Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-09 Thread Brian Rak
Also, abusix is not completely accurate (and they've never responded to 
my emails reporting problems).  For example, any IPs from apnic and 
nic.ad.jp return the registry's abuse address, which doesn't do anything.


Don't forget about all the providers with incorrect abuse contacts, or 
providers that require you to fill out some form, or providers that 
auto-respond with messages saying it's not their IP space (I'm looking 
at you charter... 71.90.222.x is definitely your space, despite what 
your abuse system thinks).


Some tips:
1) Verify the servers are still vulnerable.  This is pretty 
straightforward, and saves everyone involved some time
2) Your abuse emails should include tcpdump-like output (or you'll get 
tons of replies asking for logs)
3) Sticking to one abusive IP per email seems to get the best response 
rate (or you confuse all the automated systems for parsing these)
4) We provide instructions for fixing the issue for some common 
software... this seems to help some of the people who have no idea what 
they are doing.
5) Make sure you don't send this from your email address.  It should 
definitely be it's own mailbox due to volume of bounces and autoreplies 
you'll see.


Don't expect that sending abuse emails is going to have any noticeable 
effect on the size of the attacks you see.  The openresolverproject 
stats show the scope of the issue: 
http://openresolverproject.org/breakdown.cgi


On 11/8/2014 5:48 PM, Damian Menscher wrote:

I've used https://abusix.com/contactdb.html

Be prepared for a lot of backscatter.  You'll get autoresponders, automated
ticketing systems sending frequent updates, bounce messages (from full
abuse@ inboxes), and be surveyed for how well they're not performing.

Also, be prepared for ISPs / hosting providers to ask for additional
information, like logs proving the attack came from their customer.

Oh, and be prepared to feel sorry for their customers whose VMs are deleted
for hacking, rather than being informed of their misconfiguration.

On the bright side, some 10% will actually correct the problem, thereby
costing the attacker a few minutes of work to re-scan for active
amplifiers. :P

Damian
Professional Pessimist

On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 10:56 AM, srn.na...@prgmr.com wrote:


Like most small providers, we occasionally get hit by DoS attacks. We got
hammered by an SSDP
reflection attack (udp port 1900) last week. We took a 27 second log and
from there extracted
about 160k unique IPs.

It is really difficult to find abuse emails for 160k IPs.

We know about abuse.net but abuse.net requires hostnames, not IPs for
lookups and not all IP
addresses have valid DNS entries.

The only other way we know of to report problems is to grab the abuse
email addresses is whois.
However, whois is not structured and is not set up to deal with this
number of requests - even
caching whois data based on subnets will result in many thousands of
lookups.

Long term it seems like structured data and some kind of authentication
would be ideal for reporting
attacks. But right now how should we be doing it?





Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-09 Thread srn . nanog
On 11/09/2014 09:31 AM, Brian Rak wrote:

 Some tips:
 1) Verify the servers are still vulnerable.  This is pretty straightforward, 
 and saves everyone
 involved some time
For a DDOS, I'd be concerned that the provider would now think my activity was 
malicious.

 2) Your abuse emails should include tcpdump-like output (or you'll get tons 
 of replies asking for logs)
Is the output from nfdump close enough?

 3) Sticking to one abusive IP per email seems to get the best response rate 
 (or you confuse all the
 automated systems for parsing these)
The smallest email abuse report I sent last week contained over 15,000 IPs. Is 
it really better to
send that many emails?


Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-09 Thread Doug Barton

On 11/8/14 6:33 PM, Roland Dobbins wrote:

this is incorrect and harmful, and should be removed:

 iii.Consider dropping any DNS reply packets which are larger
than 512 Bytes – these are commonly found in DNS DoS Amplification attacks.

This *breaks the Internet*.  Don't do it.


+1


Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-09 Thread manning bill


On 9November2014Sunday, at 11:40, Doug Barton do...@dougbarton.us wrote:

 On 11/8/14 6:33 PM, Roland Dobbins wrote:
 this is incorrect and harmful, and should be removed:
 
 iii.Consider dropping any DNS reply packets which are larger
 than 512 Bytes – these are commonly found in DNS DoS Amplification attacks.
 
