannot be
properly identified until closure of the SMTP
Matthew Black wrote:
there's no bandwidth savings from silently dropping the message
versus providing a 550 rejection. In the best of all worlds,
it would be nice to give feedback. No system is perfect and a
false-positive rate of less than one in a million 220 accepted
messages seems
Matthew Black wrote:
On Mon, 10 Apr 2006 23:23:06 -0700 (PDT)
Matt Ghali [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, 11 Apr 2006, Simon Lyall wrote:
Everyone here runs spam filters. Many times a day you tell a remote MTA
you've accepted their email but you delete it instead. Explain the
4271 specifies that bgp identifier must be a valid unicast ip address
So what is the larget 32 bit value expressed as a dotted quad that meets
this requirement?
Is it the last address in class c? class e? Can 255.x.x.x be used?
Do all vendors implement this?
I understand that
Mark Smith wrote:
On Tue, 28 Mar 2006 16:37:48 -0500
Did it happen to be RIPv1 ? Only RIPv2 supports route tags.
Of course it was rip2
Rip1 is dead. Anyone using it should be shot.
Mark Smith wrote:
One better
solution is to take advantage of route tags or labels. When a route is
redistributed you tag it, and then when mutual redistribution occurs in
the other direction, you exclude routes that have that tag. You'd need
to do this in both redistribution directions,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Although you asked for DNS servers - it helps to remember that no matter
what the servers and resolvers do - IE will bring that behaviour to
naught in many cases
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=KB;en-us;263558
*/Thurman, Steven [EMAIL PROTECTED]/*
Joe Shen wrote:
Hi,
We are facing problem with PPPoE in ethernet access
network.
To provide high speed access, 10Mbps/100Mbps ethernet
is used as access method. But, we found some guy
'steal' some other's account by listening to
broadcasting packets, and they also set up 'phishing'
PPPoE
Dave Pooser wrote:
Which probably means Paul is blocking whatever server Verizon is using
for its
sender verification
Something I've seen before is a lot of mail servers will wait 10-45 seconds
before presenting an SMTP prompt to remote hosts; spambots typically won't
wait that long
Since the list seems to be accepting topics relating to ipv6 and PI
multihoming AGAIN, I thought I would chime in again with my pet idea.
Hierarchical routing. It worked for name resolution. It would work for
todays routing table, which is the routing equivalent to the host file
of old.
With 802.1w how normal is it for an environment with 8 switches ~300
ports with to exhibit 1-3 seconds of packet losss/latency/jitter
everytime any port transitions to STP forwarding and causes topology
change notices to ripple through the entire stp domain?
The ports causing this are connected
Is it really cluefull to have this paragraph?
Please make sure that your spam filters allow email from pch.net
before you sign up, since we will need to automatically verify your
email address.
Since we all know that whitelisting and blacklisting by in-band stated
from email address is
Rubens Kuhl Jr. wrote:
pch.net publishes a SPF record:
v=spf1 ip4:204.61.210.70/32 mx mx:woodynet.net a:sprockets.gibbard.org
a:ghosthacked.net ~all
Besides going from soft-fail (~all) to fail (-all), they are already
giving you the tools you need to validate a MAIL FROM: claim.
Rubens
Dennis Dayman wrote:
In 2004, Department of Homeland Security officials became fearful that
terrorists might start using accidental dig-ups as a road map for deliberate
attacks, and convinced the FCC to begin locking up previously public data on
outages. In a commission filing, DHS argued
Chris Woodfield wrote:
One thing to note here is that while VoIP flows are low volume on a
bits-per-second basis, they push substantially more packets per kilobit
than other traffic types - as much as 50pps per 82Kbps flow. And I have
seen cases of older line cards approaching their
Jay Hennigan wrote:
VoIP by design will have high PPS per connection as opposed to data flows.
At 20 ms sample rates you have 50 pps regardless of the CODEC or algorithm.
Increasing the time per sample to 40 ms would cut this in half but the
added
latency would result in degraded
Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
On Sun, 18 Dec 2005, Joe Maimon wrote:
Something about intelligent edges? The payload length of voip
applications often has a lot to do with rtt. Adapting payload length
to the actuall average rtt could have a positive effect on pps
throughput.
What is your
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, Dec 14, 2005 at 04:59:44AM -0500, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
Since the model is based around cash, there is no perception
except you pay, you get priority.
Someone has to pay for the Internet. The users aren't.
hum... then what am i getting for
Joe Abley wrote:
You also want to check all the registries which are superordinate to
zones your server is authoritative for, and check that any IP addresses
stored in those registries for your nameserver are updated, otherwise
you will experience either immediate or future glue
Douglas Otis wrote:
On Dec 9, 2005, at 10:15 AM, Todd Vierling wrote:
1. Virus warnings to forged addresses are UBE, by definition.
This definition would be making at least two of the following assumptions:
1) Malware detection has a 0% false positive.
