Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

Hi, Stephen and James, Looks like the selinux_sk_ctxid() call implemented in James' patch also requires the sk_callback_lock (see below). I am planning to introduce a new exported fucntion selinux_sock_ctxid() which does not require any locking. Comments? thanks, Catherine Stephen Smalley

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

On Tue, 2006-03-21 at 08:32 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote: I don't expect security_sk_sid() to be terribly expensive. It's not an AVC check, it's just propagating a label. But I've not done any benchmarking on that. No permission check there, but it looks like it does read lock

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

* Chris Wright ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: * Ingo Oeser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: Hi Chris, Andrew Morton wrote: Ingo Oeser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: -int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm) -{ - struct task_struct *p =

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

Chris Wright [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: * Chris Wright ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: * Ingo Oeser ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: Hi Chris, Andrew Morton wrote: Ingo Oeser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: -int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

* Andrew Morton ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: Chris Wright [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Catherine, the security_sid_to_context() is a raw SELinux function which crept into core code and should not have been there. The fallout fixes included conditionally exporting security_sid_to_context, and

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

From: Chris Wright [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 13:36:36 -0800 The point of Catherine's original patch was to make sure there's always a security identifier associated with AF_UNIX messages. So receiver can always check it (same as having credentials even w/out sender control

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

* David S. Miller ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: From: Chris Wright [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 13:36:36 -0800 The point of Catherine's original patch was to make sure there's always a security identifier associated with AF_UNIX messages. So receiver can always check it (same

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

On Mon, 20 Mar 2006, David S. Miller wrote: I'm seriously considering backing out Catherine's AF_UNIX patch from the net-2.6.17 tree before submitting it to Linus later today so that none of this crap goes in right now. I believe Catherine is away this week, so it's probably best to drop the

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

From: James Morris [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2006 19:37:51 -0500 (EST) I believe Catherine is away this week, so it's probably best to drop the code and wait till she gets back and we can get it 100% right. Ok, agreed. Sorry, this is my fault, I should have caught this problem.

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

On Mon, Mar 13, 2006 at 09:05:31PM +0100, Ingo Oeser wrote: From: Ingo Oeser [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fold __scm_send() into scm_send() and remove that interface completly from the kernel. Whoa, what are you doing here? Uninlining scm_send() is a Bad Thing to do given that scm_send() is in the

[PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

From: Ingo Oeser [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fold __scm_send() into scm_send() and remove that interface completly from the kernel. Signed-off-by: Ingo Oeser [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Inspired by the patch to inline scm_send() I did the next logical step :-) Regards Ingo Oeser diff --git

Re: [PATCH] scm: fold __scm_send() into scm_send()

Ingo Oeser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: -int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm) -{ -struct task_struct *p = current; -scm-creds = (struct ucred) { -.uid = p-uid, -.gid = p-gid, -.pid = p-tgid -};