Re: NIST NTP servers

2016-05-13 Thread Sharon Goldberg
z oscillator module (the Agilent Z3816 and kin are of > > this type). > > Does anyone know of any COTS NTP servers that are based on non-ancient > Linux kernel versions? In 2012 we bought new GPS/CDMA NTP servers > with OCXO that are based on Linux 2.4, but they are fiddly as you c

Re: NIST NTP servers

2016-05-11 Thread Sharon Goldberg
With the caveat that if some of the servers are inside your own private network then learning who the servers are might be less useful. But this could be an issue for targets who use servers that are exclusively on the public internet. On Wed, May 11, 2016 at 3:15 PM, Sharon Goldberg <

Re: NIST NTP servers

2016-05-11 Thread Sharon Goldberg
pool. There are a bunch, so Joe Random Hacker isn't going to have a > > high chance of guessing the servers your system is using. > > A determined attacker will just run servers in the official pool. > > -- Sharon Goldberg Computer Science, Boston University http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe

Re: BGPMON Alert Questions

2014-04-06 Thread Sharon Goldberg
/looking_glass/ http://www-x.antd.nist.gov/rpki-monitor/ http://certification-stats.ripe.net/ http://rpki.surfnet.nl/index.html But naturally it's harder to see who has turned on origin validation. Sharon -- Sharon Goldberg Computer Science, Boston University http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe

Re: BGPMON Alert Questions

2014-04-04 Thread Sharon Goldberg
On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 1:15 AM, Mark Tinka mark.ti...@seacom.mu wrote: On Friday, April 04, 2014 05:06:22 AM Sharon Goldberg wrote: We also looked at prefix filtering and found that it has better partial deployment characteristics. Our analysis assumed that ISPs only filter routes from

Re: BGPMON Alert Questions

2014-04-04 Thread Sharon Goldberg
On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Sharon Goldberg gol...@cs.bu.edu wrote Actually, since this is NANOG, might as well ask: Do you all view filtering your downstream's downstreams as much more difficult than filtering only downstreams, or only stub ASes? Do you have a sense for how many

Re: BGPMON Alert Questions

2014-04-03 Thread Sharon Goldberg
looked at this for origin validation. sharon goldberg and co-conspirators have done a lot of work in the area, see her pubs at https://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/. but the concentration seems to be on bgpsec which deploys quite differently Right, we (and others) have not looked at the efficacy

Soliciting your opinions on routing research: A routing policies survey

2011-09-13 Thread Sharon Goldberg
the survey to ops at other organizations who may not be reading NANOG. Thanks all of you that have responded so far! Phillipa Gill (U of Toronto), Michael Schapira (Princeton), Sharon Goldberg (Boston University)

Routing policies study [was: Preferring peers over customers]

2011-09-08 Thread Sharon Goldberg
to answer all of our questions, or just a few. Thanks! Phillipa Gill, Sharon Goldberg Michael Schapira

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-05 Thread Sharon Goldberg
to them]... Section 6.8.2 shows our results are insensitive to this assumption. Sincerely, Phillipa Gill, Michael Schapira, and Sharon Goldberg On Sep 5, 2011, at 11:36 AM, Joe Maimon wrote: Owen DeLong wrote: On Sep 5, 2011, at 7:24 AM, Jennifer Rexford wrote: One could argue

Re: Do Not Complicate Routing Security with Voodoo Economics

2011-09-04 Thread Sharon Goldberg
global S*BGP deployment. Sincerely, Sharon Goldberg and Michael Schapira -- Sharon Goldberg Assistant Professor, Computer Science, Boston University http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe On Sun, Sep 4, 2011 at 6:02 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: [ http://archive.psg.com/110904.broadside.html