On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 03:30:55PM -0700, Randy Bush wrote:
> >> may i include the arin tal in my software product with neither i nor
> >> the user of the product being encumbered, signing anything, ... as
> >> with the other RIRs?
> > Yes.
>
> excellent. thank you.
>
> [ and arin might
On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 08:07:29PM +0200, Job Snijders via NANOG wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 05:18:42PM +, Compton, Rich A wrote:
> > I was under the impression that ASPA could prevent route leaks as well
> > as path spoofing. This "BGP Route Security Cycling to the Future!"
> >
On Mon, Oct 01, 2018 at 09:47:43AM +0200, Alex Band wrote:
> Hello,
>
> To avoid any misunderstanding in this discussion going forward, I would
> like to reiterate that an RPKI ROA is a positive attestation. An
> unavailable, expired or invalid ROA will result in a BGP announcement
> with the
On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 03:29:33AM -0400, Jared Mauch wrote:
>
>
> > On Sep 26, 2018, at 3:13 AM, John Curran wrote:
> >
> > On 26 Sep 2018, at 2:09 AM, Christopher Morrow
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> (I'm going to regret posting this later, but...)
> >>
> >> On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 10:57 PM John
On Sun, Dec 16, 2012 at 11:48:13PM +0100, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
Looking for 32-bit AS numbers, I get some strange results from routeviews:
route-viewssh ip bgp regexp _23456_
BGP table version is 2393809200, local router ID is 128.223.51.103
Status codes: s suppressed, d damped, h
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 08:48:48AM -0800, David Conrad wrote:
On Nov 30, 2012, at 5:08 AM, Henning Brauer hb-na...@bsws.de wrote:
and re IANA, they made it clear they would not give us a proto number
As they should have. IANA abides by the rules laid down for it by the
IETF/IESG/IAB. The
On Thu, Oct 21, 2010 at 10:59:38AM -0700, Majdi S. Abbas wrote:
On Thu, Oct 21, 2010 at 10:52:19AM -0700, Dave CROCKER wrote:
But you aren't. No one is.
The core requirement for such announcements is that there be a real
enforcement arm.
If a couple of large carriers set their
On Sun, Aug 29, 2010 at 10:12:35PM +0200, Thomas Mangin wrote:
It would seem to me that there should actually be a better option, e.g.
recognizing the malformed update, and simply discarding it (and sending the
originator an error message) instead of resetting the session.
Resetting of
On Sat, Aug 28, 2010 at 04:56:05PM +0900, Randy Bush wrote:
imiho, researchers injecting data into the control plane are responsible
to have tested it at least against major bgp speakers. and, considering
its placement in the net (big core), i consider ios xr to be a major
speaker.
i
On Sat, Aug 28, 2010 at 01:09:47PM +0200, Leen Besselink wrote:
On 08/28/2010 11:39 AM, Saku Ytti wrote:
On (2010-08-28 18:20 +0900), Randy Bush wrote:
a bgp regression suite would not have caught this as it was not a
repeat. but it sure would be useful to implementors.
On Sat, Aug 28, 2010 at 02:51:17PM +0200, Thomas Mangin wrote:
We had ASN4, AS-PATH and this one. More or less we hit this session
reset problem once a year but nothing was done yet to change the RFC.
You are mixing up three totaly different problems. Sure the result was the
same (session
On Fri, Aug 27, 2010 at 04:57:17PM -0400, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
On Fri, 27 Aug 2010 13:43:39 PDT, Clay Fiske said:
If -everyone- dropped the session on a bad attribute, it likely wouldn't
make it far enough into the wild to cause these problems in the first
place.
That works
On Fri, Apr 23, 2010 at 09:26:10AM +0200, Thomas Habets wrote:
On Wed, 21 Apr 2010, Chris Cappuccio wrote:
OpenBSD post-4.7 (current) is about to get a full BGP MPLS VPN
implementation and has ldp working too. Yeah baby
I wouldn't run MPLS with OpenBSD in production quite yet though.
Until
13 matches
Mail list logo
