Re: Australian Dark Fibre Providers - Sydney

[Tim Raphael]

Hi Scott,

NextHop (https://www.nexthop.com.au/) is probably worth a look if you're
looking for within the Sydney 2000 area or between Sydney metro DCs.
Unicast me and I can do an intro if you like.

- Tim

On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 12:42 PM scott  wrote:

>
> On 3/10/2021 3:37 PM, Rod Beck wrote:
>
> Anyone besides Superloop?
>
> ---
>
>
> Try over on AusNOG.
>
>
> scott
>

Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Sean Donelan]

Emergency responders run into buildings everyone else is running out of. 
Keep their safety in mind when designing your mega-data centers.



https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/fire-destroys-ovhclouds-sbg2-data-center-strasbourg/

The emergency services of Bas-Rhin sent 115 firefighters and 44 machines 
including six "cannon launchers" and two ladders, according to the DNA 
report. The facility is virtually on the French border, and other 
resources were mobilized across the border in Germany, according to a 
press release from Bas-Rhin. A Franco-German pump boat, Europa 1, carrying 
a German crew, helped put out the fire, taking water directly from the 
Rhine.

Re: Australian Dark Fibre Providers - Sydney

[scott]

On 3/10/2021 3:37 PM, Rod Beck wrote:

Anyone besides Superloop?


---


Try over on AusNOG.


scott

Australian Dark Fibre Providers - Sydney

[Rod Beck]

Anyone besides Superloop?

Regards,

Roderick.


Roderick Beck

Global Network Capacity Procurement

United Cable Company

www.unitedcablecompany.com
https://unitedcablecompany.com/video/
New York City & Budapest

rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com

Budapest: 36-70-605-5144

NJ: 908-452-8183



[1467221477350_image005.png]

Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Jeff Shultz]

That'll work. :-)

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 2:10 PM Sabri Berisha  wrote:

> - On Mar 10, 2021, at 1:41 PM, Jeff Shultz 
> wrote:
>
> The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the
>> fire department was on strike.
>
> Report I saw had the fire department on site in 3 minutes of the call.
> They even had a German-manned fireboat "Europa 1" working the fire from the
> water side.
>
> That's pretty impressive. It does make me wonder how long it took for them
> to be notified, and why on earth the fire spread so fast that the entire DC
> was lost...
>
> And because, for once, the French were not on strike, I donated $10 to the
> American Red Cross.
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Sabri
>


-- 
Jeff Shultz

-- 
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Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Randy Bush]

> No, French Superheroes flew in from Le Café du Peintre near the
> Bastille in under 30 nanoseconds. However, it was still futile.

jingoism does not deter fires

Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Töma Gavrichenkov]

Peace,

On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 1:10 AM Sabri Berisha  wrote:
> And because, for once, the French were not on strike, I donated $10 to the 
> American Red Cross.

I believe the American Red Cross has long given up even trying to
figure out who donates them how much and why.

--
Töma

Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Sabri Berisha]

- On Mar 10, 2021, at 1:41 PM, Jeff Shultz  wrote: 

>> The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the
>> fire department was on strike.
> Report I saw had the fire department on site in 3 minutes of the call. They 
> even
> had a German-manned fireboat "Europa 1" working the fire from the water side.

That's pretty impressive. It does make me wonder how long it took for them to 
be notified, and why on earth the fire spread so fast that the entire DC was 
lost... 

And because, for once, the French were not on strike, I donated $10 to the 
American Red Cross. 

Thanks, 

Sabri 

Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Rod Beck]

No, French Superheroes flew in from Le Café du Peintre near the Bastille in 
under 30 nanoseconds. However, it was still futile.

-R.


From: NANOG  on behalf 
of Jeff Shultz 
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 10:41 PM
To: North American Network Operators' Group 
Subject: Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

Report I saw had the fire department on site in 3 minutes of the call. They 
even had a German-manned fireboat "Europa 1" working the fire from the water 
side.

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 11:37 AM Sabri Berisha 
mailto:sa...@cluecentral.net>> wrote:
- On Mar 10, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Bryan Holloway 
br...@shout.net wrote:

Hi,

> Fire Department was there in under five minutes.

I assume your Enron DC was in the U.S.?

The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the
fire department was on strike.

Thanks,

Sabri


--
Jeff Shultz


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Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Jeff Shultz]

Report I saw had the fire department on site in 3 minutes of the call. They
even had a German-manned fireboat "Europa 1" working the fire from the
water side.

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 11:37 AM Sabri Berisha 
wrote:

> - On Mar 10, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Bryan Holloway br...@shout.net wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> > Fire Department was there in under five minutes.
>
> I assume your Enron DC was in the U.S.?
>
> The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the
> fire department was on strike.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Sabri
>


-- 
Jeff Shultz

-- 
Like us on Social Media for News, Promotions, and other information!!

