Re: [RFC] Ethernet Cheap Cryptography

2006-10-20 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
Pawel Foremski writes: Consider such an example: our task is to bridge two LANs managed by a third-party ISP over a wireless link, with the highest performance possible for such medium. The ISP has its clients on one LAN and a PPPoE concentrator on the second one. Because the ISP doesn't

Re: [RFC] Ethernet Cheap Cryptography

2006-10-20 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
David Miller writes: From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Stephen J. Bevan) Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2006 19:18:41 -0700 Pawel Foremski writes: Secondly, IPsec won't decrease MSS in TCP encapsulated in PPPoE traffic, for example. Various, commercial, IPsec products decrease the MSS

Re: [RFC] Ethernet Cheap Cryptography

2006-10-19 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
Pawel Foremski writes: First, ccrypts task is to secure Ethernet, not IP. Understood, but the vast majority of traffic running over Ethernet that a user cares about is IP and so IPsec does the job. Obviously IPsec cannot handle non-IP traffic but the question is what non-IP traffic do users

Re: [RFC] Ethernet Cheap Cryptography

2006-10-18 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
Dawid Ciezarkiewicz writes: You're right. I'll add such documentation. For now - short version: as a company dealing with wifi regularly we often come to a problem - using wifi bridges with strengths like price, CE included, easy integration, good bandwidth, distance etc. - that those

[RFC] Ethernet Cheap Cryptography

2006-10-17 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
Dawid Ciezarkiewicz writes: I'd be thankful for your opinions about that idea. Please forgive me any nuances that I didn't know about. * I suggest extending the documentation with some motivating examples of why someone would want to use this rather than IPsec for IP and/or in what

Re: Suppress / delay SYN-ACK

2006-10-12 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
Caitlin Bestler writes: More to the point, on what basis would the application be rejecting a connection request based solely on the SYN? Perhaps not the reason that Martin is interested in but ... Say you are writing a transparent proxy i.e. when a TCP connection is made through the box,

Re: ProxyARP and IPSec

2006-09-22 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
David Miller writes: Essentially, if you use ports as part of your selector, then it is impossible to handle anything other than the first fragment of a fragmented frame because the subsequent fragments will not have the ports which you need in order to match. If you have port/protocol

Re: ProxyARP and IPSec

2006-09-05 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
Alexey Kuznetsov writes: Probably, you are not aware that standard IPsec tunnel device, if it is created: 1. Probably, will not accept fragmented frames, because IPsec cannot handle them IPsec can handle them, though not particularly smoothly if the IPsec tunnel is only supposed to

Re: ProxyARP and IPSec

2006-09-02 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
sarcasm What I great idea. Now I just have to get every host I want to interoperate with to support a nonstandard configuration. The scary part is that if I motivate it with Linux is too stupid to handle standard tunnel-mode IPsec I might actually get away with it. /sarcasm

[patch] RFC: matching interface groups

2006-08-02 Thread Stephen J. Bevan
Balazs Scheidler writes: I would like to easily match a set of dynamically created interfaces from my packet filter rules. The attached patch forms the basis of my implementation and I would like to know whether something like this is mergeable to mainline. [snip] The implementation: