Greetings!
By the way, Jeffrey, by the 24th of October, when you posted the information
that the RBN is located in our networks we couldn't even know about any
malware redirectors on our clients resources -
http://www.stopbadware.org/reports/asn/44571. I'm trying to solve the Google
SB issue
Kanak,
NANOG moderators have requested this conversation go off list.
Jeff
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 1:50 PM, noc acrino noc.akr...@gmail.com wrote:
Greetings!
By the way, Jeffrey, by the 24th of October, when you posted the information
that the RBN is located in our networks we couldn't even
2009/11/6 Jeffrey Lyon jeffrey.l...@blacklotus.net
The primary issue is that we receive a fair
deal of customers who end up with wide scale DDoS attacks followed by
an offer for protection to move to your network. In almost every
case the attacks cease once the customer has agreed to pay
Kanak,
We're not a Staminus reseller. Please do your homework:
http://webtrace.info/asn/32421 .
I'm not going to hold court on whether or not you or your resellers
are DDoSing competitor's customers, I was merely stating my opinion.
The reader can draw their own conclusion. I think your network
Hello, Jeffery and other NANOC members.
Sorry for making another thread - I'm not too experienced in mailgroups.
The problem is in structure of new generation advert or banner networks -
they allow to return other subject traffic to the partner's URL. And this
could also be used to redirect the
On 24 okt 2009, at 14:36, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 2:48 PM, Marco Hogewoning
mar...@marcoh.net wrote:
On Oct 24, 2009, at 9:00 AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
\
http://www.eweekeurope.co.uk/news/russian-police-and-internet-registry-accused-of-aiding-cybercrime-2165
Some quotes from the article -
Internet registry RIPE NCC turned a blind eye to cybercrime, and Russian police
corruption helped the perpetrators get away with it, according to the UK
Serious
Since we're on the subject, here is where RBN went:
inetnum: 91.202.60.0 - 91.202.63.255
netname: AKRINO-NET
descr: Akrino Inc
country: VG
org: ORG-AI38-RIPE
admin-c: IVM27-RIPE
tech-c: IVM27-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PI
mnt-by:
Accusing RIPE of complicity is in my opinion abusive. So when a RBN
member buys a burger at MacDonald's, should we consider MacDo accepts
money from RBN while helping them to run their business as they feed
the criminal member?
Indeed. If they bought fries and a drink that's two counts.
Jeff
On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 3:20 AM, Benjamin Billon bbillon...@splio.fr wrote:
Accusing RIPE of complicity is in my opinion abusive. So when a RBN member
buys a burger at MacDonald's, should we consider MacDo accepts money from
RBN
That's what I thought.
I still see the author's point =)
I think the larger point is that ripe turned a blind eye to an
internationally recognized criminal network.
On Oct 24, 2009 2:01 AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian ops.li...@gmail.com
wrote:
http://www.eweekeurope.co.uk/news/russian-police-and-internet-registry-accused-of-aiding-cybercrime-2165
Some
So considering they're widely regarded as a criminal network hosting the
more dodgy/dangerous stuff on the net, surely we could 'protect' our
customers by blocking the 91.202.60.0/22 range?
Consider that can of worms opened :o)
Paul
-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Lyon
On Oct 24, 2009, at 9:00 AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
http://www.eweekeurope.co.uk/news/russian-police-and-internet-registry-accused-of-aiding-cybercrime-2165
With more on that:
http://www.ripe.net/news/rbn.html
Press coverage this week portrayed the RIPE NCC as being involved
with
* a. harrowell:
It ought to be superfluous to point out that the only effective
action taken against RBN was by the Internet community in getting
all their upstreams to null route them. As is blindingly obvious,
SOCA would never have been granted a warrant by the Russians.
Ugh, in reality,
We already filter this network but the move is largely symbolic. This needs
to be done by eyeball networks, not just hosting networks.
In filtering 91.202.60.0/22 we primarily keep our reverse proxies from
serving up their content and keep them from offering proxies on our
network.
Its pretty
On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 2:48 PM, Marco Hogewoning mar...@marcoh.net wrote:
On Oct 24, 2009, at 9:00 AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:
\
http://www.eweekeurope.co.uk/news/russian-police-and-internet-registry-accused-of-aiding-cybercrime-2165
With more on that:
http://www.ripe.net/news/rbn.html
On 24.10 03:05, Paul Bosworth wrote:
I think the larger point is that ripe turned a blind eye to an
internationally recognized criminal network.
That may be a point but not a convincing one.
Imagine the outcry on this list if ARIN were to deny some organisation
address space or ASNs just
The decision to filter networks should remain with the collective
network operators. Everyone, even criminals, has a right to
distribute content but it's up to each operator to decide if that
content will be allowed to transit their network. Personally, if an
entire /22 does not have a single
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