So if you want to launch a DoS attack against a specific IP address you spoof
TCP3389 SYNs to networks single homed to XO and they will null it for you.
--
Leigh
On 8 Nov 2011, at 04:36, Blake T. Pfankuch bl...@pfankuch.me wrote:
Oh yes! Good lord I about went insane with this. I was
On Nov 7, 2011, at 10:06 PM, clay...@haydel.org wrote:
transit provider. Is XO the end-access provider for either you or the
destination site? Or are both of those on some other connection, and XO
is a bystander along the way?
We're a direct customer. The IP's that I've seen them
- Original Message -
From: clay...@haydel.org
transit provider. Is XO the end-access provider for either you or the
destination site? Or are both of those on some other connection, and XO
is a bystander along the way?
We're a direct customer. The IP's that I've seen them block
- Original Message -
From: clay...@haydel.org
There have several more cases like this, and XO has not been forthcoming
with information. We're either looking to be exempted from this filtering
or at least get a detailed description of how the system works. I'm not
sure how they think
transit provider. Is XO the end-access provider for either you or the
destination site? Or are both of those on some other connection, and XO
is a bystander along the way?
We're a direct customer. The IP's that I've seen them block have been
both on our network and on remote networks, so I
Oh yes! Good lord I about went insane with this. I was working with a
customer single homed to cBeyond. I spent 3 hours on the phone with cBeyond to
figure out what was going on, it looks like a broken route. Come to find out
it was an XO security null. The engineer on the phone from
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