Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Randy Bush
[ http://archive.psg.com/110904.broadside.html ] Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics a broadside A recent NANOG presentation and SIGCOMM paper by Gill, Schapira, and Goldberg[1] drew a lot of 'discussion' from the floor. But that

Re: iCloud - Is it going to hurt access providers?

2011-09-04 Thread Florian Weimer
* Wayne E. Bouchard: the users will screw themselves by flooding their uplinks in which case they will know what they've done to themselves and will largely accept the problems for the durration With shared media networks (or insufficient backhaul capacities), congestion affects more than

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Dobbins, Roland
On Sep 4, 2011, at 5:02 PM, Randy Bush wrote: Will the benefits of security - no more YouTube incidents, etc. - be perceived as worth having one's routing at the whim of an non-operational administrative monopoly? Given recent events in SSL CA-land, how certain are we that the putative

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Neil J. McRae
Well said Randy - the previous paper is flawed and if the findings where true you would wonder how anyone ever created a viable online business. Neil Sent from my iPhone On 4 Sep 2011, at 11:03, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: [ http://archive.psg.com/110904.broadside.html ] Do Not

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Randy Bush
the previous paper is flawed and if the findings where true you would wonder how anyone ever created a viable online business. to me honest, what set me off was http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/csric3/wg-descriptions_v1 describing, among others, a routing working group of an fcc

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Randy Bush
the previous paper is flawed and if the findings where true you would wonder how anyone ever created a viable online business. to me honest, what set me off was http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/csric3/wg-descriptions_v1 describing, among others, a routing working group of an

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Patrick W. Gilmore
Mostly excellent thoughts, well documented. I have a question about this statement though: in fact, a number of global Tier-1 providers have preferred peers for decades I assume you mean for a very limited subset of their customers? I've checked routing on well over half the transit free

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread deleskie
I have worked for more then one transit free network, and have work with people from (most) of the rest, we always prefer cust over peer, every time. -jim Sent from my BlackBerry device on the Rogers Wireless Network -Original Message- From: Patrick W. Gilmore patr...@ianai.net Date:

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Randy Bush
I have worked for more then one transit free network, and have work with people from (most) of the rest, we always prefer cust over peer, every time. again, more than one of the world's largest providers prefer peers. and even if they wanted to change, it would be horribly anti-pola to the

RE: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Leigh Porter
-Original Message- From: Randy Bush [mailto:ra...@psg.com] Sent: 04 September 2011 15:01 To: deles...@gmail.com Cc: North American Network Operators' Group Subject: Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics I have worked for more then one transit free

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Patrick W. Gilmore
On Sep 4, 2011, at 9:59 AM, Randy Bush wrote: I have worked for more then one transit free network, and have work with people from (most) of the rest, we always prefer cust over peer, every time. again, more than one of the world's largest providers prefer peers. and even if they wanted

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread jim deleskie
While I can think of some corner cases for this, ie you have a satellite down link from one provider and fiber to anther. I expect this is not the norm for most networks/customers. -jim On Sun, Sep 4, 2011 at 10:59 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: I have worked for more then one transit

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Jennifer Rexford
to me honest, what set me off was http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/csric3/wg-descriptions_v1 describing, among others, a routing working group of an fcc communications security, reliability and interoperability council i.e. these folk plan to write policy and procedures for

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Neil J. McRae
Jen, What operators are involved? And who represents them specifically? Neil. On 04/09/2011 16:07, Jennifer Rexford j...@cs.princeton.edu wrote: As one of the co-chairs of this working group, I'd like to chime in to clarify the purpose of this group. Our goal is to assemble a group of vendors

Re: Tampa small colo recs?

2011-09-04 Thread James P. Ashton
Jay, I recommend E Solutions, But I am biased (I build the network). But also in town we have, Switch and Data Qwest Peak 10 Sago Networks Hostway I know them all pretty well, so if you have any questions, fire away. James - Original Message - Anyone got any opinions on

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Neil J. McRae
maybe volunteers from the nanog community should contact you? On 4 Sep 2011, at 16:45, Jennifer Rexford j...@cs.princeton.edu wrote: Neil, The group is being assembled right now, so we don't have a list as of yet. -- Jen Sent from my iPhone On Sep 4, 2011, at 11:32 AM, Neil J.

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Randy Bush
As one of the co-chairs of this working group, I'd like to chime in to clarify the purpose of this group. Our goal is to assemble a group of vendors and operators (not publish or perish academics) to discuss and recommend effective strategies for incremental deployment of security solutions

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Randy Bush
While I can think of some corner cases for this, ie you have a satellite down link from one provider and fiber to anther. I expect this is not the norm for most networks/customers. what is it you do not understand about more than one of the world's largest providers? not in corner cases, but

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Anton Kapela
+1 -Tk On Sep 4, 2011, at 12:23 PM, Neil J. McRae n...@domino.org wrote: maybe volunteers from the nanog community should contact you? On 4 Sep 2011, at 16:45, Jennifer Rexford j...@cs.princeton.edu wrote: Neil, The group is being assembled right now, so we don't have a list as of yet.

