RE: Pros and Cons of Cloud Computing in dealing with DDoS

2009-11-05 Thread Stefan Fouant
-Original Message- From: jeffrey.l...@gmail.com [mailto:jeffrey.l...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Jeffrey Lyon Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 1:20 PM To: Stefan Fouant Cc: NANOG list Subject: Re: Pros and Cons of Cloud Computing in dealing with DDoS DDoS is a threat to the cloud

Re: Email filtering and protection Help

2009-11-05 Thread Gregory Hicks
From: Mark Urbach mark.urb...@pnpt.com To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Email filtering and protection Help Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 12:02:43 -0600 Today we use Postini for inbound email protection. Today we use Symantec's SMTP Gateway (running on Solaris) for outgoing email filtering. (helps

RE: Email filtering and protection Help

2009-11-05 Thread Jason Gurtz
Does anyone have recommendations for other products/software to filter our outgoing email, from our customers going to the internet. For Roll-your-own it's hard to beat a combo of MIMEDefang/SA/Clam (MD is a milter, so sendmail or postfix needed). The MIMEDefang developer also started a

Re: Pros and Cons of Cloud Computing in dealing with DDoS

2009-11-05 Thread Joe Greco
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Thu, Nov 5, 2009 at 10:27 AM, Seth Mattinen se...@rollernet.us wrote: Jeffrey Lyon wrote: DDoS is a threat to the cloud just as DDoS is a threat to any other service when you fail to implement protection. Our company recently put out

Re: Pros and Cons of Cloud Computing in dealing with DDoS

2009-11-05 Thread Paul Ferguson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Thu, Nov 5, 2009 at 10:27 AM, Seth Mattinen se...@rollernet.us wrote: Jeffrey Lyon wrote: DDoS is a threat to the cloud just as DDoS is a threat to any other service when you fail to implement protection. Our company recently put out a DDoS

RE: Email filtering and protection Help

2009-11-05 Thread Dave Larter
I (we) use SBG, if you like the Symantec stuff it is much better than the SMS SMTP product. -Original Message- From: Gregory Hicks [mailto:ghi...@hicks-net.net] Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 2:31 PM To: nanog@nanog.org; mark.urb...@pnpt.com Subject: Re: Email filtering and protection

Re: Email filtering and protection Help

2009-11-05 Thread John Levine
Postini also does outgoing email filtering. Just requires setup. Based on the amount of spam their customers send me, it doesn't work very well. R's, John

Re: Pros and Cons of Cloud Computing in dealing with DDoS

2009-11-05 Thread Roland Dobbins
On Nov 6, 2009, at 2:11 AM, Stefan Fouant wrote: Obviously the cloud is no different than any other infrastructure insofar as implementing protection mechanisms. Ample bandwidth (typically more so than in the enterprise) should make it easier to absorb larger amounts of the bad stuff.

Re: Upstream BGP community support

2009-11-05 Thread Steve Meuse
Randy Bush expunged (ra...@psg.com): i try to complicate the internals of my network as little as possible, after all, complexity == opex and i value my time, it is a non-renewable resource. I'm guessing you don't have the same financial constraints that others on this list have. When you

Re: Upstream BGP community support

2009-11-05 Thread Steve Meuse
Jack Bates expunged (jba...@brightok.net): I think creating a standard or at least a template might push more people to adopt communities support and to use them. I put this up there with trynig to define inter-provider QoS. You are never going to get two business to agree to the same

Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Bryan King
Did I miss a thread on this? Has anyone looked at this yet? http://m.news.com/2166-12_3-10390779-38.html Section 508 of H.R.3817: SEC. 508. PENALTY FOR MISREPRESENTATION OF SIPC MEMBERSHIP OR PROTECTION. Section 14 of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78jjj) is

Re: Upstream BGP community support

2009-11-05 Thread Jack Bates
Steve Meuse wrote: I put this up there with trynig to define inter-provider QoS. You are never going to get two business to agree to the same model.and after all, community support is basically a business tool. I know from experience that some providers deliberately constrain their

Re: Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Thu, 05 Nov 2009 16:40:09 CST, Bryan King said: Did I miss a thread on this? Has anyone looked at this yet? `(2) INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS- Any Internet service provider that, on or through a system or network controlled or operated by the Internet service provider, transmits, routes,

