> On 19 Jun 2016, at 6:05 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote:
>
> On Fri, 17 Jun 2016, cidr-rep...@potaroo.net wrote:
>
>>
>> TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes
>> Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name
>> 1 - 202.65.32.0/2128086 0.8% AS10131 -- CKTELECOM-CK-AP
You did.
--
"Everybody is a genius. But if you judge a fish by
its ability to climb a tree, it will live its whole
life believing that it is stupid."
--Albert Einstein
From Larry's Cox account.
On Fri, 17 Jun 2016, cidr-rep...@potaroo.net wrote:
TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes
Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name
1 - 202.65.32.0/2128086 0.8% AS10131 -- CKTELECOM-CK-AP Telecom Cook
Islands, CK
2 - 110.170.17.0/24 21868 0.7% AS134438 -- AIRAAIFUL-AS-AP Aira &
On 7/25/2015 08:26, Max Tulyev wrote:
Unassigned ASN is used and even is in top of the list? WTF?!
On 25.07.15 01:00, cidr-rep...@potaroo.net wrote:
Rank ASNUpds % Upds/PfxAS-Name
2 - AS22059 140461 3.6% 70230.5 -- -Reserved AS-,ZZ
It appears it
Unassigned ASN is used and even is in top of the list? WTF?!
On 25.07.15 01:00, cidr-rep...@potaroo.net wrote:
Rank ASNUpds % Upds/PfxAS-Name
2 - AS22059 140461 3.6% 70230.5 -- -Reserved AS-,ZZ
cidr-report writes:
BGP Update Report
Interval: 20-Nov-14 -to- 27-Nov-14 (7 days)
Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072
TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS
Rank ASNUpds % Upds/PfxAS-Name
[...]
11 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics,
Simon == Simon Leinen simon.lei...@switch.ch writes:
Simon Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now:
Simon 133439 5
Simon 197945 4
my bet is on someone using the syntax prepend asnX timesY on a router
that instead wants prepend asnX asnX
--
Pierfrancesco Caci, ik5pvx
Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
On 11/30/2014 午後 11:24, Pierfrancesco Caci wrote:
Simon == Simon Leinen simon.lei...@switch.ch writes:
Simon Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now:
I'm currently looking into AS3 in an attempt to figure out what's going on.
Always interested to hear what others have found out.
Cheers,
Harry
On Nov 30, 2014 8:57 AM, Simon Leinen simon.lei...@switch.ch wrote:
cidr-report writes:
BGP Update Report
Interval: 20-Nov-14 -to- 27-Nov-14
On Mon, 01 Dec 2014 00:53:07 +0900, Paul S. said:
Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
You're new here, aren't you? :)
pgpeSOBr2fqm8.pgp
Description: PGP signature
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 12:53:07AM +0900, Paul S. wrote:
Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
Of course not because their neighbors are allowing it to
pass; so as with all hijacks, deaggregation, and other
On 11/30/2014 11:26 AM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
On Mon, 01 Dec 2014 00:53:07 +0900, Paul S. said:
Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
You're new here, aren't you? :)
Thank you, I needed the
.-- My secret spy satellite informs me that at 2014-11-30 6:24 AM
Pierfrancesco Caci wrote:
Simon == Simon Leinen simon.lei...@switch.ch writes:
Simon Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now:
Simon 133439 5
Simon 197945 4
my bet is on someone using the syntax prepend
- Original Message -
From: Joe Provo nanog-p...@rsuc.gweep.net
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 12:53:07AM +0900, Paul S. wrote:
Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
Of course not because their
I’m not new here but the thread caught my eye, as I am one of the lower ASs
being mentioned. I guess there isn’t really anything one can do to prevent
these things other than listening to route servers, etc. I guess it’s all on
what the upstream decides to allow-in and re-advertise.
Jason
- Original Message -
Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating
outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case?
Of course not because their neighbors are allowing it to
pass; so as with all hijacks, deaggregation, and other
unfiltered noise, the
It's not just AS_PATH, a lot of the reason so many duplicate updates
occur (nearly 50% of all updates at times, and often more during the
busiest times) is because on the other end implementations don't keep
egress advertisement state per attribute (e.g., if cluster_list length
just triggered
On Mar 30, 2010, at 9:30 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
might some of this be that the implementations use router-id to fill in
an unconfigured rr cluster-id?
Yep! So intermediate nodes in an iBGP topology with varying cluster
IDs per RR with a common client set can certainly result in duplicate
On Sun, Mar 28, 2010 at 01:20:04AM -0400, Anton Kapela wrote:
So, this week, I actually read the update report. Noting the stats below (..a
flap/update once per minute? please, fix your CPE router), I have but one
humble request:
Could the settlement-free members of the DFZ please consider
Joe,
The problem is that unless one is holding customer routes in a
seperate VRF and dampen them there or take similar steps to
segment, dampening leads directly to blackholes. Even in that
case, failover within that VRF wouldn't work, as all
implementations I've seen attack the prefix
I'm guessing that the top 20 unstable ASes are Korean or Asian is
related to the cable cuts in Asia?
cidr-rep...@potaroo.net wrote:
BGP Update Report
Interval: 13-Aug-09 -to- 20-Aug-09 (7 days)
Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072
TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS
Rank ASNUpds
It's nice to give Kazakhstan a break for a week or so. :p
On Sat, Aug 22, 2009 at 12:56 AM, Matthew Moyle-Croft
m...@internode.com.auwrote:
I'm guessing that the top 20 unstable ASes are Korean or Asian is related
to the cable cuts in Asia?
cidr-rep...@potaroo.net wrote:
BGP Update Report
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