Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-06-04 Thread Jay R. Ashworth
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 06:08:47AM -0700, Joel Jaeggli wrote: Dorn Hetzel wrote: There is a really huge difference in the ease with which payment from a credit card can be reversed if fraudulent, and the amount of effort necessary to reverse a wire transfer. I won't go so far as to say that

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-06-04 Thread Jay R. Ashworth
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 11:10:40AM -0700, Joel Jaeggli wrote: Barry Shein wrote: Equating port 25 use with domestic terrorism is specious. Ammonium nitrate requires requires some care in handling regardless of your intentions,see for exmple the oppau or texas city disasters. And

RE: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-30 Thread michael.dillon
So to get Amazon to police their customers either requires regulation or an external economic pressure. Blocking AWS from folk's mail servers would apply some pressure, No it would not. That is what AWS wants you to to. making areas of the net go dark to AWS would apply more pressure

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-30 Thread Robert E. Seastrom
I'm not on the MLC (which doesn't have any community representatives on it at present) anymore. Nonetheless, I implore everyone to consider this thread dead. It's run far enough afield on speculation and analogies that I for one think it's fairly out of scope. Thanks,

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Al Iverson
On Wed, May 28, 2008 at 11:08 PM, Barry Shein [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I am a big, big fan of assessing charges for AUP abuse and making some realistic attempt to try to make sure it's collectible, and otherwise make some attempt to know who you're doing business with. Just out of curiosity,

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Joel Jaeggli
Dorn Hetzel wrote: There is a really huge difference in the ease with which payment from a credit card can be reversed if fraudulent, and the amount of effort necessary to reverse a wire transfer. I won't go so far as to say that reversing a wire transfer is impossible, but I would claim it's

RE: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Matthew Huff
aim: matthewbhuff | Fax: 914-460-4139 -Original Message- From: Joel Jaeggli [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2008 9:09 AM To: Dorn Hetzel Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: amazonaws.com? Dorn Hetzel wrote: There is a really huge difference in the ease with which

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Dorn Hetzel
Oh, come on... Businesses buy services every day that have to be paid for by methods like wire transfer. We're not talking about making it the only payment method, just the method for deposits for risky services. I wonder what percentage of Amazon E2C customers even want outbound port 25 access

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Dorn Hetzel
www.otaotr.com | Phone: 914-460-4039 aim: matthewbhuff | Fax: 914-460-4139 -Original Message- From: Joel Jaeggli [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, May 29, 2008 9:09 AM To: Dorn Hetzel Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: amazonaws.com? Dorn Hetzel wrote

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Joel Jaeggli
@nanog.org Subject: Re: amazonaws.com http://amazonaws.com? Dorn Hetzel wrote: There is a really huge difference in the ease with which payment from a credit card can be reversed if fraudulent, and the amount of effort necessary to reverse a wire transfer. I won't go so

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Barry Shein
On May 28, 2008 at 23:53 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Beckman) wrote: Getting someone to fax their ID in takes extra time and resources, and means it might be hours before you get your account approved, and for some service providers, part of the value of the service is the immediacy

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Barry Shein
On May 29, 2008 at 09:07 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Al Iverson) wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2008 at 11:08 PM, Barry Shein [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I am a big, big fan of assessing charges for AUP abuse and making some realistic attempt to try to make sure it's collectible, and otherwise make

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Barry Shein
On May 29, 2008 at 06:46 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Joel Jaeggli) wrote: Dorn Hetzel wrote: Yeah, there was a day when anyone could buy a pickup truck full of ammonium nitrate fertilizer from a random feed store and not attract any attention at all, now, maybe not. Just like port 25, it has

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Luke S Crawford
Peter Beckman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: If you are taking card-not-present credit card transactions over the ...snip hard to charge fradulent customers and also verifying customer identity annoys the customer... points- The goal here is to give abuse a negative expected return. One way to

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Joel Jaeggli
Barry Shein wrote: On May 29, 2008 at 06:46 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Joel Jaeggli) wrote: Dorn Hetzel wrote: Yeah, there was a day when anyone could buy a pickup truck full of ammonium nitrate fertilizer from a random feed store and not attract any attention at all, now, maybe not. Just

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Peter Beckman
On Thu, 29 May 2008, Luke S Crawford wrote: Peter Beckman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: If you are taking card-not-present credit card transactions over the ...snip hard to charge fradulent customers and also verifying customer identity annoys the customer... points- The goal here is to give

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Barry Shein
What I really, really, (really), don't understand is what is this perverse urge to argue incessantly that spam and related do little or no harm, are of little consequence, and nothing can be done about it anyhow? You'd think we were discussing ways to prevent hurricanes (and some won't even

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Luke S Crawford
Peter Beckman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: ...snip use snort suggestion This is what I think we should ALL be doing -- monitoring our own network to make sure we aren't the source, via customers, of the spam or DOS attacks. All outbound email from your own network should be scanned by

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Joel Jaeggli
Barry Shein wrote: What I really, really, (really), don't understand is what is this perverse urge to argue incessantly that spam and related do little or no harm, are of little consequence, and nothing can be done about it anyhow? You'd think we were discussing ways to prevent hurricanes (and