Re: Upstream BGP community support

2009-11-05 Thread Daniel Roesen
On Mon, Nov 02, 2009 at 02:13:38PM -0600, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: Rather than simply double the size and break it up into 32:32, the designers reserved the top 16 bits for type and subtype attributes, leaving you only 48 bits to work with. Clearly the only suitable mapping for support of

Re: Human Factors and Accident reduction/mitigation

2009-11-05 Thread Robert Boyle
At 09:20 AM 11/5/2009, Owen DeLong wrote: Regarding Reliability and Availability: We could learn a lot about this from Aviation. Owen, I think if we conducted a poll, a disproportionate percentage of NANOG folks are likely also pilots (compared to the general population anyway) I agree

Re: Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Mark Andrews
In message 23895.1257461...@turing-police.cc.vt.edu, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu writes: --==_Exmh_1257461806_2581P Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii On Thu, 05 Nov 2009 16:40:09 CST, Bryan King said: Did I miss a thread on this? Has anyone looked at this yet? `(2) INTERNET

Re: Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Steven Bellovin
On Nov 5, 2009, at 5:56 PM, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote: On Thu, 05 Nov 2009 16:40:09 CST, Bryan King said: Did I miss a thread on this? Has anyone looked at this yet? `(2) INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS- Any Internet service provider that, on or through a system or network controlled or

Re: Human Factors and Accident reduction/mitigation

2009-11-05 Thread Michael Peddemors
On November 5, 2009, Robert Boyle wrote: It's because someone circumvented the rules, processes, and cross checks put in place to prevent the problem in the first place. Nothing can be made idiot proof because idiots are so creative. -Robert SEL/MEL Private Instrument No, no

Re: Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Richard Bennett
I think the idea is for the government to create an official blacklist of the offending sites, and for ISPs to consult it before routing a packet to the fraud site. The common implementation would be an ACL on the ISPs border router. The Congress doesn't yet understand the distinction between

Re: Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Steven Bellovin
On Nov 5, 2009, at 7:44 PM, Richard Bennett wrote: I think the idea is for the government to create an official blacklist of the offending sites, and for ISPs to consult it before routing a packet to the fraud site. The common implementation would be an ACL on the ISPs border router. The

Re: Human Factors and Accident reduction/mitigation

2009-11-05 Thread Owen DeLong
On Nov 5, 2009, at 4:30 PM, Michael Peddemors wrote: On November 5, 2009, Robert Boyle wrote: It's because someone circumvented the rules, processes, and cross checks put in place to prevent the problem in the first place. Nothing can be made idiot proof because idiots are so creative.

Re: Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Richard Bennett
IANAL, but I wouldn't set too much stock by that order - there are numerous errors of fact in the opinion, and much of it relates to the lack of due process in the maintenance of a secret blacklist. It was also a state law, not a federal one, so there was a large jurisdictional question (the

Re: Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Jeffrey Lyon
Net neutrality suffers another blow. I liked Congress when they had no idea what the internet was, now they've progressed to still have no idea but like to pretend. Jeff On Thu, Nov 5, 2009 at 7:58 PM, Steven Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu wrote: On Nov 5, 2009, at 7:44 PM, Richard Bennett

RE: Pros and Cons of Cloud Computing in dealing with DDoS

2009-11-05 Thread Stefan Fouant
-Original Message- From: Paul Ferguson [mailto:fergdawgs...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 8:26 PM On Thu, Nov 5, 2009 at 4:46 PM, Stefan Fouant sfou...@shortestpathfirst.com wrote: Actually, no - the miscreants are always going to have more bandwidth at their

Re: Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

2009-11-05 Thread Eric Brunner-Williams
Barry Shein wrote: I was at an IP (as in intellectual property), um, constituency I think, IPC, meeting at ICANN which basically consisted of 99 lawyers and me in the room. By the Montevideo ICANN meeting '01 the Internet Service Providers Constituency (ISPC) had dwindled down to the

Re: Upstream BGP community support

2009-11-05 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
On Fri, Nov 06, 2009 at 12:04:18AM +0100, Daniel Roesen wrote: On Mon, Nov 02, 2009 at 02:13:38PM -0600, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: Rather than simply double the size and break it up into 32:32, the designers reserved the top 16 bits for type and subtype attributes, leaving you only 48