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Jennifer Rexford
Neil, maybe volunteers from the nanog community should contact you? Thanks for the suggestion! Yes, I would encourage interested people to contact me. We won't be able to put everyone on the working group (in the interest of having a small enough group to make progress), but we are very

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread jim deleskie
Because routing to peers as a policy instead of customer as a matter of policy, outside of corner cases make logical sence. While many providers aren;t good at making money it is fact the purpose of the ventures. If I route to a customer I get paid for it. If I send it to a peer I do not. On

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Randy Bush
Because routing to peers as a policy instead of customer as a matter of policy, outside of corner cases make logical sence. welcome to the internet, it does not always make logical sense at first glance. the myth in academia that customers are always preferred over peers comes from about '96

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Sharon Goldberg
In response to Randy's three criticisms of our recent SIGCOMM'11/NANOG'52 paper, which is available here: http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/SBGPtrans_full.pdf http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~phillipa/sbgpTrans.html Point 1: The ISP economic and incentive model is overly naive to the point of being

RE: Tampa small colo recs?

2011-09-04 Thread Blake T. Pfankuch
I've managed a few servers from sago, they have a great network and quick support responses as needed. Hostway not had quite as good of responses from them, and some weird network issues. However that was a few years back. -Original Message- From: James P. Ashton

Re: iCloud - Is it going to hurt access providers?

2011-09-04 Thread Wayne E Bouchard
On Sun, Sep 04, 2011 at 12:56:25PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: * Wayne E. Bouchard: the users will screw themselves by flooding their uplinks in which case they will know what they've done to themselves and will largely accept the problems for the durration With shared media networks

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Sun, 04 Sep 2011 16:16:45 EDT, Sharon Goldberg said: Point 2: The security threat model is unrealistic and misguided Our paper does not present a security threat model at all. We do not present a new security solution. Unfortunately for all concerned, it's going to be *perceived* as a

anyone from netnames / ascio on list?

2011-09-04 Thread Andrew Mulholland
Hi Seems Netnames / Ascio have been compromised, resulting in DNS servers for a number of their customers (telegraph.co.uk, acer.com, betfair.com , theregister.co.uk etc) being changed, and the sites being redirected to an hacked page. list of domains affected here:

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Neil J. McRae
On 4 Sep 2011, at 21:17, Sharon Goldberg gol...@cs.bu.edu wrote: thanks for responding you paper is interesting, Thus, while we cannot hope to accurately model every aspect of interdomain routing, nor predict how S*BGP deployment will proceed in practice, we believe that ISP competition

Re: iCloud - Is it going to hurt access providers?

2011-09-04 Thread Jeff Wheeler
On Sun, Sep 4, 2011 at 4:45 PM, Wayne E Bouchard w...@typo.org wrote: Okay, so to state the obvious for those who missed the point... The congestion will either be directly in front of user because they're flooding their uplink or towards the destination (beit a single central network or a

Preferring peers over customers [was: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics]

2011-09-04 Thread Patrick W. Gilmore
On Sep 5, 2011, at 4:03, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: Because routing to peers as a policy instead of customer as a matter of policy, outside of corner cases make logical sence. welcome to the internet, it does not always make logical sense at first glance. the myth in academia that

Re: Preferring peers over customers [was: Do Not Complicate Routing

2011-09-04 Thread Avi Freedman
Forgive my potential lack of understanding; perhaps BGP behavior has changed or the way people use it has but my understanding is - Since BGP is used in almost all circumstances in a mode where only the best path to a prefix can be re-advertised, only one of the peer or customer path can be used

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Michael Schapira
On Sun, Sep 4, 2011 at 5:39 PM Neil J. McRae n...@domino.org wrote: ... one could almost argue the opposite also or make the same case about nearly any feature in a transit product! If i stop offering community based filtering- I'd probably see revenue decline! Yes some features in a

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Dobbins, Roland
On Sep 5, 2011, at 11:04 AM, Michael Schapira wrote: One crucial way in which S*BGP differs from other features is that ASes which deploy S*BGP *must* use their ability to validate paths to inform route selection (otherwise, adding security to BGP makes no sense). Origin validation path

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Dobbins, Roland
On Sep 5, 2011, at 11:55 AM, Dobbins, Roland wrote: Origin validation path validation. Rather, that should read, 'Origin/path validation origin/path enforcement'. The idea of origin validation is a simple one. The idea of path validation isn't to determine the 'correctness' or