 This *breaks the Internet*.  Don't do it.
 
 +1

actually, if you think this will help you, by all means drop any DNS packets 
which are gt. 512bytes, not UDP, and not IPv4.

/bill



Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-09 Thread Larry Sheldon

On 11/9/2014 13:40, Doug Barton wrote:

On 11/8/14 6:33 PM, Roland Dobbins wrote:

this is incorrect and harmful, and should be removed:

 iii.Consider dropping any DNS reply packets which are larger
than 512 Bytes – these are commonly found in DNS DoS Amplification
attacks.

This *breaks the Internet*.  Don't do it.


+1


The whole thing  Really?

--
The unique Characteristics of System Administrators:

The fact that they are infallible; and,

The fact that they learn from their mistakes.


Quis custodiet ipsos custodes


Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-09 Thread Roland Dobbins

On 10 Nov 2014, at 8:23, Larry Sheldon wrote:

 The whole thing  Really?

Breaking DNS for your customers pretty much breaks the Internet for them, yes.

---
Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net


Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread McDonald Richards
Out of curiosity, have any of you had luck reporting the sources of attacks
to the admins of the origin ASNs?

Any failure or success stories you can share?

Macca


On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 6:20 PM, Paul Bennett paul.w.benn...@gmail.com
wrote:

 On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 2:00 AM, Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:
 
  On 8 Nov 2014, at 1:56, srn.na...@prgmr.com wrote:
 
  But right now how should we be doing it?
 
  http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/ip-to-asn.html

 Once you get the ASN or at least the domain name of the ISP providing
 service to the reflecting host, several major reputable ISPs
 (including my employer, who I can't name because I'm not an official
 spokesperson) will welcome RFC 5070 IODEF reports for general
 network abuse and RFC 5965 MARF format for email abuse, directed to
 abuse@ the main domain for that ISP.

 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5070.txt

 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5965.txt



 --
 Paul W Bennett



Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread Roland Dobbins


On 8 Nov 2014, at 17:09, McDonald Richards wrote:


Any failure or success stories you can share?


In my experience, it's the generally broadband access operators who will 
sometimes respond, when contacted about reflection/amplification attacks 
leveraging misconfigured, abusable CPE.


Generally speaking, networks running misconfigured, abusable devices by 
definition aren't very actively managed - and so those operators don't 
often respond, unless one has personal contacts within the relevant 
group(s).


YMMV, of course.

---
Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net


Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread Ruairi Carroll
Hey,

We've been hit on/off with large scale amplification attacks over the last
few years.

We found looking up src ASN of the attack and reporting is not super
helpful, as many blocks come from sub allocations and you'll just get
redirected to someone else. This will just cause more overhead and legwork
for you in the long run.

Whois data *seems* to be a little more reliable, and there's an abuseEmail
script out there that helps automate the abuse contact lookup (
http://abuseemail.sourceforge.net/ ).

We've added a bit of logic in front of this to aggregate the flows per
destination abuse email, then send a report with all listed flows +
timestamp.

Feel free to ping me offlist if you want some more info on this.

/Ruairi




On 7 November 2014 18:56, srn.na...@prgmr.com wrote:

 Like most small providers, we occasionally get hit by DoS attacks. We got
 hammered by an SSDP
 reflection attack (udp port 1900) last week. We took a 27 second log and
 from there extracted
 about 160k unique IPs.

 It is really difficult to find abuse emails for 160k IPs.

 We know about abuse.net but abuse.net requires hostnames, not IPs for
 lookups and not all IP
 addresses have valid DNS entries.

 The only other way we know of to report problems is to grab the abuse
 email addresses is whois.
 However, whois is not structured and is not set up to deal with this
 number of requests - even
 caching whois data based on subnets will result in many thousands of
 lookups.

 Long term it seems like structured data and some kind of authentication
 would be ideal for reporting
 attacks. But right now how should we be doing it?



Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread Miles Fidelman
I can offer an indirect story, and not quite a reflection attack, but a 
DDoS one.


