Ong Beng Hui wrote:
The problem of been LoS is a big problem in metro as far as I know.
You can't just put a pair of FSO gear without going to the building
owner to talk about rights and cost. Not forgetting lighting
protection and other stuff.
Murphy, Brian S CTR USAF ACC 83 NOS/Det 4
That service is probably very expensive.
There is no known way to provide cheap 10 wave protection. Not carrier grade.
Protected 10 GigE service (LAN PHY 10 GigE) will tolerate a very high BER
before switching. And the cost of switching STM64 is very high as well.
Bottom line is that it
-
From: Rod Beck [mailto:rod.b...@hiberniaatlantic.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2009 7:39 AM
To: joel.merc...@verizon.net; Wallace Keith; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Diversity - was: Fiber cut in SF area
That service is probably very expensive.
There is no known way to provide cheap 10 wave
Rod Beck wrote:
That service is probably very expensive.
There is no known way to provide cheap 10 wave protection. Not carrier grade. Protected 10 GigE service (LAN PHY 10 GigE) will tolerate a very high BER before switching. And the cost of switching STM64 is very high as well.
Bottom line
...@verizon.net; Wallace Keith; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Diversity - was: Fiber cut in SF area
That's funny, because our company is a (very small) LEC and a member of a
(small) regional network, and we've been asked by a larger consortium to
give them protected 10-Gig waves between two cities
And if the 10 gig wave is from 1 Wilshire to 60 Hudson with hundreds of regen
huts and 30 POPs in between?
How that affect the capex cost?
Roderick S. Beck
Director of European Sales
Hibernia Atlantic
13-15, rue Sedaine, 75011 Paris
http://www.hiberniaatlantic.com
Wireless: 1-212-444-8829.
Rod Beck wrote:
And if the 10 gig wave is from 1 Wilshire to 60 Hudson with hundreds of regen huts and 30 POPs in between?
How that affect the capex cost?
Sure, the capex cost of offering full diversity is substantial; my point
was just that the cost of switching STM64 signals at the
: Wed 4/15/2009 4:00 PM
To: Rod Beck
Cc: joel.merc...@verizon.net; Wallace Keith; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Diversity - was: Fiber cut in SF area
Rod Beck wrote:
And if the 10 gig wave is from 1 Wilshire to 60 Hudson with hundreds of regen
huts and 30 POPs in between?
How that affect
On Wed, Apr 15, 2009 at 01:38:43PM +0100, Rod Beck wrote:
There is no known way to provide cheap 10 wave protection. Not carrier
grade. Protected 10 GigE service (LAN PHY 10 GigE) will tolerate a
very high BER before switching. And the cost of switching STM64 is
very high as well.
Bottom
On Wed, Apr 15, 2009 at 1:37 PM, Rod Beck rod.b...@hiberniaatlantic.comwrote:
Hi Richard,
I never said that protected LAN PHY 10 GigE was more expensive than two
diversely routed waves. However, Hibernia's engineers have advised that
route protected LAN PHY 10 GigE will tolerate a relatively
Hi Martin,
That statement is true in the long run. But not the short run.
No would argue that current TransAtlantic pricing could justify a new cable
system. :)
If you look at the last three TransAtlantic builds, they spanned from $600
million to $980 million. No backhaul included.
On Wed, Apr 15, 2009 at 06:37:36PM +0100, Rod Beck wrote:
Hi Richard,
I never said that protected LAN PHY 10 GigE was more expensive than
two diversely routed waves.
Strange, the e-mail from you that I quoted specifically said:
Bottom line is that it will cost more than two diversely
Earth is a single point of failure.
On top of that, one basic principle of telecommunications:
No matter how much diversity and path redundancy, tons of concrete or
titanium sealed fiber vaults you have, in the data exchange between points
A and B there will be always two single points of
.: 505.827.2851
We move the information that moves your world.
-Original Message-
From: Jorge Amodio [mailto:jmamo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 9:21 AM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
Earth is a single point of failure.
On top of that, one basic
, 2009 11:19
To: Dylan Ebner dylan.eb...@crlmed.com
Cc: nanog@nanog.org nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
It will be easier to get more divergence than secure all the manholes in
the country.
