Disclosure note: AT and Comcast public relations folks have been
sending information about what they are doing for disaster recovery. I've
included some of their information.
From various official sources (FEMA, Dept. of Energy, FCC, NOAA, etc).
Fatalities (FEMA)
Georgia: 2
On Wed, Sep 13, 2017 at 8:47 PM, Van Dyk, Donovan via NANOG wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Has anyone else been seeing issues today from routes being learnt through
> the Verizon network, AS 701?
>
> Does anyone know if they have a looking glass? I can’t find one.
>
>
they peer with
Hello,
Has anyone else been seeing issues today from routes being learnt through the
Verizon network, AS 701?
Does anyone know if they have a looking glass? I can’t find one.
Thanks
--
Donovan Van Dyk
SOC Network Engineer
Fort Lauderdale, FL USA
[cid:image001.png@01D32CD1.73DBD490]
The
On Tue, Sep 12, 2017 at 10:03 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
> > So how do we fix it?
>
> this is most strongly an american disease. nanog has encouraged and
> supported a frat boy ego parade and beauty contest. try the ietf
> nomcomm approach, but with zero white boys on the nomcomm.
>
The port info is in the first fragmented packet as was mentioned elsewhere.
My guess is someone fragmenting large packets ( the mtu is set to 1464 or so).
and the host is receiving those fragment, but it not reconstructing the
packets. If it is possible to do a tcpdump/wireshark etc ,
On Wed, Sep 13, 2017 at 11:42 AM, Matthew Huff wrote:
> Both should have been similar.
>
> In the first case we lost power to all of our BGP border routers that are
> peered with the upstream providers
> In the second case, I did an explicit “shut” on the interface connected to
>
Both should have been similar.
In the first case we lost power to all of our BGP border routers that are
peered with the upstream providers
In the second case, I did an explicit “shut” on the interface connected to the
upstream provider that appeared “stuck” after an hour after the outage.
Job should also have pointed to http://irrexplorer.nlnog.net (notes "Created by
Job Snijders"). It notes multiple route objects (e.g.,
http://irrexplorer.nlnog.net/search/129.77.0.0/16). IMHO, worth a look or two
from time to time for one’s own resources.
—Sandy
> On Sep 13, 2017, at 7:10
On Wed, Sep 13, 2017 at 5:30 AM, Matthew Huff wrote:
> This weekend our uninterruptible power supply became interruptible and we
> lost all circuits. While I was doing initial debugging of the problem while
> I waited on site power verification, I noticed that there was still paths
On Wed, Sep 13, 2017 at 9:59 AM, Krunal Shah wrote:
> It might be spoofed source IPs
>
>
if you are seeing large fragmented udp packets.. it's almost always not
spoofed.
or historically speaking anyway it's not been spoofed.
There are cases with dns reflection that include
It might be spoofed source IPs
Krunal Shah
-Original Message-
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of Mark Andrews
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 10:45 PM
To: Large Hadron Collider
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Protocol 17 floods from Vietnam & Mexico?
In
On Wed, 13 Sep 2017 at 13:08, Matthew Huff wrote:
> It appears that Reliance Globalcom (AS6157) added an RADB entry for our
> prefix (129.77.0.0/16) when we were a peer of theirs years ago, and it
> was never removed when we ended the relationship. We are ASN 14607.
>
> I've
It appears that Reliance Globalcom (AS6157) added an RADB entry for our prefix
(129.77.0.0/16) when we were a peer of theirs years ago, and it was never
removed when we ended the relationship. We are ASN 14607.
I've reached out to their support, but does anyone have a suggestion on how I
This weekend our uninterruptible power supply became interruptible and we lost
all circuits. While I was doing initial debugging of the problem while I waited
on site power verification, I noticed that there was still paths being shown in
rviews for the circuit that were down. This was over an
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