   
      
      
      














_ This message 
contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual 
named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, 
distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by 
e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail 
from your system. E-mail transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or 
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Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Rod Beck]

Sounds like France. 😃


From: NANOG  on behalf 
of Sabri Berisha 
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 8:34 PM
To: Bryan Holloway 
Cc: nanog 
Subject: Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

- On Mar 10, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Bryan Holloway br...@shout.net wrote:

Hi,

> Fire Department was there in under five minutes.

I assume your Enron DC was in the U.S.?

The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the
fire department was on strike.

Thanks,

Sabri

Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Sabri Berisha]

- On Mar 10, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Bryan Holloway br...@shout.net wrote:

Hi,

> Fire Department was there in under five minutes.

I assume your Enron DC was in the U.S.?

The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the
fire department was on strike.

Thanks,

Sabri

Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Bryan Holloway]

Vitrol™ -- Ask for it by name.

At $dayjob-1 I ran one of Enron's old (abandoned) datacenters which was 
built in the early aughts or earlier.


Even that had full pre-action systems, which we once triggered when one 
of my colleagues accidentally hooked up a battery backwards.


*poof*

Fire Department was there in under five minutes.

So yeah -- seems a little weird.


On 3/10/21 7:16 PM, Randy Bush wrote:

the conjecturbation is only surpassed by the vitrol

Re: AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Randy Bush]

the conjecturbation is only surpassed by the vitrol

AW: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Gunther Stammwitz]

According to these pictures a similar part of the datacenter (SBX4) was built 
with wood.
https://twitter.com/MedecineLibre/status/1369618937063817219
Ceilings at least. Walls?

-Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
Von: NANOG Im Auftrag von Andy Ringsmuth
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 10. März 2021 16:42
An: nanog@nanog.org
Betreff: Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥


> On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler  wrote:
>
> Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their 
> datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is 
> destroyed“) in a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary.
>
> https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-impo
> rtant-incendie-dans-une-entreprise-situee-sur-un-site-seveso-au-port-d
> u-rhin

Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression 
systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.

Unless they didn’t exist?



Andy Ringsmuth
5609 Harding Drive
Lincoln, NE 68521-5831
(402) 304-0083
a...@andyring.com

“Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas, 1863

Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Marco Teixeira]

I'm sure this is just a coincidence:
"OVHcloud has launched the process for a public offering (IPO) on the Paris
stock exchange. The announcement came on Monday, two days before a fire
destroyed one of the company's 32 global data centers in Strasbourg."

Cheers,



On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 4:03 PM David Hubbard 
wrote:

> Was thinking the exact same thing; they and Digital Ocean seem to compete
> for the number two spot behind China as a malicious traffic source on all
> my public facing networks.
>
> From the pics, the place looked like it has had quite a few semi-trailer
> containers added around it, perhaps they were running a little too much
> equipment in the building and it required power / hvac augmenting but fire
> suppression was left as it was...
>
>
>
> On 3/10/21, 8:55 AM, "NANOG on behalf of JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via NANOG"
>  nanog@nanog.org> wrote:
>
> In addition to that, even if this is not good for many "honest" people
> that was using the DC, we need to take it in the positive side. In my own
> case, OVH is probably the cause of 80% of the abuse cases I report, and
> they never react. I'm convinced I'm not the only one, as I read in other
> ops mailing lists ...
>
> So, the positive side is a) during some days, we can see an
> interesting decrease in abuse cases, b) because the so many abuse cases,
> many OVH "honest" customers are often being filtered because they share
> addresses with the "bad guys", so it is an opportunity for them to move to
> alternative DCs that probably are more careful about "bad guys".
>
> A good topic for researchers :-)
>
> Regards,
> Jordi
> @jordipalet
>
>
>
> El 10/3/21 16:44, "NANOG en nombre de Andy Ringsmuth"
>  a...@andyring.com> escribió:
>
>
> > On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler 
> wrote:
> >
> > Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost
> their datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is
> destroyed“) in a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least
> temporary.
> >
> >
> https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-incendie-dans-une-entreprise-situee-sur-un-site-seveso-au-port-du-rhin
>
> Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire
> suppression systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.
>
> Unless they didn’t exist?
>
>
> 
> Andy Ringsmuth
> 5609 Harding Drive
> Lincoln, NE 68521-5831
> (402) 304-0083
> a...@andyring.com
>
> “Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas,
> 1863
>
>
>
>
> **
> IPv4 is over
> Are you ready for the new Internet ?
> http://www.theipv6company.com
> The IPv6 Company
>
> This electronic message contains information which may be privileged
> or confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of
> the individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized
> disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this
> information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly
> prohibited and will be considered a criminal offense. If you are not the
> intended recipient be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or
> use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including
> attached files, is strictly prohibited, will be considered a criminal
> offense, so you must reply to the original sender to inform about this
> communication and delete it.
>
>
>
>
>

Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire ????

