David Conrad wrote:
I'm with Jason. If even a small percentage of the "representative use
cases" that came out of the ITU's Network 2030 Focus Group or other
similar efforts comes to pass, bandwidth demand will continue to
grow.
As Moore's law has ended, it means users must pay a lot, which
is
Are we discussing direct connectivity between 15169/174?
or via a third party(ies)? I ask, because i looks like RouteViews has, in:
http://archive.routeviews.org/bgpdata/2020.07/UPDATES/updates.20200715.0345.bz2
at last this bit of clues:
BGP4MP_ET|1594784883.404691|A|91.218.184.60|49788|35.213.0
On 6/8/22 15:41, David Hubbard wrote:
Appears HE (ASN6939) is still
unreachable though… I feel like less entities are single homed to HE,
but it would still be a calculated risk.
HE is the 800-pound gorilla of IPv6. I would be leery of a carrier
without reachability to AS6939.
--
Jay Henni
At this point I don't think we can reasonably expect something like an
online purchased game from the Microsoft store for somebody's new Xbox
Series X to *not* be a 150GB download. There's a number of games out there
like that. And if people only have 25 to 50Mbps downstream they absolutely
will co
I've had zero issues reaching Google via Cogent, however Google didn't pick
up transit from Cogent themselves: They got transit from Tata, which makes
them reachable via Cogent due to the peering relationship between Cogent
and Tata.
Regards,
Peter
On Wed, Jun 8, 2022 at 6:45 PM David Hubbard
wr
It seemed like a decade in the making but has the IPv6 transit between Cogent
and Google (via that showed up last fall remained stable? I’d ruled them out
on a number of projects for this reason but may reconsider if it has been
reliable. Appears HE (ASN6939) is still unreachable though… I fe
For members of the broader NANOG community who may not have been able to
see the community meeting that happened this morning, I jotted down some
notes on what was discussed. Much of the content was directly from the
slide deck
https://storage.googleapis.com/site-media-prod/meetings/NANOG85/4478/
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
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