Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On 01/11/2018 04:58 PM, Dan Williams wrote: > On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote: >> On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote: >>> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 1:54 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote: > On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote: > >> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: >> > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote: >> > > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Tue, 9 Jan 2018, Josh Poimboeuf wrote: > On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote: > > > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > > > [ ... snip ... ] > > >> Andi Kleen (1): > > >> x86,

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 11:44:05AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote: > > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote: > > > > [ ... snip ... ] > >> Andi Kleen (1): > >> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok > >> > >>

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote: [ ... snip ... ] > Andi Kleen (1): > x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok > > Dan Williams (13): > x86: implement nospec_barrier() > [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution > carl9170:

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina wrote: > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote: > > [ ... snip ... ] >> Andi Kleen (1): >> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok >> >> Dan Williams (13): >> x86: implement nospec_barrier() >> [media]

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

* Alan Cox wrote: > On Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:08:36 +0100 > Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman > > > wrote: >

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On 01/05/18 22:30, Dan Williams wrote: On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: Please expand this. It is not clear what the static analysis is looking for. Have a clear description of what is being fixed is crucial for allowing any of these changes.

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 11:43:42AM +, Alan Cox wrote: > On Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:08:36 +0100 > Peter Zijlstra wrote: > > > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman > > >

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:08:36 +0100 Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman > > wrote: > > > In at least one place (mpls) you are patching a fast

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:30:16PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman > wrote: > > In at least one place (mpls) you are patching a fast path. Compile out > > or don't load mpls by all means. But it is not acceptable to change

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 11:37 AM, Dan Williams wrote: > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Dan Williams wrote: >> Quoting Mark's original RFC: >> >> "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack >> against speculative

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Dan Williams wrote: > Quoting Mark's original RFC: > > "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack > against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows > explicit bounds checks to be bypassed

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

Le 01/05/18 à 17:09, Dan Williams a écrit : > Quoting Mark's original RFC: > > "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack > against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows > explicit bounds checks to be bypassed under speculation, providing an >

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

It sounds like Coverity was used to produce these patches? If so, is there a plan to have smatch (hey Dan) or other open source static analysis tool be possibly enhanced to do a similar type of work? I'd love for that to happen; the tricky part is being able to have even a sort of sensible

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Dan Williams writes: > >> Quoting Mark's original RFC: >> >> "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack >> against speculative execution. One of these, known as

Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

Dan Williams writes: > Quoting Mark's original RFC: > > "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack > against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows > explicit bounds checks to be bypassed under speculation, providing an

[PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

Quoting Mark's original RFC: "Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows explicit bounds checks to be bypassed under speculation, providing an arbitrary read gadget. Further details can be found on the