[Rich Kulawiec]

If you give people the means to hurt you, and they do it, and
you take no action except to continue giving them the means to
hurt you, and they take no action except to keep hurting you,
then one of the ways you can describe the situation is "it isn't
scaling well".
--- Paul Vixie (on NANOG)

1. I have every OVH network block that I'm aware of permanently firewalled
out.  I recommend the same to everyone else, unless you're doing research.

2. When something burns that's not supposed to burn, that was designed
not to burn, that was built not to burn, that was operated not to burn,
then one of the distinct possibilities is that it wasn't an accident.

---rsk

Re: Cable Landing Station Address

[Rod Beck]

I found it. 😃😃😃

And it is probably not a coincidence that the staff at the facility are posed 
on the beach. The cable goes into a bore pipe on the beach and into the 
facility. Infrapedia was useful because it allowed me to pinpoint the building. 
Then I used the building's owner to get the street address.

https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-viettel

https://www.google.com/maps/place/Viettel+B%C3%A0+R%E1%BB%8Ba+V%C5%A9ng+T%C3%A0u+(Ch%C3%ADnh+th%E1%BB%A9c)/@10.3647686,107.0847827,19z/data=!4m8!1m2!2m1!1zdmlldHRlbCBjYWJsZSBsYW5kaW5nIHN0YXRpb24gbmVhciBQaMOzIMSQ4bupYyBDaMOtbmgsIFRo4bqvbmcgVGFtLCBUaMOgbmggcGjhu5EgVsWpbmcgVOG6p3UsIEJhIFJpYSAtIFZ1bmcgVGF1LCBWaWV0bmFt!3m4!1s0x31756f4c2a612769:0x45739089e004af9d!8m2!3d10.3646899!4d107.0848851
[https://maps.google.com/maps/api/staticmap?center=10.3647686%2C107.0847827&zoom=19&size=256x256&language=en&sensor=false&client=google-maps-frontend&signature=137iZu4LKaOj31oD8UdXOrZzkPc]
Google 
Maps
Find local businesses, view maps and get driving directions in Google Maps.
www.google.com




From: Sean Donelan 
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 4:38 PM
To: Rod Beck 
Cc: Mehmet Akcin ; North American Network Operators Group 

Subject: Re: Cable Landing Station Address


Street addresses aren't universal in all countries.

On Wed, 10 Mar 2021, Rod Beck wrote:
> That little blue dot is the target. 🙂
>
> https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-viettel

Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[David Hubbard]

Was thinking the exact same thing; they and Digital Ocean seem to compete for 
the number two spot behind China as a malicious traffic source on all my public 
facing networks.

From the pics, the place looked like it has had quite a few semi-trailer 
containers added around it, perhaps they were running a little too much 
equipment in the building and it required power / hvac augmenting but fire 
suppression was left as it was...



On 3/10/21, 8:55 AM, "NANOG on behalf of JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via NANOG" 
 wrote:

In addition to that, even if this is not good for many "honest" people that 
was using the DC, we need to take it in the positive side. In my own case, OVH 
is probably the cause of 80% of the abuse cases I report, and they never react. 
I'm convinced I'm not the only one, as I read in other ops mailing lists ...

So, the positive side is a) during some days, we can see an interesting 
decrease in abuse cases, b) because the so many abuse cases, many OVH "honest" 
customers are often being filtered because they share addresses with the "bad 
guys", so it is an opportunity for them to move to alternative DCs that 
probably are more careful about "bad guys".

A good topic for researchers :-)

Regards,
Jordi
@jordipalet



El 10/3/21 16:44, "NANOG en nombre de Andy Ringsmuth" 
 escribió:


> On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler  
wrote:
> 
> Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their 
datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“) in 
a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary.
> 
> 
https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-incendie-dans-une-entreprise-situee-sur-un-site-seveso-au-port-du-rhin

Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire 
suppression systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.

Unless they didn’t exist?



Andy Ringsmuth
5609 Harding Drive
Lincoln, NE 68521-5831
(402) 304-0083
a...@andyring.com

“Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas, 1863




**
IPv4 is over
Are you ready for the new Internet ?
http://www.theipv6company.com
The IPv6 Company

This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or 
confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the 
individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, 
copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if 
partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be 
considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware 
that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this 
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prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the 
original sender to inform about this communication and delete it.

Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[John Von Essen]

So your saying my “bot” dashboard should show a decrease in volume today? 
Interesting… I might run some stats today to see if there is a noticeable drop 
in Europe.

