Dobbins, Roland wrote:
The thorniest issues aren't technology-related, per se; they're legal
exposure (both real and imagined), regulatory concerns (both real and
imagined), antitrust concerns (both real and imagined),
management/marketing/PR concerns (largely imagined), skillset
On Jul 19, 2010, at 8:06 PM, J. Oquendo wrote:
Here is a semi-universal solution... Throw an N-Byte field into the TCP
protocol and label it dirty the dirty bit.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3514
;
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Roland Dobbins
On 7/16/10 11:17 PM, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
The thorniest issues aren't technology-related, per se; they're legal exposure
(both real and imagined), regulatory concerns (both real and imagined),
antitrust concerns (both real and imagined), management/marketing/PR concerns
(largely imagined),
On Mon, 19 Jul 2010 08:06:08 EDT, J. Oquendo said:
Maybe naivete on my part, but I don't see how customers would have
issues if the scenario/framework was concisely explained.
It's one thing to be sitting in my office rationally discussing what my bank
does to prevent credit card fraud, and
On 7/19/10 10:21 AM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
... my credit card is declined and flagged (I find out later) by my bank's
anti-fraud group because it's being used 3 states away from where it's usually
used. ...
Or in my recent case, I used my card multiple times in California in April,
On Thu, 15 Jul 2010, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
On Thu, 15 Jul 2010 13:46:24 EDT, J. Oquendo said:
RFP anyone.. Botnet Mitigation for Networks surely collectively it would
and CAN work.
A nice idea, but consider if a more automated tool/system was created to
behead a botnet (50,000 null0
Sean Donelan wrote:
Damned if they do, Damned if they don't.
It seems like every 4-6 weeks people alternate between ISPs are bad
because they don't try to prevent X, Y or Z; and then 4-6 weeks later
ISPs are bad because they tried to prevent A, B or C. It doesn't matter
what A, B, C or X,
On Thursday, July 15, 2010 02:40:50 pm Michael Holstein wrote:
Why is it that network operators can't work together
on instances like this and have a botnet killswitch
Trust (or lack thereof).
That's certainly one of the biggest non-technical reasons. Others go by the
acronyms NIH and
On Jul 16, 2010, at 9:42 PM, Lamar Owen wrote:
I'm sure the collective wisdom here is capable of pulling the task off at
least in theory;
The thorniest issues aren't technology-related, per se; they're legal exposure
(both real and imagined), regulatory concerns (both real and imagined),
upcoming-getting-old-birthday-ramble
While on another list (security list that some of you guys are on) there
is a discussion about a particular botnet that the BP approach of
containment is occurring. Not a big deal, we've all seen them from time
to time.
I read with interest on how volunteers
On Thu, 15 Jul 2010 13:46:24 EDT, J. Oquendo said:
RFP anyone.. Botnet Mitigation for Networks surely collectively it would
and CAN work.
A nice idea, but consider if a more automated tool/system was created to
behead a botnet (50,000 null0 routes to blackhole all the nodes? Or accept
On Thu, Jul 15, 2010 at 1:03 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
Hint: Why do many sites refuse to accept automated BGP feeds from Cymru's
bogon list or RIR services?
The same reason many sites don't follow best practices and let spoofed
packets leave their network, etc?
Why is it that network operators can't work together
on instances like this and have a botnet killswitch
Trust (or lack thereof).
Cheers,
Michael Holstein
Cleveland State University
On 7/15/2010 11:40 AM, Michael Holstein wrote:
Why is it that network operators can't work together
on instances like this and have a botnet killswitch
Trust (or lack thereof).
If networking tools were designed properly it wouldn't matter...
its about designing tools for the intentional
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