Near enough so that
Sam Crooks wrote:
One of those pesky legal notice on all my outgoing email gets filtered
by Randy's mail ... (the outgoing addition is not under my control)
maybe someone could tell him for me (as I can't email him...)
you have sent a message to me which seems to contain a legal
Randy Bush wrote:
so a few of us are still looking at routing through the anycast
sunglasses. a particular probe is seeing instability [0] for
k.root-servers.net [1]. so we hop on to a router nearby, and
o this obscures their path to k1
o and, as they obey k0's NO_EXPORT, they can
Owen DeLong wrote:
Frankly, I think we need to show the Senate and the House a movie titled
The Siege and ask them if they really want to keep moving in this
direction.
Owen
TH
The real secret is that hollywood designs these films expressly as
desensitizers, in cahoots with
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, 24 Oct 2005 12:53:12 CDT, John Dupuy said:
In fact, this is technically feasible right now with IPv4. Does anyone know
of a pair of ISPs doing this?
technically feasible and business case reasonable are two different things.
Under what conditions does
(apologies to Owen for CC'ng list, his points are valid concerns that I
hadnt addressed or considered properly)
Owen DeLong wrote:
c) Carry a much larger table on a vastly more expensive set of routers
in order to play.
ISPs who dont wish to connect these customers should feel
This is what I meant by suggesting that source routing was an original
attempt at a seperation from routing/locating and endpoint identifiers.
You can replace the concept of source routing in below with mpls TE,
l2tpv3 or any other suitable encapsulation mechanism.
The concept is that
Owen DeLong wrote:
A customer with a prefix assigned from this chunk has to connect with an
ISP who has
* a Very Large Multihoming (to handle scaling concerns) router somewhere
in its network that peers to other ISP Very Large Multihoming routers.
ISP operating a VLMrouter to offer
Tony Li wrote:
It's just a mess. I think that we all can agree that a real locator/
identifier split is the correct architectural direction, but that's
simply not politically tractable. If the real message that the
provider community is trying to send is that they want this, and not
Tony Li wrote:
How is a split between locator / identifier any different logicaly
from the existing ipv4 source routing?
IPv4 source routing, as it exists today, is an extremely limited
mechanism for specifying waypoints along the path to the destination.
IOW the end stations were
Mike Leber wrote:
On Sun, 16 Oct 2005, Joe Maimon wrote:
For example, if your goal was to have TCP-like sessions between
identifiers survive network events without globally propagating full
network topology information about your site (the gripe against classic
IPv4 BGP) you could have
How about something like this.
A chunk of ipv6 space is carved off. This is assigned to multihoming
desiring sites.
All routers {can | should } filter this space from their tables
completely by default - except the single prefix covering the entire space.
A customer with a prefix
Jay Adelson wrote:
On Fri, Oct 07, 2005 at 01:29:06AM -0400, Patrick W. Gilmore wrote:
You also forgot that Providers A B have to pay cab fare to get to
those geographically dispersed corners. One might have to take the
cab a lot longer than the other, incurring more time money.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes, this is quite clearly the case; there are dozens of mutual customers
who have forwarding rules setup. We are not generating Spam to send to
Bellsouth; it's coming from somewhere else and then being forwarded.
I imagine that at some time in the future,
If the hop(s) following the one you see loss for shows no loss, then
disregard the loss for that hop, obviously whatever it is, it does not
affect transit, which is what you really want to know.
Is that correct?
Network Fortius wrote:
And how exactly would you interpret the number
Elvis DePaula wrote:
Anyone in the list has a good update on the IETF:draftietf-
idr-as4bytes-10.txt ?
Is the projection os AS Number exhaustion of 2011-2013 exaggerated or do
we really have a potential big problem with a slow solution ahead of us?
-Elvis.
Are you asking this after
Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
On Mon, 15 Aug 2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
NetBIOS was never meant to be a WAN protocol, so no problem
in blocking it.
rule #1: do not be the Internet's Firewall
rule #2: see rule #1
Surely we realize that this discussion is not concerning the oft
quotes from wired interview with Mike Lynn
WN: So this new version of the operating system that they're coming out
with, that's in beta testing.
Lynn: It's actually a better architecture ... but it will be less
secure That's why I felt it was important to make the point now
rather
Rob
Can a cisco 1600 run PPPoE?
I've never tried it, but if they can run 12.2, they should do PPPoE.
R
Only suitable one is the 1605R (because you would never dial on the same
ethernet that your lan is on right?)
20mb flash card and 16mb SIMM you have around and your up and running
David Andersen wrote:
On Jul 5, 2005, at 11:28 PM, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
snip
It's much easier to
configure your backup MXen to not toss messages or send warning emails
after 4h than it is to politely ask all sending SMTP servers to do the
same.