-John

> On Mar 10, 2021, at 10:53 AM, JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via NANOG 
>  wrote:
> 
> In addition to that, even if this is not good for many "honest" people that 
> was using the DC, we need to take it in the positive side. In my own case, 
> OVH is probably the cause of 80% of the abuse cases I report, and they never 
> react. I'm convinced I'm not the only one, as I read in other ops mailing 
> lists ...
> 
> So, the positive side is a) during some days, we can see an interesting 
> decrease in abuse cases, b) because the so many abuse cases, many OVH 
> "honest" customers are often being filtered because they share addresses with 
> the "bad guys", so it is an opportunity for them to move to alternative DCs 
> that probably are more careful about "bad guys".
> 
> A good topic for researchers :-)
> 
> Regards,
> Jordi
> @jordipalet
> 
> 
> 
> El 10/3/21 16:44, "NANOG en nombre de Andy Ringsmuth" 
>  a...@andyring.com> escribió:
> 
> 
>> On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler  wrote:
>> 
>> Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their 
>> datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“) 
>> in a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary.
>> 
>> https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-incendie-dans-une-entreprise-situee-sur-un-site-seveso-au-port-du-rhin
> 
>Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression 
> systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.
> 
>Unless they didn’t exist?
> 
> 
>
>Andy Ringsmuth
>5609 Harding Drive
>Lincoln, NE 68521-5831
>(402) 304-0083
>a...@andyring.com
> 
>“Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas, 1863
> 
> 
> 
> 
> **
> IPv4 is over
> Are you ready for the new Internet ?
> http://www.theipv6company.com
> The IPv6 Company
> 
> This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or 
> confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the 
> individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, 
> copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if 
> partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be 
> considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware 
> that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this 
> information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly 
> prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the 
> original sender to inform about this communication and delete it.
> 
> 
> 

Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via NANOG]

In addition to that, even if this is not good for many "honest" people that was 
using the DC, we need to take it in the positive side. In my own case, OVH is 
probably the cause of 80% of the abuse cases I report, and they never react. 
I'm convinced I'm not the only one, as I read in other ops mailing lists ...

So, the positive side is a) during some days, we can see an interesting 
decrease in abuse cases, b) because the so many abuse cases, many OVH "honest" 
customers are often being filtered because they share addresses with the "bad 
guys", so it is an opportunity for them to move to alternative DCs that 
probably are more careful about "bad guys".

A good topic for researchers :-)

Regards,
Jordi
@jordipalet
 
 

El 10/3/21 16:44, "NANOG en nombre de Andy Ringsmuth" 
 escribió:


> On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler  wrote:
> 
> Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their 
datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“) in 
a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary.
> 
> 
https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-incendie-dans-une-entreprise-situee-sur-un-site-seveso-au-port-du-rhin

Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression 
systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.

Unless they didn’t exist?



Andy Ringsmuth
5609 Harding Drive
Lincoln, NE 68521-5831
(402) 304-0083
a...@andyring.com

“Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas, 1863




**
IPv4 is over
Are you ready for the new Internet ?
http://www.theipv6company.com
The IPv6 Company

This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or 
confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the 
individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, 
copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if 
partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be 
considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware 
that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this 
information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly 
prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the 
original sender to inform about this communication and delete it.

Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Matt Harris]

Matt Harris|Infrastructure Lead
816-256-5446|Direct
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On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 9:43 AM Andy Ringsmuth  wrote:

>
> > On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler  wrote:
> >
> > Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their
> datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“)
> in a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary.
> >
> >
> https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-incendie-dans-une-entreprise-situee-sur-un-site-seveso-au-port-du-rhin
>
> Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression
> systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.
>
> Unless they didn’t exist?
>

I was just discussing this with a buddy of mine. I'm hoping we get a
post-mortem that helps us understand what happened and how we can all do
better potentially as an industry. The fact that fire fighters (ostensibly
professionals, based out of what appears to be an industrial areas no less)
were unable to get the fire under control definitely indicates to me that
there was something exceptional going on there beyond a typical fire in a
data center environment.

There had to have been cascading failures somewhere along the line, though,
imho: whether that involve the engineering, implementation, or execution
stage or multiple thereof remains to be seen...

 - Matt

Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Andy Ringsmuth]

> On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler  wrote:
> 
> Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their datacenter 
> SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“) in a fire 🔥 
> and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary.
> 
> https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-incendie-dans-une-entreprise-situee-sur-un-site-seveso-au-port-du-rhin

Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression 
systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.

Unless they didn’t exist?



Andy Ringsmuth
5609 Harding Drive
Lincoln, NE 68521-5831
(402) 304-0083
a...@andyring.com

“Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas, 1863

Re: Cable Landing Station Address

[Sean Donelan]

Street addresses aren't universal in all countries.

On Wed, 10 Mar 2021, Rod Beck wrote:

That little blue dot is the target. 🙂

https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-viettel

Re: Network / Infrastructure security testing services

[Alain Hebert]

Shameless plug:

    We do that =D.

