Revised MD5 proliferation statistics

Last week I sent out some numbers on MD5 proliferation among Packet Clearing House's peers, did some speculation about what this meant for the rest of the Net, and asked for numbers from other sources. At PCH, we had 12% of sessions configured as MD5. We had been responding to requests from peer

Re: MD5 proliferation statistics

On Thu, 6 May 2004 17:52:16 -0400 "Patrick W.Gilmore" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Unfortunately, my organization was not passive until we got to see what > the threat actually was, so our numbers are not useful. Would any > traffic-carrying-organization care to discuss their numbers?

Re: MD5 proliferation statistics

We requested md5 by emailing all our peers several weeks ago, responses have been steady. We have 49% of peering sessions MD5 (thats 43% counted by ASN) In general small ISPs and customers have been poor to respond with large ISPs and those operating ticket systems on their peering contact em

Re: MD5 proliferation statistics

On May 6, 2004, at 2:42 PM, Arnold Nipper wrote: On 06.05.2004 20:03 Steve Gibbard wrote: I'm curious as to what sorts of response rates those who have been actively contacting peers to ask for MD5 configuration have been getting, as well as whether other networks that have not been being proactiv

Re: MD5 proliferation statistics

On 06.05.2004 20:03 Steve Gibbard wrote: > I'm curious as to what sorts of response rates those who have been > actively contacting peers to ask for MD5 configuration have been getting, > as well as whether other networks that have not been being proactive about > this have been seeing contact ra

MD5 proliferation statistics

Packet Clearing House has routers at a several exchange points, which we use to collect local snapshots of the routes available at the exchanges. To do this, we peer with as many of the participants at each exchange as possible. We're mainly just collecting data, so route flaps aren't a huge prob