Re: About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-07 Thread Michael Thomas
On 2/7/23 11:33 AM, Jay Hennigan wrote: On 2/7/23 11:18, Michael Thomas wrote: FWIW, lookalike domains can and do happen with http too. Nothing unique about that to email. Then the bad guys throw in the occasional Cyrillic, etc. character that looks like a Roman one and things get even

Re: About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-07 Thread Jay Hennigan
On 2/7/23 11:18, Michael Thomas wrote: FWIW, lookalike domains can and do happen with http too. Nothing unique about that to email. Then the bad guys throw in the occasional Cyrillic, etc. character that looks like a Roman one and things get even more fun. -- Jay Hennigan - j...@west.net

Re: About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-07 Thread Michael Thomas
On 2/7/23 6:09 AM, Rich Kulawiec wrote: On Mon, Feb 06, 2023 at 12:41:43PM -0800, Michael Thomas wrote: This seems like a perfect object lesson on why you should use DKIM and SPF and make sure the sending domain can set up a p=reject policy for DMARC. But it's not. DKIM and SPF are mostly

Re: About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-07 Thread Martin Hannigan
On Tue, Feb 7, 2023 at 11:59 AM J. Hellenthal via NANOG wrote: > Your only option is to monitor the generic tld's atp and register them > yourself. Clone attacks are real, impersonation has been around since > centuries and yes, its an attack vector but only impacting your customers. > There is

Re: About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-07 Thread Rafael Possamai
Subject: About emails impersonating Path Network Date: Monday, February 06, 2023 12:25 Hi Nanog, It looks like someone with an axe to grind against our company has decided to email every AS contact they could find on PeeringDB, impersonating us and sometimes spoofing our domains. We're aware

Re: About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-07 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Mon, Feb 06, 2023 at 12:41:43PM -0800, Michael Thomas wrote: > This seems like a perfect object lesson on why you should use DKIM and SPF > and make sure the sending domain can set up a p=reject policy for DMARC. But it's not. DKIM and SPF are mostly useless against competently executed email

Re: About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-06 Thread Martin Hannigan
Is widespread impact confirmed? Unfortunate. Our ASN’s and location contacts in PDB have not received anything from Path. I looked in search engines (quickly) and see nothing negative re: your ASN. I found a reference as new to the platform at AMSIX 7/21 for AS 396998. Lack of mail security bits

Re: About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-06 Thread Michael Thomas
This seems like a perfect object lesson on why you should use DKIM and SPF and make sure the sending domain can set up a p=reject policy for DMARC. Mike On 2/6/23 10:25 AM, Konrad Zemek wrote: Hi Nanog, It looks like someone with an axe to grind against our company has decided to email

About emails impersonating Path Network

2023-02-06 Thread Konrad Zemek
Hi Nanog, It looks like someone with an axe to grind against our company has decided to email every AS contact they could find on PeeringDB, impersonating us and sometimes spoofing our domains. We're aware of the emails and are sorry for the inconvenience. We've since added SPF records to the