-
Alain Hebertaheb...@pubnix.net
PubNIX Inc.
50 boul. St-Charles
P.O. Box 26770 Beaconsfield, Quebec H9W 6G7
Tel: 514-990-5911  http://www.pubnix.netFax: 514-990-9443

On 3/10/21 9:57 AM, Andrew Latham wrote:

Is this a search for a FTE (best idea here) or consulting services?

On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 4:13 PM Nathanael Cariaga > wrote:


I'm looking for someone if anyone from this thread does it.

On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 3:05 PM jim deleskie mailto:deles...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Your asking if anyone does it or your offering your services?
>
> -jim
>
> On Tue., Mar. 9, 2021, 3:56 p.m. Nathanael Cariaga,
mailto:ncari...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> Apologies for this shameless plug, but wanted to ask if any
folks on this list who does network/infrastructure security
testing? Please to reach back to me off the list.
>>
>> Thank you for your time.
>>



--
- Andrew "lathama" Latham -

Re: Cable Landing Station Address

[Rod Beck]

That little blue dot is the target. 🙂

https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-viettel


From: NANOG  on behalf 
of Rod Beck 
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 3:57 PM
To: Mehmet Akcin 
Cc: North American Network Operators Group 
Subject: Re: Cable Landing Station Address

The cable system landing there is SMW3.

Vung Tau is the city and the system is AAE1.


From: Mehmet Akcin 
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 3:47 PM
To: Rod Beck 
Cc: J. Hellenthal ; North American Network Operators 
Group 
Subject: Re: Cable Landing Station Address

Danang International Cable Landing Station
https://goo.gl/maps/N7NJBAZc6iesdhBA8

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 06:42 Rod Beck 
mailto:rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com>> wrote:
I did and no street address, just the city.



From: Mehmet Akcin mailto:meh...@akcin.net>>
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 3:41 PM
To: J. Hellenthal mailto:jhellent...@dataix.net>>
Cc: North American Network Operators Group 
mailto:nanog@nanog.org>>; Rod Beck 
mailto:rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com>>
Subject: Re: Cable Landing Station Address

Did you google the address? If you did , it would have been very easy to find 
out.

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 06:29 J. Hellenthal 
mailto:jhellent...@dataix.net>> wrote:
Can you talk to …. Mehmet Akcin meh...@akcin.net 
“copied in” or someone he may be able to refer you to ?



https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-vnpt



> On Mar 10, 2021, at 08:13, Rod Beck 
> mailto:rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com>> 
> wrote:
>
> Vung Tau


--

J. Hellenthal

The fact that there's a highway to Hell but only a stairway to Heaven says a 
lot about anticipated traffic volume.






--
Mehmet
+1-424-298-1903
--
Mehmet
+1-424-298-1903

Re: Contact data for outlook.com

[sam]

Good news on our front, Microsoft did respond to cCircleNet's request 
and has cleared the issue.

Thanks for all of the feedback.

Sam Moats

On 2021-03-10 03:50, Arne Jensen wrote:

Here are some suggestions for improvements, for both of you, below...

Many postmasters (/networks) out there, are actually very strict on RFC
/ BCP compliance, where the slightest violation equals potentially
severe consequences:

Looking at circlenet.us, the domain itself has the caveat of going
directly against the Internet's RFC2182 / Best Current Practice #16.

... Are you by any chance using "Mail in a Box", or any of the other
packages, where the maintainers do not wish to follow standards / 
BCP's,

but instead suggests their users to ignore those?

-> https://discourse.mailinabox.email/t/dnswl-org-recommendations/667

Those "temporary network glitches" the author actually mentions having
"from time to time", is the exact consequence of violating the RFC2182 
/

Best Current Practice #16.

I would be very happy to see the whole world reject for such things 
like

that. Or said in another way: if you don't care enough about your own
stuff - why should any third party care about it, at all? :)

Next, it seems like your mail server DKIM signed your message, however,
there is no DKIM record on the relevant "mail._domainkey.circlenet.us."
TXT record, it yells DKIM.

Literally, for what seems to be against all kind of advice from the
whole email community, it seems like your server is actually rewriting
the client's original IP address ("Received:" header), to one of your
server's IP addresses, perhaps for some privacy reasons:


Received: from authenticated-user (mail.circlenet.us [51.222.96.171])
 (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits))
 (No client certificate requested)
 by mail.circlenet.us (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 59CE72A001B;
 Tue,  9 Mar 2021 12:07:56 + (UTC)

When Google (MX records of @NANOG.ORG) got your message, it arrived to
Google, from another IP address, with a dynamic / generic looking
hostname. This IP address was not authorized by your SPF record.