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Ian Mason
On 27 May 2008, at 16:33, Robert Bonomi wrote: From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mon May 26 21:16:58 2008 Date: Tue, 27 May 2008 07:46:26 +0530 From: Suresh Ramasubramanian [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Colin Alston [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: amazonaws.com? Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tue, May 27, 2008 at 1

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-29 Thread Paul Vixie
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ian Mason) writes: On 27 May 2008, at 16:33, Robert Bonomi wrote: Amazon _might_ 'get a clue' if enough providers walled off the EC2 space, and they found difficulty selling cycles to people who couldn't access the machines to set up their compute applications. This

RE: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-28 Thread Tony Finch
On Tue, 27 May 2008, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But a more advanced intelligence will wonder why we have to have an SMTP server architecture that invites attacks. Why, by definition, do SMTP servers have to accept connections from all comers, by default? We have shown that other architectures

RE: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-28 Thread michael.dillon
I don't see how, in your preferred replacement email architecture, a provider would be able to avoid policing their users to prevent spam in the way that you complain is so burdensome. To begin with, mail could only enter such a system through port 587 or through a rogue operator signing

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-28 Thread Dorn Hetzel
: Re: amazonaws.com? Well the thing that differentiates the cloud is that there is an infinite amount of resources, the ability to have anonymous access, and the infinite amount of identities. Basically Amazon has allocated a /18, /19, and /17 to EC2. The chances of getting the same IP between

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-28 Thread Joe Abley
On 28 May 2008, at 16:34, Sargun Dhillon wrote: Well the thing that differentiates the cloud is that there is an infinite amount of resources, the ability to have anonymous access, and the infinite amount of identities. That sounds great. Presumably in addition to the above the sun is

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-28 Thread Jay R. Ashworth
On Wed, May 28, 2008 at 12:01:30PM -0500, Skywing wrote: That's somewhat ironic of a sentiment you referred to there, given that the conception that one should have to hand over one's SSN for verification to anyone who asks for it is the kind of thing that many of these spammers/phishers

RE: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-28 Thread michael.dillon
I think the straightforward fix is for Amazon to put some practical mail guidelines together for their environment Has anyone making these suggestions ever thought to look at the Amazon Web Services agreement that governs these EC2 customers?

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-28 Thread Peter Beckman
On Wed, 28 May 2008, Barry Shein wrote: On May 28, 2008 at 21:43 [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Beckman) wrote: On Wed, 28 May 2008, Dorn Hetzel wrote: I would think that simply requiring some appropriate amount of irrevocable funds (wire transfer, etc) for a deposit that will be forfeited in

RE: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-27 Thread Robert Bonomi
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Tue May 27 12:06:50 2008 Subject: RE: amazonaws.com? Date: Tue, 27 May 2008 18:08:16 +0100 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] If the address-space owner won't police it's own property, there is no reason for the rest of the world to spend the time

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-27 Thread Colin Alston
On 27/05/2008 20:53 Robert Bonomi wrote: Because the _privilege_ to send packets to other networks has been, from 'day one', conditional on the presumption that the sending network _is_ a good neighbor to the networks receiving their traffic. You need to wake up Dorothy, this isn't Kansas

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-25 Thread Barry Shein
If I may be so bold as to summarize a few posts: It's ok to let spammers and other criminals use your systems (e.g., compute clouds) to slam others just so long as you get yourself into the various blacklists. But I thought (routed) bandwidth was the ISP's stock in trade? And trust (e.g.,

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-24 Thread Colin Alston
On 24/05/2008 02:42 Steve Atkins wrote: If you're seeing something more egregious than just deluges of spam then [EMAIL PROTECTED] would likely be the right people to talk to. They've been contacted about it and, AIUI, state that the spam being sent from there is not something they're going to

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-24 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Sat, May 24, 2008 at 12:13 PM, Kee Hinckley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On May 24, 2008, at 3:24 AM, Colin Alston wrote: You should not accept SMTP from the Amazon EC2 cloud at all. Amazon don't intend for anyone to use it as an email platform and tell their clients to use an external relay.

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-24 Thread Barry Shein
not to excuse this, but... it's not a simple problem. The 'bad guy' rolls up to the website, orders 200 machines for 20 mins under the name 'xplosiveman' pays with some paypal/CC and runs his/her job. That job happens to create a bunch of email outbound. It could be a legitimate email

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-23 Thread Patrick Clochesy
EC2 is a pay-per-cycle service, where you can run your work on their servers. Probably one of their clients. Try [EMAIL PROTECTED] -Patrick On May 23, 2008, at 6:59 PM, Barry Shein [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Is it just us or does someone pWn *.amazonaws.com? Every one of our mail servers is

Re: amazonaws.com?

2008-05-23 Thread Chris Stone
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Patrick Clochesy wrote: EC2 is a pay-per-cycle service, where you can run your work on their servers. Probably one of their clients. Try [EMAIL PROTECTED] -Patrick On May 23, 2008, at 6:59 PM, Barry Shein [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Is it