I still think skipping the securing of manholes
True enough Jorge, however, we need full-orbed perspective hereit's
not merely beating a dead horse; as far as topic goes, it is purely
edification in the nth degree, manner, fashion. This is the lingua
franca of this forum, and those who chose to read it, or not. Not
merely pointed
: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 11:31 AM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
True enough Jorge, however, we need full-orbed perspective hereit's
not merely beating a dead horse; as far as topic goes, it is purely
edification in the nth degree, manner, fashion. This is the lingua
...@aeronetpr.com
Aeronet Wireless Broadband Corp.
tel 787.273.4143 fax 787.273.4145
-Original Message-
From: Jorge Amodio [mailto:jmamo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 11:21 AM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
Earth is a single point of failure.
On top
Message-
From: Deepak Jain [mailto:dee...@ai.net]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 4:36 PM
To: Gino Villarini; Jorge Amodio; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
I don't mean to jump in here and state the obvious, but wireless links
are not a panacea. At least a few folks have
in such a key US metropolitan area?
-Original Message-
From: Gino Villarini [mailto:g...@aeronetpr.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 1:42 PM
To: Deepak Jain; Jorge Amodio; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
Good points, some variables are dependant on the network
; Deepak Jain; Jorge Amodio; nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
Wireless RF links have their drawbacks:
1. Current GHz Frequency technology places upper limit of 1 Gbps on
point-to-point links, and distance at 1 Gbps is limited. Commercial GiGE
radios are just now appearing
Gino Villarini wrote:
Good points, some variables are dependant on the network infrastructure
of the wireless provider. Localy, the main 2 providers have a
copper/fiber independent networks.
I'm pretty sure the WISPs in the Santa Cruz and Gilroy/Morgan Hill areas
were all also taken
Gino Villarini wrote:
SF area is serviced by Covad Wireless division among others, every major
US city is served by at least 1 or 2 reputable business class Wireless
ISP's.
AFAIK Covad Wireless is just last mile wireless, and the route your
packets take quickly merges with the local
I think this issue has been beat.
We're dealing with an arcaic system and protection at the same time...
Mark Jackson, CCIE 4736
Senior Network, Security and Voice Architect
858-705-1861
markcciejack...@gmail.com
Sent from my iPhone
Please excuse spelling errors
On Apr 14, 2009, at 3:24 PM, JC
Gino Villarini wrote:
Here in my area most of business outfits that require maximum
availability of Internet or WAN conenctions have implemented dual
connections from dual providers, most with a fiber/copper main and a
fixed wireless backup. This trend goes from banks to Mcdonalds
Gino
JC Dill wrote:
Gino Villarini wrote:
Good points, some variables are dependant on the network infrastructure
of the wireless provider. Localy, the main 2 providers have a
copper/fiber independent networks.
I'm pretty sure the WISPs in the Santa Cruz and Gilroy/Morgan Hill
areas were
-Original Message-
From: Roy [mailto:r.engehau...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 6:43 PM
To: Gino Villarini
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
Gino Villarini wrote:
Here in my area most of business outfits that require maximum
availability of Internet
Message--
From: Wallace Keith
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Diversity - was: Fiber cut in SF area
Sent: Apr 14, 2009 7:06 PM
-Original Message-
From: Roy [mailto:r.engehau...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 6:43 PM
To: Gino Villarini
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut
Roy wrote:
JC Dill wrote:
I'm pretty sure the WISPs in the Santa Cruz and Gilroy/Morgan Hill
areas were all also taken offline due to the fiber cut. (Roy, can you
verify, for south county?) Anyone in those areas who relied on a WISP
as a backup to their fiber/copper link found that their
[mailto:kwall...@pcconnection.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 6:06 PM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Diversity - was: Fiber cut in SF area
-Original Message-
From: Roy [mailto:r.engehau...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 6:43 PM
To: Gino Villarini
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re
or
more pairs can probably handle the 80% situation in the metro (unless there is
data to indicate otherwise).
murph
-
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 15:57:52 -0700
From: Roy r.engehau...@gmail.com
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
To: JC Dill jcdill.li...@gmail.com
The problem of been LoS is a big problem in metro as far as I know.
You can't just put a pair of FSO gear without going to the building
owner to talk about rights and cost. Not forgetting lighting protection
and other stuff.