Received: from mail.circlenet.us (ip169.ip-51-222-96.net. 
[51.222.96.169])
 by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 
i8si2272841qki.324.2021.03.09.04.07.57

 for 
 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256);
 Tue, 09 Mar 2021 04:07:57 -0800 (PST)

Received-SPF: neutral (google.com: 51.222.96.169 is neither permitted 
nor

 denied by domain of s...@circlenet.us) client-ip=51.222.96.169;

Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
 dkim=temperror (no key for signature) header.i=@circlenet.us 
header.s=mail

 header.b=WCzH8ira;
 spf=neutral (google.com: 51.222.96.169 is neither permitted nor 
denied by

 domain of s...@circlenet.us) smtp.mailfrom=s...@circlenet.us


Literally no kind of authentiation (valid SPF, valid DKIM, ...), at 
all.

Rumours goes that Outlook.com is strict at SPF.

Ideally, your SMTP HELO/EHLO name should be identical to the PTR,
"mail.circlenet.us" is not equal to "ip169.ip-51-222-96.net" above.

For both of you, I would actually lean towards cleaning up / 
maintaining

your SPF records a little better:

- Always use ip6: ip4: directives for your own (static) mail servers.
- Then add the include: or whatever mechanisms that your third parties
require you to, for example "include:_spf.google.com", *** if they are
really needed, at that specific (sub)domain level ***.
- Then end your record, preferably with "-all" (hardfail), but
absolutely minimum of softfail. As restrictive as possible.

Sam, it sounds like you have at least the IPv4 /30 subnet (adapt it to
match your subnet), so a SPF like this, would be what I would do for
"circlenet.us":


"v=spf1 ip4:51.222.96.168/30 ip4:23.25.121.0/24 ip4:173.230.144.119/32
-all"


Dan, as for yours, on "omnigo.com":


v=spf1 ***mx*** ***a*** ***ip4:13.89.36.13/32*** ip4:13.110.6.214/32
ip4:168.61.173.54/32 ip4:23.99.213.249/32 ip4:207.164.169.226/32
ip4:54.174.52.85/32 ip4:68.185.106.96/28 ip4:63.246.31.7/32
ip4:13.78.237.56/32 ip4:13.108.0.0/14 ***a:smtp01.omnigo.com***
include:aspmx.pardot.
com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.salesforce.com
***~all***

***mx***: You are using Office 365 as inbound (MX) records, the bigger
ones are separate inbound/outbound servers, so take away this useless 
one.

***a***: You are proxying your domain over CloudFlare, CloudFlare will
never send any emails on your domain's behalf, so take away this 
useless

one.
***ip4:13.89.36.13/32***: See next, but chances are you should leave
this one.
***a:smtp01.omnigo.com***: This one literally duplicates the previous,
already authorized IP address, meaning you are authorizing
"ip4:13.89.36.13/32" twice, so take away this useless one.
***~all***: I would also here lean towards e.g. -all (hardfail).


I have been running "-all" (hardfail) since forever, literally since 
SPF
was created, and motivated everyone around me to do the same, and so 
far

without any issues.

As for 

Re: Network / Infrastructure security testing services

[Andrew Latham]

Is this a search for a FTE (best idea here) or consulting services?

On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 4:13 PM Nathanael Cariaga  wrote:

> I'm looking for someone if anyone from this thread does it.
>
> On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 3:05 PM jim deleskie  wrote:
> >
> > Your asking if anyone does it or your offering your services?
> >
> > -jim
> >
> > On Tue., Mar. 9, 2021, 3:56 p.m. Nathanael Cariaga, 
> wrote:
> >>
> >> Apologies for this shameless plug, but wanted to ask if any folks on
> this list who does network/infrastructure security testing? Please to reach
> back to me off the list.
> >>
> >> Thank you for your time.
> >>
>


-- 
- Andrew "lathama" Latham -

Re: Cable Landing Station Address

[Rod Beck]

The cable system landing there is SMW3.

Vung Tau is the city and the system is AAE1.


From: Mehmet Akcin 
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 3:47 PM
To: Rod Beck 
Cc: J. Hellenthal ; North American Network Operators 
Group 
Subject: Re: Cable Landing Station Address

Danang International Cable Landing Station
https://goo.gl/maps/N7NJBAZc6iesdhBA8

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 06:42 Rod Beck 
mailto:rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com>> wrote:
I did and no street address, just the city.



From: Mehmet Akcin mailto:meh...@akcin.net>>
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 3:41 PM
To: J. Hellenthal mailto:jhellent...@dataix.net>>
Cc: North American Network Operators Group 
mailto:nanog@nanog.org>>; Rod Beck 
mailto:rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com>>
Subject: Re: Cable Landing Station Address

Did you google the address? If you did , it would have been very easy to find 
out.

