Re: BGP-iSec: Improved Security of Internet Routing Against Post-ROV Attacks

and more feasible. Can we use BGP-iSec and ASPA together? Would that be more beneficial? BTW, I will also present my new work on routing security in NDSS’2024. Looking forward to discussing more with you in San Diego:) Best, Lancheng Qin -原始邮件- 发件人:"Amir Herzberg"

Re: Soliciting suggestions and experiences from the community for RPKI-invalid filtering deployment

to ql...@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn. If not, please ignore this email. Best, Lancheng -原始邮件- 发件人:"Lancheng Qin" 发送时间:2023-05-23 14:40:14 (星期二) 收件人: NANOG 抄送: 主题: Soliciting suggestions and experiences from the community for RPKI-invalid filtering deployment Hello, we

Re: Re: Soliciting suggestions and experiences from the community for RPKI-invalid filtering deployment

Thank you. I've heard similar feedback from several other network operators. It seems that this is one of the main reasons why some networks do not apply rov at customer interfaces. Best, Lancheng -原始邮件- 发件人: "Randy Bush" 发送时间: 2023-05-23 21:45:13 (星期二) 收件人: "Lan

Soliciting suggestions and experiences from the community for RPKI-invalid filtering deployment

Hello, we have done a worldwide measurement to identify which ASes have propagated RPKI-invalid prefixes. We find an interesting phenomenon that some ASes may perform RPKI-invalid filtering only at partial interfaces (e.g., provider interfaces, customer interfaces, and peer interfaces).