-Dave
Apparently this has
Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
On Fri, 1 Jul 2005, Mohacsi Janos wrote:
This keeps coming up in each discussion about v6, 'what security measures'
is never really defined in any real sense. As near as I can tell it's
level of 'security' is no better (and probably worse at the outset, for
the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Similar concept, same scaling problems; it just hides the explicit
routing
from the user (as would any modern peering system, presumably).
snip
One way that it COULD be implemented is for people accepting
incoming email on port 25 to check a whitelist before
Todd Vierling wrote:
On Thu, 16 Jun 2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The proponents of email peering typically want to switch from the
current model (millions of independant email servers) to a different
model, with only a few big actors.
I don't know who these proponents are, that you
Pete Templin wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This is new to me, but I haven't bought any new transit in the past 18
months -- is
this common practice on multihomed BGP customers now? I could force
things to work
by always advertising all my prefixes out to them with the obvious
downside
Joe Abley wrote:
On 2005-06-03, at 10:26, Andre Oppermann wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I guess it's been a while since I've played with it, but isn't this
pretty
well what happens with uRPF anyhow?
No, my proposal works as long as the customer advertizes their prefixes
via
Is there still justification for denying transit for ms-sql slammer ports?
Thanks,
Joe
Joe Maimon wrote:
Is there still justification for denying transit for ms-sql slammer ports?
Thanks,
Joe
Thanks all for your responses. To me it appears that
a) If you block 135/445 you should block slammer as well
b) If the number of potential infected hosts connected to your network
can
Matt Bazan wrote:
why in the world would anyone want to purchase dsl from a private
reseller when i can get 4mb down 384 up from comcast for $25? think you
dsl resellers out there are doomed. in fact, just a matter of time
before most of you isps are down the toilet. im reminded of the mom and
Joel Jaeggli wrote:
On Wed, 4 May 2005, Luke Parrish wrote:
Andrew, traceroute is an effective tool is measuring roundtrip in ms
format.
packets sent to a router are typically processed differently and with
different priority then packets forwarded through it. This makes
traceroute fairly
Steven Champeon wrote:
on Sun, May 01, 2005 at 10:40:21PM -0400, Joe Maimon wrote:
What does the rest of the internet gain when all IPs have boilerplate
reverse DNS setup for them, especialy with all these wildly differing
and wacky naming conventions?
I don't care what the rest
Dean Anderson wrote:
And if they aren't found by open-relay
blacklists, they aren't abused and there are no problems whatsoever.
How much credibility are you trying to lose?
Nicholas Suan wrote:
Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
On 4/30/05, Steven Champeon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
ANantes-106-1-5-107.w193-251.abo.wanadoo.fr
You'll see 'abo' for 'cable', perhaps? as well as 'cable'. But for most
abo = short for abonnement, that is, subscription / subscriber
Just means
Yes it is kindof amazing how well it works..
Unlike others on this list I have never claimed to have any credibility.
I am just a small time op.
Dean Anderson wrote:
Using SORBS? just how much credibility do you want to lose?
-- Forwarded message --
Date: Sun, 1 May 2005
Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
On 4/27/05, Joel Jaeggli [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In any event the malware is already ahead of port 25 blocking and is
leveraging ISP smarthosting. SMTP-Auth is the pill to ease this pain/
Really smtp-auth will solve it? or do most windows mua's cache your
password?
Florian Weimer wrote:
* Joe Maimon:
How do spammers make step 5 succeed?
They delegate www.example.com instead of example.com?
I suspect I am some distance over the cliff here but nevertheless, onward.
I dont get it. That has nothing to do with the registrar, or dodging
forced deactivation
Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
On Sat, 26 Mar 2005 17:52:56 -0500 (EST), Sean Donelan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
snip
Thank $DEITY for large ISPs running open resolvers on fat pipes ..
those do come in quite handy in a resolv.conf sometimes, when I run
into this sort of behavior.
--srs
Slightly OT
vijay gill wrote:
On Tue, Mar 22, 2005 at 03:13:07PM -0800, Randy Bush wrote:
y'all might give us something pingable in that space so we can
do a primitive and incomplete test in a simple fashion.
randy
try 172.128.1.1
/vijay
Wouldnt 172.15.255.254 and 172.32.0.1 do better at helping to nail
Jon Lewis wrote:
On Thu, 24 Mar 2005, Randy Bush wrote:
snip
[1] at least not until cisco adds a feature allowing you to ignore new BGP
routes for subnets of a bogon feed.
Last I understood from c-nsp this was a feature without much interest.
Is such a feature expected to arrive anytime soon?
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sun, Mar 27, 2005 at 11:36:26AM -0500, Joe Maimon wrote:
snip
er... common best practice for YOU... perhaps.
dnsreport.com is apparently someone who agrees w/ you.
and i know why some COMMERCIAL operators want to squeeze
every last lira from
Josh Vince wrote:
Here's what APC has to say about it:
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