Murphy, Brian S CTR USAF ACC 83 NOS/Det 4 wrote:
I haven't seen any
Mike Lewinski wrote:
Joe Greco wrote:
Which brings me to a new point: if we accept that security by
obscurity is not security, then, what (practical thing) IS security?
Obscurity as a principle works just fine provided the given token is
obscure enough. Ideally there are layers of security
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 09:18:04 -0500
Stephen Sprunk step...@sprunk.org wrote:
Mike Lewinski wrote:
Joe Greco wrote:
Which brings me to a new point: if we accept that security by
obscurity is not security, then, what (practical thing) IS
security?
Obscurity as a principle works just
. 612.573.2250
dylan.eb...@crlmed.com
www.consultingradiologists.com
-Original Message-
From: Joe Greco [mailto:jgr...@ns.sol.net]
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2009 7:12 AM
To: Mike Lewinski
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
Joe Greco wrote:
My point was more the inverse
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
Manhole locks are just going to stop vandalism, and I think the threat
to obstruction calculation just doesn't add up for that small level of
isolated cases.
It doesn't stop it, it just makes it slightly harder, and they'll go after
another point.
: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
One thing that is missing here is before we can define security we
need to define the threat and the obstruction the security creates.
With an ATM machine, the threat is someone comes and steals the machine
for the cash. The majority of the assailants in an ATM case
On Apr 13, 2009, at 11:12 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
Manhole locks are just going to stop vandalism, and I think the
threat
to obstruction calculation just doesn't add up for that small level
of
isolated cases.
It doesn't stop it, it just makes it slightly harder, and they'll go
On 4/13/09, Dylan Ebner dylan.eb...@crlmed.com wrote:
My point is, it is getting harder and harder to gurantee path divergence
and sometimes the redundancies need to be built into the workflow
instead of IT.
Actually, in many ways it's getting easier; now, you can sign an NDA
with your
I guess the next generation fiber networks will need to be installed with
tunnel boring machines and just not surface anywhere except the endpoints
:) After all, undersea cables get along just fine without convenient access
along their length...
On Mon, Apr 13, 2009 at 12:12 PM, Mikael
Or skip the locks and fill the manholes with sand. Then provide the service
folks those big suction trucks to remove the sand for servicing :)
On Mon, Apr 13, 2009 at 12:28 PM, Andy Ringsmuth andyr...@inebraska.comwrote:
On Apr 13, 2009, at 11:12 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
Manhole locks
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dorn Hetzel wrote:
I guess the next generation fiber networks will need to be installed with
tunnel boring machines and just not surface anywhere except the endpoints
:) After all, undersea cables get along just fine without convenient
access along their length...
Boat
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
It will be easier to get more divergence than secure all the manholes in
the country.
I still think skipping the securing of manholes and access points in favor
of active monitoring with offsite access is a better solution. You can't
keep people
On Sun, Apr 12, 2009 at 03:37:00AM +, Paul Vixie wrote:
as long as the west's ideological opponents want terror rather than panic,
and also to inflict long term losses rather than short term losses, that's
true. in this light you can hopefully understand why bollards to protect
internet
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, chris.ra...@nokia.com wrote:
Peter Beckman [mailto:beck...@angryox.com] wrote:
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 11:19 AM
To: Dylan Ebner
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
It will be easier to get more divergence
--- beck...@angryox.com wrote:
I still think skipping the securing of manholes and access
points in favor of active monitoring with offsite access is a
better solution.
The only thing missing from your plan was a cost analysis. Cost of each,
plus operational costs, * however many of each
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Scott Weeks wrote:
--- beck...@angryox.com wrote:
I still think skipping the securing of manholes and access
points in favor of active monitoring with offsite access is a
better solution.
The only thing missing from your plan was a cost analysis. Cost of each,
plus
Peter Beckman [mailto:beck...@angryox.com] wrote:
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 11:19 AM
To: Dylan Ebner
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Dylan Ebner wrote:
It will be easier to get more divergence than secure all the
manholes in the country.
I still
On 4/13/2009 at 1:12 PM, Peter Beckman beck...@angryox.com wrote:
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, Scott Weeks wrote:
--- beck...@angryox.com wrote:
I still think skipping the securing of manholes and access
points in favor of active monitoring with offsite access is a
better solution.
