Re: Re: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route?
On Fri, Nov 11, 2022 at 8:49 AM Lukas Tribus wrote: > > On Fri, 11 Nov 2022 at 14:00, Christopher Morrow > wrote: > > Also, also, possibly the output path on the session(s) here is not > > filtering in an OV fashion. > > ROV belongs on the input path, let's not ROV on the output towards > customers / route collectors. sure. This assumes a 100% coverage for all inputs to the rib-out on the customer port we're talking about, though. If you don't have 100% coverage you'll end up with the leaks seen/reported by the OP. I don't mean to say/imply: "Hey, everyone(anyone) should do OV on output" I mean to say that: "Hey, if you see OV failures leaking, this is probably a side effect of the behavior/design choices a network made." (not doing OV filtering on one of peer/customer/transit type peerings." -chris
RE: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route?
FYI, Huawei routers support Egress ROV. > -Original Message- > From: NANOG > [mailto:nanog-bounces+zhuangshunwan=huawei@nanog.org] On Behalf > Of Randy Bush > Sent: Saturday, November 12, 2022 12:49 AM > To: Lukas Tribus > Cc: 孙乐童 ; sh...@cernet.edu.cn; > nanog@nanog.org > Subject: Re: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route? > > > ROV belongs on the input path, let's not ROV on the output towards > > customers / route collectors. > > 8893 > > randy
Re: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route?
> ROV belongs on the input path, let's not ROV on the output towards > customers / route collectors. 8893 randy
Re: Re: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route?
On Fri, 11 Nov 2022 at 14:00, Christopher Morrow wrote: > Also, also, possibly the output path on the session(s) here is not > filtering in an OV fashion. ROV belongs on the input path, let's not ROV on the output towards customers / route collectors. Announcing bigger, ROV valid/unkown aggregates, while really routing based on possibly ROV-invalid more specifics in the FIB is akin to actively obscuring routing security, "cheating" your way to a RAS. Yes, there are some very specific situations where output ROV is beneficial (a peering box not supporting ROV and you ask your peer to ROV their output), but let's not normalize ROV on the output path. Thanks, Lukas
Re: Re: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route?
There are 2 sides to the bgp conversation for any ASN, and then really 4 sides. customer -> RAS -> peer (settlement-free) peer(sfp) -> RAS -> customer customer -> ras -> transit transit -> ras -> customer Depending on the RAS's capabilities or status in their journey to 'fully RAS', it's possible that they may have: o "We OV all customer sessions" (notably not SFP peers) o "We OV all sessions(*)" (noting not all, and maybe depending on platform specifics) There are a bunch of ways this goes wrong :( This also doesn't really tell what sort of peering the RAS has set up with RouteViews (customer? peer? partial peer?) Also, also, possibly the output path on the session(s) here is not filtering in an OV fashion. On Thu, Nov 10, 2022 at 9:13 AM 孙乐童 wrote: > > Hello Job, > Thank you very much for your reply! I got that no AS can actually filter > all the invalids. Yet I was trying to figure out why we couldn't see > reasonable amount of withdrawals from AS6939 about invalid prefixes, as they > explained how they implement ROV > (https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2020-June/108309.html). Perhaps we > need to learn their detailed implementations. > Thank you very much! > > Best wishes, > Sun Letong > > 在2022-11-08 00:11:24,Job Snijders写道： > > Dear 孙乐童, > > > > On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 08:40:57PM +0800, 孙乐童 wrote: > > > We learned from Cloudflare's https://isbgpsafeyet.com/ that some ASes > > > have deployed RPKI Origin Validation (ROV). However, we downloaded BGP > > > collection data from RouteViews and RipeRis platforms and found that > > > some ROV-ASes can announce some invalid routes. For example, from RIB > > > data at 2022-10-31 00:00:00, 13 out of 17 ASes which declared to > > > deploy ROV announced invalid routes, and we list the number of related > > > prefixes for each AS below. > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > As a comparison, we count the invalid routes the non-ROV ASes (also > > > declared in https://isbgpsafeyet.com/) announces, as below: > > > > > > We can see that ROV ASes announced apparently fewer invalid routes > > > compared to the non-ROV ASes, though they did not filter all the > > > invalids. > > > > > > [snip] > > > > > > Can anyone help us to correctly interpret this case? Thank you very much. > > > > You ask great questions! I hope an answer to your questions can be found > > in a message I sent a year ago: > > > > https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-April/213346.html > > > > The summary: in any sufficiently large network, chances are not 100% of > > all equipment supports RPKI-based BGP Route Origin Validation; in such > > cases a handful of invalid routes may still percolate through the > > system. Another contributing factor might be certain types of software > > upgrades; where ROV temporarily is disabled on one or more devices. Or > > perhaps an ISP made a handful of exceptions for test/beacon invalid > > routes to propagate. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Job >
Re: Re: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route?