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 06:29 J. Hellenthal 
mailto:jhellent...@dataix.net>> wrote:
Can you talk to …. Mehmet Akcin meh...@akcin.net 
“copied in” or someone he may be able to refer you to ?



https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-vnpt



> On Mar 10, 2021, at 08:13, Rod Beck 
> mailto:rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com>> 
> wrote:
>
> Vung Tau


--

J. Hellenthal

The fact that there's a highway to Hell but only a stairway to Heaven says a 
lot about anticipated traffic volume.






--
Mehmet
+1-424-298-1903
--
Mehmet
+1-424-298-1903

Re: Cable Landing Station Address

[Mehmet Akcin]

Danang International Cable Landing Station
https://goo.gl/maps/N7NJBAZc6iesdhBA8

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 06:42 Rod Beck 
wrote:

> I did and no street address, just the city.
>
>
> --
> *From:* Mehmet Akcin 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 10, 2021 3:41 PM
> *To:* J. Hellenthal 
> *Cc:* North American Network Operators Group ; Rod Beck <
> rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com>
> *Subject:* Re: Cable Landing Station Address
>
> Did you google the address? If you did , it would have been very easy to
> find out.
>
> On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 06:29 J. Hellenthal 
> wrote:
>
> Can you talk to …. Mehmet Akcin meh...@akcin.net “copied in” or someone
> he may be able to refer you to ?
>
>
>
> https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-vnpt
>
>
>
> > On Mar 10, 2021, at 08:13, Rod Beck 
> wrote:
> >
> > Vung Tau
>
>
> --
>
> J. Hellenthal
>
> The fact that there's a highway to Hell but only a stairway to Heaven says
> a lot about anticipated traffic volume.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Mehmet
> +1-424-298-1903
>
-- 
Mehmet
+1-424-298-1903

Re: Cable Landing Station Address

[Rod Beck]

I did and no street address, just the city.



From: Mehmet Akcin 
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2021 3:41 PM
To: J. Hellenthal 
Cc: North American Network Operators Group ; Rod Beck 

Subject: Re: Cable Landing Station Address

Did you google the address? If you did , it would have been very easy to find 
out.

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 06:29 J. Hellenthal 
mailto:jhellent...@dataix.net>> wrote:
Can you talk to …. Mehmet Akcin meh...@akcin.net 
“copied in” or someone he may be able to refer you to ?



https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-vnpt



> On Mar 10, 2021, at 08:13, Rod Beck 
> mailto:rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com>> 
> wrote:
>
> Vung Tau


--

J. Hellenthal

The fact that there's a highway to Hell but only a stairway to Heaven says a 
lot about anticipated traffic volume.






--
Mehmet
+1-424-298-1903

Re: Cable Landing Station Address

[Mehmet Akcin]

Did you google the address? If you did , it would have been very easy to
find out.

On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 06:29 J. Hellenthal  wrote:

> Can you talk to …. Mehmet Akcin meh...@akcin.net “copied in” or someone
> he may be able to refer you to ?
>
>
>
> https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-vnpt
>
>
>
> > On Mar 10, 2021, at 08:13, Rod Beck 
> wrote:
> >
> > Vung Tau
>
>
> --
>
> J. Hellenthal
>
> The fact that there's a highway to Hell but only a stairway to Heaven says
> a lot about anticipated traffic volume.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
Mehmet
+1-424-298-1903

Re: Cable Landing Station Address

[J. Hellenthal via NANOG]

Can you talk to …. Mehmet Akcin meh...@akcin.net “copied in” or someone he may 
be able to refer you to ?



https://www.infrapedia.com/app/cls/vung-tau-vnpt



> On Mar 10, 2021, at 08:13, Rod Beck  wrote:
> 
> Vung Tau


-- 

J. Hellenthal

The fact that there's a highway to Hell but only a stairway to Heaven says a 
lot about anticipated traffic volume.

Cable Landing Station Address

[Rod Beck]

Vung Tau cable landing station - 3 cables include AAE1.

I want the street address which many not even exist given PTT paranoia.



Roderick Beck

Global Network Capacity Procurement

United Cable Company

www.unitedcablecompany.com
https://unitedcablecompany.com/video/
New York City & Budapest

rod.b...@unitedcablecompany.com

Budapest: 36-70-605-5144

NJ: 908-452-8183



[1467221477350_image005.png]

OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire 🔥

[Fredy Kuenzler]

Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their datacenter 
SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“) in a fire 🔥 
and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary.

https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-incendie-dans-une-entreprise-situee-sur-un-site-seveso-au-port-du-rhin

--
Fredy Künzler

Init7 (Switzerland) Ltd.
Technoparkstrasse 5
CH-8406 Winterthur
https://www.init7.net/

Re: Contact data for outlook.com

[Arne Jensen]

Here are some suggestions for improvements, for both of you, below...