The only
Hi Peter,
You wrote:
So, let's see. I'm pulling numbers out of my butt here,
snip
Total cost...is about $3000 per mile for equipment
snip
It could run on an overhead monorail
snip
Network it all
snip
Confickr-type domains to make sure
I get the feeling you haven't deployed or
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, chris.ra...@nokia.com wrote:
I get the feeling you haven't deployed or operated large networks.
Nope.
You never did say what the multiplier was. How many miles or detection
nodes there were. Think millions. The number that popped into my head
when thinking of active
I sense a thread moderation occurring here shortly.
valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
On Mon, 13 Apr 2009 14:39:23 EDT, Izaac said:
Do you realize that you're putting trust in the sane action of parties
who conclude their reasoning process with destruction and murder?
And how is that different
This all implies that the majority of fiber is in tunnels that can
be monitored. In my experience, almost none of it is in tunnels.
In NYC, it's usually buried in conduits directly under the street,
with no access, except through the man holes which are located about
every 500 feet.
In
--- On Mon, 4/13/09, chris.ra...@nokia.com chris.ra...@nokia.com wrote:
From: Peter Beckman
Subject: RE: Fiber cut in SF area
Total cost...is about $3000 per mile for
equipment
I get the feeling you haven't deployed or operated large
networks. You never did say what the multiplier
On 14/04/2009, at 11:35 AM, David Barak wrote:
In addition, as has been noted, this system wouldn't PREVENT a
failure, it would just give you some warning that a failure may be
coming, probably by a matter of minutes.
Some statistics about the effectiveness of car alarms and unmonitored
But that would not be NEBS Complient -PHB
I have thought of air horns in my colo cage when a tech of mine messes up.
--Original Message--
From: Nathan Ward
To: nanog list
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
Sent: Apr 13, 2009 4:55 PM
On 14/04/2009, at 11:35 AM, David Barak wrote
Nathan Ward wrote:
Whack a $5 12v horn on it, and my bet is that it'd become a deterrent
pretty quickly.
Presumes the perp isn't familiar with the hole, and it's security
measures. In this case, I doubt that either is the case. Pop in, snip
the wires on the horn, and do what you do.
Most
There are three solutions to the problem;
A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
just makes you tired, but nothing hapens.
C: Do nothing.
As the society becomes more and more
Though I think networked environmental monitoring has its merits, it's
clear the technology is unproven in monitoring fiber tunnels, and my
inexperience in running and managing such tunnels makes this thread
bordering on off-topic.
I'm happy to continue conversations via email, but this will be
Presumes the perp isn't familiar with the hole, and it's security measures.
In this case, I doubt that either is the case. Pop in, snip the wires on the
horn, and do what you do.
Better they cut the fiber instead of Oklahoma Citying the central office.
But you are ignoring the cost of designing, procuring, installing,
monitoring, maintaining such a solution for the THOUSANDS of man holes
and hand holes in even a small fiber network.
The reality is, the types of outages that these things would protect
against (intentional damage to the
On 4/13/09, George William Herbert gherb...@retro.com wrote:
Matthew Petach writes:
protected rings are a technology of the past. Don't count on your
vendor to provide redundancy for you. Get two unprotected runs
for half the cost each, from two different providers, and verify the
path
On Apr 13, 2009, at 8:31 PM, Peter Lothberg wrote:
There are three solutions to the problem;
A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
just makes you tired, but nothing hapens.
C: Do
There are three solutions to the problem;
A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
just makes you tired, but nothing hapens.
C: Do nothing.
As the society becomes more and more
Matthew Petach wrote:
George William Herbert gherb...@retro.com wrote:
Matthew Petach writes:
protected rings are a technology of the past. Don't count on your
vendor to provide redundancy for you. Get two unprotected runs
for half the cost each, from two different providers, and
On Tue, Apr 14, 2009 at 03:41:25AM +0200, Peter Lothberg wrote:
There are three solutions to the problem;
A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
just makes you tired, but nothing hapens.
C:
On 4/13/09, George William Herbert gherb...@retro.com wrote:
Matthew Petach wrote:
George William Herbert gherb...@retro.com wrote:
Matthew Petach writes:
[much material snipped in the interests of saving precious electron
resources...]
This was all in one geographical area.
Rofl Matt,
I was recently laid off from my job for 'economic' reasons, what you say is
deadly accurate.