Hello Job, Thank you very much for your reply! I got that no AS can actually filter all the invalids. Yet I was trying to figure out why we couldn't see reasonable amount of withdrawals from AS6939 about invalid prefixes, as they explained how they implement ROV (https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2020-June/108309.html). Perhaps we need to learn their detailed implementations. Thank you very much! Best wishes, Sun Letong 在2022-11-08 00:11:24,Job Snijders写道： > Dear 孙乐童, > > On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 08:40:57PM +0800, 孙乐童 wrote: > > We learned from Cloudflare's https://isbgpsafeyet.com/ that some ASes > > have deployed RPKI Origin Validation (ROV). However, we downloaded BGP > > collection data from RouteViews and RipeRis platforms and found that > > some ROV-ASes can announce some invalid routes. For example, from RIB > > data at 2022-10-31 00:00:00, 13 out of 17 ASes which declared to > > deploy ROV announced invalid routes, and we list the number of related > > prefixes for each AS below. > > > > [snip] > > > > As a comparison, we count the invalid routes the non-ROV ASes (also > > declared in https://isbgpsafeyet.com/) announces, as below: > > > > We can see that ROV ASes announced apparently fewer invalid routes > > compared to the non-ROV ASes, though they did not filter all the > > invalids. > > > > [snip] > > > > Can anyone help us to correctly interpret this case? Thank you very much. > > You ask great questions! I hope an answer to your questions can be found > in a message I sent a year ago: > > https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-April/213346.html > > The summary: in any sufficiently large network, chances are not 100% of > all equipment supports RPKI-based BGP Route Origin Validation; in such > cases a handful of invalid routes may still percolate through the > system. Another contributing factor might be certain types of software > upgrades; where ROV temporarily is disabled on one or more devices. Or > perhaps an ISP made a handful of exceptions for test/beacon invalid > routes to propagate. > > Kind regards, > > Job
Re: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route?
aside from technical reasons for an ROV-supporting AS (RAS) to announce an ROV invalid prefix, there is an administrative one. the RAS's customers *pay* RAS to announce the customers' prefixes. so RAS is configured to propagate their customers' announcements without dropping invalids. randy
Re: Why do ROV-ASes announce some invalid route?
Dear 孙乐童, On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 08:40:57PM +0800, 孙乐童 wrote: > We learned from Cloudflare's https://isbgpsafeyet.com/ that some ASes > have deployed RPKI Origin Validation (ROV). However, we downloaded BGP > collection data from RouteViews and RipeRis platforms and found that > some ROV-ASes can announce some invalid routes. For example, from RIB > data at 2022-10-31 00:00:00, 13 out of 17 ASes which declared to > deploy ROV announced invalid routes, and we list the number of related > prefixes for each AS below. > > [snip] > > As a comparison, we count the invalid routes the non-ROV ASes (also > declared in https://isbgpsafeyet.com/) announces, as below: > > We can see that ROV ASes announced apparently fewer invalid routes > compared to the non-ROV ASes, though they did not filter all the > invalids. > > [snip] > > Can anyone help us to correctly interpret this case? Thank you very much. You ask great questions! I hope an answer to your questions can be found in a message I sent a year ago: https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2021-April/213346.html The summary: in any sufficiently large network, chances are not 100% of all equipment supports RPKI-based BGP Route Origin Validation; in such cases a handful of invalid routes may still percolate through the system. Another contributing factor might be certain types of software upgrades; where ROV temporarily is disabled on one or more devices. Or perhaps an ISP made a handful of exceptions for test/beacon invalid routes to propagate. Kind regards, Job