Many postmasters (/networks) out there, are actually very strict on RFC
/ BCP compliance, where the slightest violation equals potentially
severe consequences:

Looking at circlenet.us, the domain itself has the caveat of going
directly against the Internet's RFC2182 / Best Current Practice #16.

... Are you by any chance using "Mail in a Box", or any of the other
packages, where the maintainers do not wish to follow standards / BCP's,
but instead suggests their users to ignore those?

-> https://discourse.mailinabox.email/t/dnswl-org-recommendations/667

Those "temporary network glitches" the author actually mentions having
"from time to time", is the exact consequence of violating the RFC2182 /
Best Current Practice #16.

I would be very happy to see the whole world reject for such things like
that. Or said in another way: if you don't care enough about your own
stuff - why should any third party care about it, at all? :)

Next, it seems like your mail server DKIM signed your message, however,
there is no DKIM record on the relevant "mail._domainkey.circlenet.us."
TXT record, it yells DKIM.

Literally, for what seems to be against all kind of advice from the
whole email community, it seems like your server is actually rewriting
the client's original IP address ("Received:" header), to one of your
server's IP addresses, perhaps for some privacy reasons:

> Received: from authenticated-user (mail.circlenet.us [51.222.96.171])
>  (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits))
>  (No client certificate requested)
>  by mail.circlenet.us (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 59CE72A001B;
>  Tue,  9 Mar 2021 12:07:56 + (UTC)
When Google (MX records of @NANOG.ORG) got your message, it arrived to
Google, from another IP address, with a dynamic / generic looking
hostname. This IP address was not authorized by your SPF record.

> Received: from mail.circlenet.us (ip169.ip-51-222-96.net. [51.222.96.169])
>  by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id i8si2272841qki.324.2021.03.09.04.07.57
>  for 
>  (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256);
>  Tue, 09 Mar 2021 04:07:57 -0800 (PST)
>
> Received-SPF: neutral (google.com: 51.222.96.169 is neither permitted nor
>  denied by domain of s...@circlenet.us) client-ip=51.222.96.169; 
>
> Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
>  dkim=temperror (no key for signature) header.i=@circlenet.us header.s=mail
>  header.b=WCzH8ira; 
>  spf=neutral (google.com: 51.222.96.169 is neither permitted nor denied by
>  domain of s...@circlenet.us) smtp.mailfrom=s...@circlenet.us

Literally no kind of authentiation (valid SPF, valid DKIM, ...), at all.
Rumours goes that Outlook.com is strict at SPF.

Ideally, your SMTP HELO/EHLO name should be identical to the PTR,
"mail.circlenet.us" is not equal to "ip169.ip-51-222-96.net" above.

For both of you, I would actually lean towards cleaning up / maintaining
your SPF records a little better:

- Always use ip6: ip4: directives for your own (static) mail servers.
- Then add the include: or whatever mechanisms that your third parties
require you to, for example "include:_spf.google.com", *** if they are
really needed, at that specific (sub)domain level ***.
- Then end your record, preferably with "-all" (hardfail), but
absolutely minimum of softfail. As restrictive as possible.

Sam, it sounds like you have at least the IPv4 /30 subnet (adapt it to
match your subnet), so a SPF like this, would be what I would do for
"circlenet.us":

> "v=spf1 ip4:51.222.96.168/30 ip4:23.25.121.0/24 ip4:173.230.144.119/32
> -all"

Dan, as for yours, on "omnigo.com":

> v=spf1 ***mx*** ***a*** ***ip4:13.89.36.13/32*** ip4:13.110.6.214/32
> ip4:168.61.173.54/32 ip4:23.99.213.249/32 ip4:207.164.169.226/32
> ip4:54.174.52.85/32 ip4:68.185.106.96/28 ip4:63.246.31.7/32
> ip4:13.78.237.56/32 ip4:13.108.0.0/14 ***a:smtp01.omnigo.com***
> include:aspmx.pardot.
> com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.salesforce.com
> ***~all***
***mx***: You are using Office 365 as inbound (MX) records, the bigger
ones are separate inbound/outbound servers, so take away this useless one.
***a***: You are proxying your domain over CloudFlare, CloudFlare will
never send any emails on your domain's behalf, so take away this useless
one.
***ip4:13.89.36.13/32***: See next, but chances are you should leave
this one.
***a:smtp01.omnigo.com***: This one literally duplicates the previous,
already authorized IP address, meaning you are authorizing
"ip4:13.89.36.13/32" twice, so take away this useless one.
***~all***: I would also here lean towards e.g. -all (hardfail).


I have been running "-all" (hardfail) since forever, literally since SPF
was created, and motivated everyone around me to do the same, and so far
without any issues.

As for the classic forwarding issue, you can ask yourself - if the
bigger ones like PayPal, Bank of America, and so on, are NOT going to
set less restrictive policies d