Re: AS29073, 196.16.0.0/14, Level3: Why does anyone peer with these schmucks?

Hello, AS29073 seem be visible (for anyone?) on AMS-IX routeserver. I think that can explain why many ASN peer with this network. So, thanks for this thread. I have filtered this ASN on AMS-IX RS (99 =>98). Johann 2017-08-17 5:51 GMT+02:00 Troy Mursch : > This discussion is

Verizon 701 Route leak?

Anyone from Verizon want to comment on a possible route leak on the 25th 10:30 PM EDT? Saw route table jump up to 737629 routes last night from 701. Marcus Josephson mjoseph...@inap.com * www.inap.com INAP (r) connectivity | colocation |

RE: Verizon 701 Route leak?

Damn you Google.. yup. Thanks for links. -Marcus From: Youssef Bengelloun-Zahr [mailto:benge...@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, August 28, 2017 11:47 AM To: Marcus Josephson Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Verizon 701 Route leak? Hello, Do you mean this one ?

MPLS Usage Survey

Dear all, At the Université de Liège (Belgium) and Université de Strasbourg (France), we are heavily working on measuring MPLS networks for a few years now (you can have a look at all our contributions here: http://montefiore.ulg.ac.be/~bdonnet/mpls/) In order to validate our techniques and

Re: How can I obtain the abuse e-mail address for IPs from Japan?

one more command. whois -h whois.nic.ad.jp KW419JP -- Kazunori ANDO / a...@kk.iij4u.or.jp On 2017/08/24 0:16, Kurt Kraut wrote: Hello Suresh, It doesn't seem to help a lot: ktk@ktk:~$ whois -h whois.nic.ad.jp 59.106.13.181 [ JPNIC database provides information regarding IP address and ASN.

Re: Verizon 701 Route leak?

Hello, Do you mean this one ? https://dyn.com/blog/large-bgp-leak-by-google-disrupts-internet-in-japan/ https://bgpmon.net/bgp-leak-causing-internet-outages-in-japan-and-beyond/ https://mobile.twitter.com/bgpmon/status/901565301048803329 Best regards. > Le 25 août 2017 à 08:58, Marcus

Re: Verizon 701 Route leak?

On Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 03:48:44PM +, someone wrote: > Damn you Google.. yup. I am not sure it is fair to say "damn you Google", because accidents happen (be it through human error or software defects). All of us have entered commands at some point and subsequently

Re: Hurricane Harvey - Network Status (FCC)

These held up well in previous examples as well until their batteries ran down. So we'll have to see if they continue to be operational as the water drains away. On Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 05:47:33PM +, Robert Jacobs wrote: > Large network provider in the middle of this... This event will

Re: Hurricane Harvey - Network Status (FCC)

On 2017-08-27 20:58, Tim Jackson wrote: > KHOU's local transmitter (Missouri City I think is where it's at) seems to > be back on the air, but with all production from WFAA out of Dallas. KHOU had a tweet with video showing the water flooding into their offices/studios and staff having to leave.

RE: Hurricane Harvey - Network Status (FCC)

Large network provider in the middle of this... This event will re-write all of our DR plans... Telecom and communication systems are holding up extremely well with high water and multi-county power outages caused by high-water... I commend all those out in this responding to immediate needs of

Hijack Factories: AS203418, AS205944, and AS203040

Executive Summary: AS203418 (Marketigames, LLC), together with its one and only immediate IPv4 upstream, AS203040 (Mint Company, LLC), and its sister network, AS205944 (MediaClick, LLC) either are currently hijacking or have recently hijacked multiple abandoned /16 IPv4

Re: Verizon 701 Route leak?

On 28/08/17 18:34, Job Snijders wrote: > Finally, it may be worthwhile exploring if we can standardize and > promote maximum prefix limits applied on the the _sending_ side. This > way you protect your neighbor (and the Internet at large) by > self-destructing when you inadvertently announce more

Re: Hurricane Harvey - Network Status (FCC)

Tropical Storm Harvey FCC DIRS and FEMA Operations report August 28, 2017: Emergency Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts between August 25-28 issued by NWS Houston (and surrounding metro area) 154 tornado warnings 149 flood warnings 67 flash flood warnings 27 reported tornados 5 civil

Re: Cogent BCP-38

> On Aug 17, 2017, at 9:11 AM, William Herrin wrote: > > Doesn't loose mode URPF allow packets from anything that exists in the > routing table regardless of source? Seems just about worthless. You're > allowing the site to spoof anything in the routing table which is NOT >

Re: Hijack Factories: AS203418, AS205944, and AS203040

Sorry to follow-up on myself, but I just now realized that I made a small omission in my earlier post. I indicated that AS205944 (MediaClick, LLC) had previously hijacked the 116.79.0.0/16 block. That is true, but it may perhaps have led some people to incorrectly conclude that AS205944 was not