issue is when you start believing that you are as safe as the sheep
think you are.
Rubens
- Original Message -
From: Peter Galbavy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: E.B. Dreger [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 1:16 PM
Subject: Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think London is rather more paranoid. I work in London and just on
Monday
I was stopped by police at Tower Hill tube station and searched for
explosive paraphernalia as part of their programme of random searches.
When
I told people about this in the office,
Gil Levi wrote:
While it is impossible to stop someone (a terrorist) from cutting
fiber, it is possible to limit his ability to do damage. It is
possible to create alternative routes to be used in such cases. Then
while the primary route may be down, the alternate route will be used
and no
I stand corrected, last I saw any information on the bunker was well over a year ago.
My opinion is that business continuity/disaster recovery customers can save money by
using two separate commercial grade facilities in widely spaced cities (for example,
London UK and Frankfurt DE), rather
PG Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2003 17:30:27 +0100
PG From: Peter Galbavy
PG Protecting the switching centres (IP or voice) looks great,
PG but walk a few hundred feet and all senblence of physical
But those biometric handscanners are so cool! They look like
something from a movie! High tech!
Perhaps
E.B. Dreger wrote:
Perhaps some security measures have a different purpose -- as
you say, LOOKS great (emphasis added).
Just like 99% of all recent airport security measures... reassure the sheep,
then they might stop bleating and march to order instead. Baauy
McDonalds, Bauy Gas,
Are we going to throw a burlap sack over 60 Hudson, the Westin Building,
One Wilshire,
or similar buildings and disavow knowledge of their existence? You can't
hide major infrastructure.
Yes.
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is
harder for terrorists to
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is
harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they
have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased
probability that something will go wrong (as on
In a message written on Tue, Jul 08, 2003 at 11:29:23AM -0400, Adam Kujawski wrote:
Who, besides Sean, has maps like this? The state PUC? If so, is that
information available to the public? Do you have to go thorugh a background
check and/or sign an NDA? Or is it only the providers themselves
On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Jack Bates wrote:
:
: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
: However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is
: harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they
: have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it
is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack.
If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an
increased probability that something will go wrong (as on
On Wed, Jul 09, 2003 at 05:30:27PM +0100, Peter Galbavy wrote:
I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and
rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another
location in minutes. ...
Perhaps it's time for IDS on manholes?
But really, since the
Maybe you guys in the US
are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single
points
of major failure for telecoms.
I think London is rather more paranoid. I work in London and just on
Monday
I was stopped by police at Tower Hill tube station and searched for
explosive
I can tell you that FREQUENTLY the maps dont match the reality of utility placement.
Especially w.r.t. fiber paths. VERY few cable maps that are availaible accurately
reflect splice points or interconnects between mutiple cables entering a vault.
Without access to the specific GPS points
Thus spake [EMAIL PROTECTED]
In the USA in the past year I've travelled through half a dozen airports
and the most intense searching scrutiny was when leaving the smallest
ones, Eugene OR and Memphis TN.
I've been to an airport (MLU) where the TSA employees even outnumbered the
passengers by
I recall reading, last year, about a Cyber Bunker outside London UK which is being
offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving praise about it. This facility
is an ex-RAF centralized radar control site, buried dozens of feet underground w/
thick concrete and designed to withstand
http://www.thebunker.net/
-Original Message-
From: Eric Kuhnke [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 3:48 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
I recall reading, last year, about a Cyber Bunker outside London UK which is being
i think that that is the point of the article - mr gorman is 'the one' ;)
he mapped something that those who put it together hoped was unmappable.
now it seems that they are blaming their incompetance on his skills.
could his work be used to better our 'critical' infrastructure? sure.
could
On Tue, Jul 08, 2003 at 11:29:23AM -0400, Adam Kujawski wrote:
NANOG's Sean Gorman is in the news:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23689-2003Jul7.html
I would find GIS like the one described *very* usefull in finding transport
providers. If I could see who has what
On Tue, 8 Jul 2003, Adam Kujawski wrote:
Who, besides Sean, has maps like this? The state PUC? If
so, is that information available to the public? Do you
have to go thorugh a background check and/or sign an
NDA? Or is it only the providers themselves that have
the maps for this stuff?
It
Barn door, horse is already gone.
I'm willing to stipulate that Sean may be a GIS wizard, and has compiled a very
accurate listing of north american fiber routes. However, this is nothing new...
US Transatlantic cable landings (mirrored from John Young's cryptome.org):
On Tue, 8 Jul 2003, Joshua Sahala wrote:
i think that that is the point of the article - mr gorman is 'the one' ;)
he mapped something that those who put it together hoped was unmappable.
now it seems that they are blaming their incompetance on his skills.
could his work be used to better
Security by obscurity is not viable for the long-term.
Amen. This whole industry is littered with NDAs and such which only keep
honest people honest. There is _nothing_ stopping a malicious individual (or
group of acting collaboratively but independently) from getting hired to a
Joel Jaeggli wrote:
The part that's striking to me, is that as usual, the folks in the
industry don't know when their facilities are co-mingled, in part becuase
that information simply isn't readily and easily available unless
someone's willing to go out collect the small little bits and connect
Quoting Joel Jaeggli [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
The part that's striking to me, is that as usual, the folks in the
industry don't know when their facilities are co-mingled, in part becuase
that information simply isn't readily and easily available unless
someone's willing to go out collect the small
Adam Kujawski [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[cut]
Exactly. I think we all agree that this kind of information would be
usefull for a variety of reasons (locating available resources,
ensuring path redundancy, identifying critical points of failure,
etc). I think we all agree that this
JS Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2003 18:14:59 -0400
JS From: Joshua Sahala
JS better yet, make it widely available and subject to a lot of scrutiny
JS and work to fix the problems (think openbsd - one remote compromise
JS in how many years...)
Turn off daemons. Hope the IP stack doesn't offer a
At 5:57 PM -0400 7/8/03, Adam Kujawski wrote:
I like the idea of a clearinghouse where one can access the data
after a background check and a NDA.
Except for the fact that it expensive and time consuming to do
background checks. The FBI is still chewing through a backlog of
thousands of
28 matches
Mail list logo
