as a fellow researcher said the other week, ROV, ASPA, ... are intended
to provide safety, not security.
randy
Heya,
On Wed, Aug 24, 2022 at 09:17:03AM +0200, Claudio Jeker wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 08:07:29PM +0200, Job Snijders via NANOG wrote:
> > In this sense, ASPA (just by itself) suffers the same challenge as
> > RPKI ROA-based Origin Validation: the input (the BGP AS_PATH) is
> > unsigned
On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 08:07:29PM +0200, Job Snijders via NANOG wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 05:18:42PM +, Compton, Rich A wrote:
> > I was under the impression that ASPA could prevent route leaks as well
> > as path spoofing. This "BGP Route Security Cycling to the Future!"
> >
On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 05:18:42PM +, Compton, Rich A wrote:
> I was under the impression that ASPA could prevent route leaks as well
> as path spoofing. This "BGP Route Security Cycling to the Future!"
> presentation from NANOG seems to indicate this is the case:
>
I was under the impression that ASPA could prevent route leaks as well as path
spoofing. This "BGP Route Security Cycling to the Future!" presentation from
NANOG seems to indicate this is the case: https://youtu.be/0Fi2ghCnXi0?t=1093
Also, can't the path spoofing protection that BGPsec provides
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