Bravo! :)
On Mon, Apr 13, 2009 at 7:01 PM, Matthew Petach mpet...@netflight.comwrote:
On 4/13/09, George William Herbert gherb...@retro.com wrote:
Matthew Petach wrote:
George William
On Tue, Apr 14, 2009 at 03:41:25AM +0200, Peter Lothberg wrote:
There are three solutions to the problem;
A: Put a armed soldier every 150ft on the fiber path.
B: Make the infrstructure so redundant that cutting things
just makes you tired, but
telmn...@757.org wrote:
Presumes the perp isn't familiar with the hole, and it's security
measures. In this case, I doubt that either is the case. Pop in, snip
the wires on the horn, and do what you do.
Better they cut the fiber instead of Oklahoma Citying the central office.
If you're
On Apr 13, 2009, at 8:40 PM, telmn...@757.org wrote:
Better they cut the fiber instead of Oklahoma Citying the central
office.
I'm not sure that the someone will alway s find the weakest link
argument can be summed up any better than this.
If you don't believe it, you all need to spend
On Sat, 11 Apr 2009, Joe Greco wrote:
Public key crypto is, pretty much by definition, reliant on the
obscurity of private keys in order to make it work.
In security terms, public key crypto is not security by obscurity, as
the obscurity part is related to how the method works, and the key
On Sat, 11 Apr 2009, Christopher Morrow wrote:
I'm not sure that the manholes == atm discussion is valid, but in the
end the same thing is prone to happen to the manholes, there isn't
going to be a unique key per manhole, at best it'll be 1/region or
1/manhole-owner. In the end that key is
Joe Greco wrote:
My point was more the inverse, which is that a determined, equipped,
and knowledgeable attacker is a very difficult thing to defend against.
The Untold Story of the World's Biggest Diamond Heist published
recently in Wired was a good read on that subject:
Jo¢ wrote:
I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
data areas. Not that every area of fiber should have such, but
at least should they? Manhole covers can be keyed. For those of
you arguing that this is not enough, I
Jo¢ wrote:
I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
data areas. Not that every area of fiber should have such, but
at least should they? Manhole covers can be keyed. For those of
you arguing that this is not enough, I
Once upon a time, Jo¢ jbfixu...@gmail.com said:
Yes if enough time goes by anything can happen, but how can one
argue an ATM machince that has (at times) thousands of dollars stands
out 24/7 without more immediate wealth. Perhaps I am missing
something here, do the Cops stake out those areas?
* Joe Greco:
The ATM machine is somewhat protected for the extremely obvious reason
that it has cash in it, but an ATM is hardly impervious.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4P8WM8ZZDHk
Heh. Once you install ATMs into solid walls, the attacks get a tad
more interesting. In some places of
On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 11:10 AM, Florian Weimer f...@deneb.enyo.de wrote:
* Joe Greco:
The ATM machine is somewhat protected for the extremely obvious reason
that it has cash in it, but an ATM is hardly impervious.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4P8WM8ZZDHk
Heh. Once you install ATMs
The best protecion is good engineering taking advantage of
technologies and architecures
available since long time ago at any of the different network layers.
Why network operators/carriers don't do it ?, it's another issue and
most of the time
is a question of bottom line numbers for which there
On Saturday 11 April 2009 08:31:55 Joe Greco wrote:
Speaking of that, a manhole cover is
typically protecting some hole, accessway, or vault that's made out of
concrete.
An oxyacetylene torch or a plasma cutter will slice through regular steel
manhole covers in minutes.
You can cut the
You can cut the concrete, too, for that matter, with oxyacetylene, as long as
you wear certain protective gear. We have a few vault covers here that are
concrete covering the largest vaults we have. You need more than a manhole
hook to get one of those covers up.
And when you think you
Jo? wrote:
I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
data areas. Not that every area of fiber should have such, but
at least should they? Manhole covers can be keyed. For those of
you arguing that this is not enough, I would say at
The real problem is route redundancy. This is what the original contract
from DARPA to BBM, to create the Internet, was about!
s/DARPA/ARPA/; s/BBM/BBN/; s/Internet/ARPAnet/.
BBN won the contract to build the first four IMPs.
Theory and research about it is older, look at:
On Saturday 11 April 2009 08:31:55 Joe Greco wrote:
Speaking of that, a manhole cover is
typically protecting some hole, accessway, or vault that's made out of
concrete.
