Steve wrote:
water - 8 of it
Scary stuff - was that at Murray Hill?
My department at Holmdel inherited a computer lab with various Vaxen,
and more obvious problem under the raised floor was too much
cable to get all the tiles to stay down. The less obvious problems
had to do with unbalanced
On or about July 1 2004, Erik allegedly at myevilempire.net Amundson
allegedly asked about peering point bandwidth.
Some North American ISPs will tell you that under non-disclosure,
but almost all of them will point you to their standards for peering,
and you won't find many Tier 1 ISPs that
Daniel Golding suggested that the problem was that many folks are sharing Akamai's
magic DNS algorithms.
This doesn't appear to be a problem with magic algorithms - it appears that they're
sharing the _servers_,
and that the reported attack on the servers means that it doesn't matter how magic
Eric Brunner-Williams is slightly incorrect in his description
of the blog-spammer's attack, because he's misinterpreting whois.
He states that based on the spammer's entry in the whois entry,
the spammer claims domicile in whatever location.
Whois records don't make any claims about domicile,
As far as your own incoming mail is concerned,
you get the same results by either requiring almost every ISP in the world
to block outgoing SMTP from almost all of their users,
or by using a blocking list that blocks the same users.
The blocking list approach preserves the end-to-end behavior of
Not a new problem.
I got my first Nigerian Scam Deaf Relay Call last May, on my cell phone.
I had to listen to them for a minute or two to make sure it wasn't
one of my European customers having a network problem,
but it was somebody who said they wanted to discuss a business opportunity -
on
ping did _this_
Ping is not very informative or accurate.
If you run a traceroute, which is also not very accurate,
you can get some idea about where the delay appears to be.
Is it the DSL segment? Is it somewhere else that traceroute can show you?
The nice thing about delays that are this
The patent doesn't claim to apply to domains - it claims to apply to URLs of the form
name.subdomain.domain. The mere fact that this isn't correct syntax for URLs didn't
prevent them from getting the patent, but it should make enforcing it on people who
are using *domain names* of that form
I can see a couple of obvious approaches for getting Neulevel's attention
- Their web site lists two Registry Relationship Managers, one with popup contact info
Ivor Sequeira - Senior Manager, European, African, and Middle Eastern Regions
571-434-5776 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Chuck Goolsbee wrote that one of his clients was having problems
because miscreants have hijacked IP space that they own but
haven't actively used in a while.
While it's definitely worth submitting it to completewhois
and developing whatever paper trail it takes to give it back
to the registrars
Subtopics: Redundancy, Hunters.
On Sun, Nov 02, 2003 at 09:37:30PM -0500, Robert M. Enger wrote:
You'd think after three previous disruptions, that Qwest would
have enabled some form of redundancy.
If a single fiber cut takes them out, it's not _just_ Qwest's fault.
A service like 911
Brian Bruns asserts that there are lots of home users
connecting to their office Exchange servers without VPNs,
and that therefore blocking the Microsoft ports was bad.
While I agree with his point that you shouldn't do it
without documenting what you are or are not blocking,
I'm really surprised
Most ISPs don't provide users with a heavy-duty client that
replaces or patches lots of the operating system's functions,
though may will offer friendly customized browsers for
users who want them, and a few misguided carriers will
provide drivers for PPPoE or other evil excuses for protocols
I have to agree with Scott. Be professional.
Y'all can use tomato.net as examples if you want
(though actually that one belongs to buydomains.com,
which buys potentially resellable domain names.)
A more important concern is that they keep mentioning that they've
been talking to web users and
Pete Templin wrote:
Very rusty memory cells on this, but I think the mileage is
0.1 * sqrt ((delta-V)^2 + (delta-H)^2)).
That's assuming same LATA, IIRC.
Close. It's
sqrt ( 0.1 * ((delta-V)^2 + (delta-H)^2)) )
and it doesn't care about LATAs.
It's mostly accurate in the US middle
From: Claudio Gutiérrez [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
I think http://datec.web.att.com/faqs/telecom.htm is an internal ATT webserver
Arrgh..You're correct, and I should have noticed.
It's the 1996 FAQ for Telecom Digest,
Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
TELECOM Digest - Frequently Asked
Some cable user's machine running default-configured MS apps
is sending Paul dynamic DNS queries that it shouldn't,
because somehow it's decided he's got an interesting destination
(I'm guessing f.root-servers.net ?)
Paul wants the user to get an error popup about it.
Well, default-configured
Distributing an RBL list is the easy part. There are a
variety of methods in place that can provide sufficient
reliability and are sufficiently anonymous or difficult to attack,
such as Usenet and Freenet and Gnutella and probably Kazaa,
and it's not too hard to develop efficient data formats
Avleen Vig suggests that it's very wrong for Verisign's bad-domain catcher to
begin to accept SMTP messages and just reject all recipients with 550s
rather than rejecting the whole transaction with a 554.
I'm glad I'm not the only one who thinks that -
is there some conceivable case for which this
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
The right answer for the original question is probably
Buy an email server package with virus scanning hooks or
Get a virus scanner with sendmail milter hooks
rather than specific details of how to set it...
The suggestion to do virus filtering
According to http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?date=2003-08-11 ,
the worm uses the latest popular MS exploit ports, so
* Close port 135/tcp (and if possible 135-139, 445 and 593) .
It also uses TCP port and TFTP = UDP 69 to download its
attack code after getting the initial bootstrap
I'd say keep it.
NANOG's archives at Merit are probably more stable than
many mailing list archives I've seen, but it's possible that
something will happen to it in the next 5-10 years that kills it.
Multiple copies of list archives aren't a bad thing,
at least for relatively low volume lists
I tend to think of T1 and E1 connections as small
(STM1s are starting to be big :-).
It's easy enough to test them if there's something fast enough to test to.
The two kinds of tests your customers are likely to care about are
- Is your connection to them really the speed it should be?
- Do you
As Vadim said, it's about display of power.
However, I'm not worried about terrorists attacking infrastructure
under the cover of Presidential No-Fly Zones;
I'm more worried about backhoe drivers named Bubba
who didn't call the Call Before You Dig number
and weren't noticed by cable route
RFC1918 is a wonderful document. It probably added 10-15 years
to the lifespan of the IPv4 address space, made IP addressing
much simpler for internal applications, and it's prevented
a large number of problems like people randomly making up addresses
for boxes they know that they'll never need
Jim wrote:
One router and it takes there entire network off-line...
Maybe someone needs a Intro to Networks 101 class.
I assume things are designed in such a way that if the router were
actually dead, the traffic would take an alternate route.
But the posting commented that they'd been saying
Yes, it appears they had problems:
Power failure leads to BTo blackout
By Tim Richardson
Posted: 17/06/2003 at 11:46 GMT
http://theregister.com/content/22/31248.html
It would be really bad form to use BGP to advertise a
specific route to their hosts and DNS server,
and if you're not a Tier 1 provider your advertisements
would probably be blocked anyway.
While using the main Bogon list isn't really appropriate either,
it's a problem that's becoming
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