We happen to have a host that had an IPMI board exposed to the net, that 
got compromised, and became a vector for a DDoS attack. The target 
reported the attack to at least some of the sources, including 
Windstream/Hosted Solutions, where this particular server is located.  
They contacted me, and I dealt with things with about a 1-hour 
turn-around from when a trouble ticket hit my inbox (well, still dealing 
with things - that IPMI card is offline until I get around to securing 
it, and it's the occasional reboot-by-phone-call until then).  So at 
least one small success.


Miles Fidelman


McDonald Richards wrote:

Out of curiosity, have any of you had luck reporting the sources of attacks
to the admins of the origin ASNs?

Any failure or success stories you can share?

Macca


On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 6:20 PM, Paul Bennett paul.w.benn...@gmail.com
wrote:


On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 2:00 AM, Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:

On 8 Nov 2014, at 1:56, srn.na...@prgmr.com wrote:


But right now how should we be doing it?

http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/ip-to-asn.html

Once you get the ASN or at least the domain name of the ISP providing
service to the reflecting host, several major reputable ISPs
(including my employer, who I can't name because I'm not an official
spokesperson) will welcome RFC 5070 IODEF reports for general
network abuse and RFC 5965 MARF format for email abuse, directed to
abuse@ the main domain for that ISP.

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5070.txt

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5965.txt



--
Paul W Bennett




--
In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice.
In practice, there is.    Yogi Berra



Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread srn . nanog
On 11/07/2014 11:20 PM, Paul Bennett wrote:
 On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 2:00 AM, Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:

 On 8 Nov 2014, at 1:56, srn.na...@prgmr.com wrote:

 But right now how should we be doing it?

 http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/ip-to-asn.html
 
 Once you get the ASN or at least the domain name of the ISP providing
 service to the reflecting host, several major reputable ISPs
 (including my employer, who I can't name because I'm not an official
 spokesperson) will welcome RFC 5070 IODEF reports for general
 network abuse and RFC 5965 MARF format for email abuse, directed to
 abuse@ the main domain for that ISP.
 
 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5070.txt
 
 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5965.txt

Thanks, the IP-subnet/ASN lookup and rfc5070 look like exactly what we need to 
start with.  I'm
fairly certain it would have gotten us the same contact for all the IPs we 
reported last week.

Since IODEF is so flexible, are there any exact guidelines or examples on how 
to use it to report a
DDOS? For example, should there be a separate XML document for each prefix or 
one for the entire
list? What I found was 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-mile-iodef-guidance-03#page-21 but it
could use some more explanation.


Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread srn . nanog
On 11/08/2014 03:30 AM, Ruairi Carroll wrote:

 Whois data *seems* to be a little more reliable, and there's an abuseEmail 
 script out there that
 helps automate the abuse contact lookup ( http://abuseemail.sourceforge.net/ 
 ).  

I believe this script is out of date and I would not use this script without 
doing a thorough
review/update. For example, 100.43.102.0/24 is reported to be reserved but 
whois clearly shows that
it is allocated to Xplornet Communications Inc. Then when I remove the reserved 
allocation from the
script, the abuse email returned is arin.net rather than xplornet.com.

Using

dig +short 102.43.100.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
and then
whois as22995

would have gotten me the same abuse email address as what I originally found.


RE: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread Frank Bulk
Do you know if third-parties such as SANS ISC or ShadowServer take lists of IPs?

Frank

-Original Message-
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of srn.na...@prgmr.com
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 12:57 PM
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

Like most small providers, we occasionally get hit by DoS attacks. We got 
hammered by an SSDP
reflection attack (udp port 1900) last week. We took a 27 second log and from 
there extracted
about 160k unique IPs.

It is really difficult to find abuse emails for 160k IPs.

We know about abuse.net but abuse.net requires hostnames, not IPs for lookups 
and not all IP
addresses have valid DNS entries.

The only other way we know of to report problems is to grab the abuse email 
addresses is whois.
However, whois is not structured and is not set up to deal with this number of 
requests - even
caching whois data based on subnets will result in many thousands of lookups.

Long term it seems like structured data and some kind of authentication would 
be ideal for reporting
attacks. But right now how should we be doing it?




Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread Yardiel D. Fuentes

Another DDoS/DoS email thread in progress, ah?... these seem to occur often 
lately...

SoPerfect timing to remind all in the list that there is a NANOG BCOP in 
the works on this topic. 

Some of us have been working on documenting our collective knowledge about real 
practices that
can help our community deal with this annoying networking decease...in a vendor 
agnostic manner...

Our DDoS/DoS attack Best Common Ops Practices doc seeks to provide 
community-wide guidelines 
on what to do before, during and after a DDoS/DoS attack.

If any of you want to contribute and join us to help the community on what we 
have documented so far, 
please check out the document below and/or drop me a note...

http://bcop.nanog.org/index.php/BCOP_Drafts


Yardiel Fuentes
yard...@gmail.com
twitter: #techguane


On Nov 8, 2014, at 6:19 PM, Frank Bulk wrote:

 Do you know if third-parties such as SANS ISC or ShadowServer take lists of 
 IPs?
 
 Frank
 
 -Original Message-
 From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of srn.na...@prgmr.com
 Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 12:57 PM
 To: nanog@nanog.org
 Subject: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks
 
 Like most small providers, we occasionally get hit by DoS attacks. We got 
 hammered by an SSDP
 reflection attack (udp port 1900) last week. We took a 27 second log and from 
 there extracted
 about 160k unique IPs.
 
 It is really difficult to find abuse emails for 160k IPs.
 
 We know about abuse.net but abuse.net requires hostnames, not IPs for lookups 
 and not all IP
 addresses have valid DNS entries.
 
 The only other way we know of to report problems is to grab the abuse email 
 addresses is whois.
 However, whois is not structured and is not set up to deal with this number 
 of requests - even
 caching whois data based on subnets will result in many thousands of lookups.
 
 Long term it seems like structured data and some kind of authentication would 
 be ideal for reporting
 attacks. But right now how should we be doing it?
 
 



Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-08 Thread Roland Dobbins


On 9 Nov 2014, at 6:46, Yardiel D. Fuentes wrote:


http://bcop.nanog.org/index.php/BCOP_Drafts


There are some good general recommendations in this document (Word 
format?  Really?), but this is incorrect and harmful, and should be 
removed:


	iii.	Consider dropping any DNS reply packets which are larger than 512 
Bytes – these are commonly found in DNS DoS Amplification attacks.


This *breaks the Internet*.  Don't do it.

---
Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net


Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-07 Thread srn . nanog
Like most small providers, we occasionally get hit by DoS attacks. We got 
hammered by an SSDP
reflection attack (udp port 1900) last week. We took a 27 second log and from 
there extracted
about 160k unique IPs.

It is really difficult to find abuse emails for 160k IPs.

We know about abuse.net but abuse.net requires hostnames, not IPs for lookups 
and not all IP
addresses have valid DNS entries.

The only other way we know of to report problems is to grab the abuse email 
addresses is whois.
However, whois is not structured and is not set up to deal with this number of 
requests - even
caching whois data based on subnets will result in many thousands of lookups.

Long term it seems like structured data and some kind of authentication would 
be ideal for reporting
attacks. But right now how should we be doing it?


Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-07 Thread Roland Dobbins

On 8 Nov 2014, at 1:56, srn.na...@prgmr.com wrote:

 But right now how should we be doing it?

http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/ip-to-asn.html

---
Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net


Re: Reporting DDOS reflection attacks

2014-11-07 Thread Paul Bennett
On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 2:00 AM, Roland Dobbins rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:

 On 8 Nov 2014, at 1:56, srn.na...@prgmr.com wrote:

 But right now how should we be doing it?

 http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/ip-to-asn.html

Once you get the ASN or at least the domain name of the ISP providing
service to the reflecting host, several major reputable ISPs
(including my employer, who I can't name because I'm not an official
spokesperson) will welcome RFC 5070 IODEF reports for general
network abuse and RFC 5965 MARF format for email abuse, directed to
abuse@ the main domain for that ISP.

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5070.txt

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5965.txt



--
Paul W Bennett