An oxyacetylene torch or a plasma cutter will slice through regular steel
manhole covers in minutes.
Yes, but we
On Sat, 11 Apr 2009, Roger Marquis wrote:
The real problem is route redundancy. This is what the original contract
from DARPA to BBM, to create the Internet, was about! The net was
created to enable communications bttn point A and point B in this exact
scenario.
Uh, not exactly. There was
Anyone know how banks in the Bay Area did through this? I wonder how many
banks went dark and whether they had any backup plans/connectivity. Me
thinks its doubtful.
I also wonder if the bigger pharmacies such as Longs, Walgreens, Rite-Aid,
Etc had thought about these kinds of issues? I
While OT the news reports indicated ATMs were offline and many credit card
processing machines were down. This is no big shock because many ATM
networks are on frame relay and POS credit card machines use POTS lines.
The outage also impacted mobile service too if it hadn't been said.
I hope we
Mike Lyon wrote:
Anyone know how banks in the Bay Area did through this? I wonder how many
banks went dark and whether they had any backup plans/connectivity. Me
thinks its doubtful.
...
Because of the loss of the alarm systems, many banks went to a method
where only one or two people were
Don't really care so much about the bank's security, especially if it was
one that received some the bailout money :)
I was more worried about if people could make withdraws from their bank
accounts. Deposits they could do as they could enter them in later but
withdraws I think would be
Sean Donelan wrote:
Uh, not exactly. There was diversity in this case, but there was also
N+1 breaks. Outside of a few counties in the Bay Area, the rest of
the country's telecommunication system was unaffected. So in that
sense the system worked as designed.
About eight or ten
On Sat, Apr 11, 2009 at 2:43 PM, Joe Greco jgr...@ns.sol.net wrote:
On Saturday 11 April 2009 08:31:55 Joe Greco wrote:
Speaking of that, a manhole cover is
typically protecting some hole, accessway, or vault that's made out of
concrete.
An oxyacetylene torch or a plasma cutter will slice
, 2009 6:02 PM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Fiber cut in SF area
Sean Donelan wrote:
Uh, not exactly. There was diversity in this case, but there was also
N+1 breaks. Outside of a few counties in the Bay Area, the rest of
the country's telecommunication system was unaffected. So
Jorge Amodio wrote:
s/DARPA/ARPA/; s/BBM/BBN/; s/Internet/ARPAnet/.
/DARPA/ARPA/ may be splitting hairs. According to
http://www.livinginternet.com/i/ii_roberts.htm
DARPA head Charlie Hertzfeld promised IPTO Director Bob Taylor a million
dollars to build a distributed communications
Christopher Morrow morrowc.li...@gmail.com writes:
and I also would ask.. what's the cost/risk here? 'We' lost at best
~1day for some folks in the outage, nothing global and nothing
earth-shattering... This has happened (this sort of thing) 1 time in
how many years? Expending $$ and time and
An easy way to describe what your saying is Security by obscurity is
not security
On Apr 11, 2009, at 8:31 AM, Joe Greco wrote:
Jo¢ wrote:
I'm confussed, but please pardon the ignorance.
All the data centers we have are at minimum keys to access
data areas. Not that every area of fiber
Roger Marquis wrote:
Why didn't the man in the street pharmacy have its own backup plans?
I assume they, as most of us, believed the government was taking care of
the country's critical infrastructure. Interesting how well this
illustrates the growing importance of the Internet vis-a-vis
On Sat, 11 Apr 2009, Lamar Owen wrote:
The locking covers I have seen here put the lock(s) on the inside cover cam
jackscrew (holes through the jackscrew close to the inside cover seal rod
nut), rather than on the outside cover, thus keeping the padlocks out of the
weather.
I'm starting to
An easy way to describe what your saying is Security by obscurity is
not security
Yes and no. From a certain point of view, security is almost always
closely tied to obscurity.
A cylinder lock is simply a device that operates through principles that
are relatively unknown to the average
Joe Greco wrote:
My point was more the inverse, which is that a determined, equipped,
and knowledgeable attacker is a very difficult thing to defend against.
The Untold Story of the World's Biggest Diamond Heist published
recently in Wired was a good read on that subject:
1 - 100 of 150 matches
Mail list logo
