On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 19:54 -0400, David Miller wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet
> Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2016 13:51:46 -0700
>
> > On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 13:46 -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> >
> >> We have at least 384 bytes of padding in skb->head (this is struct
> >> skb_shared_info).
> >>
> >> Whatever
From: Eric Dumazet
Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2016 13:51:46 -0700
> On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 13:46 -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>
>> We have at least 384 bytes of padding in skb->head (this is struct
>> skb_shared_info).
>>
>> Whatever garbage we might read, current code is fine.
>>
>> We have to deal with
From: Jan Engelhardt
Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2016 22:20:39 +0200 (CEST)
>
> On Monday 2016-03-28 21:29, David Miller wrote:
> > @@ -3716,6 +3716,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb,
> > length--;
> > continue;
> > default:
>>>
On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 23:11 +0200, Jozsef Kadlecsik wrote:
> In net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c we copy the options into a
> buffer with skb_header_pointer(), so it's not a false positive there and
> the KASAN report referred to that part.
>
Although the out of bound could be one extra
On Mon, 28 Mar 2016, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 22:20 +0200, Jan Engelhardt wrote:
> > On Monday 2016-03-28 21:29, David Miller wrote:
> > >>> > > @@ -3716,6 +3716,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff
> > >>> > > *skb,
> > >>> > > length--;
> > >>> > >
On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 13:46 -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> We have at least 384 bytes of padding in skb->head (this is struct
> skb_shared_info).
>
> Whatever garbage we might read, current code is fine.
>
> We have to deal with a false positive here.
Very similar to the one fixed in
https://git
On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 22:20 +0200, Jan Engelhardt wrote:
> On Monday 2016-03-28 21:29, David Miller wrote:
> >>> > > @@ -3716,6 +3716,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff
> >>> > > *skb,
> >>> > > length--;
> >>> > > continue;
> >>> > > default:
>
On Monday 2016-03-28 21:29, David Miller wrote:
>>> > > @@ -3716,6 +3716,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb,
>>> > > length--;
>>> > > continue;
>>> > > default:
>>> > > +if (length < 2)
>>> > > +return;
>>> > >
On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 15:29 -0400, David Miller wrote:
> From: Jozsef Kadlecsik
> Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2016 18:48:51 +0200 (CEST)
>
> >> > > @@ -3716,6 +3716,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb,
> >> > > length--;
> >> > > continue;
> >> > > de
From: Jozsef Kadlecsik
Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2016 18:48:51 +0200 (CEST)
>> > > @@ -3716,6 +3716,8 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb,
>> > > length--;
>> > > continue;
>> > > default:
>> > > +if (length < 2)
>> > > +re
On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 06:48:51PM +0200, Jozsef Kadlecsik wrote:
> Hi David, Pablo,
>
> David, do you agree with the patch for net/ipv4/tcp_input.c? If yes, how
> should I proceed? Should I send the whole patch to you or is it OK to send
> to Pablo?
Submit a formal patch and Cc: netdev@vger.ke
Hi David, Pablo,
David, do you agree with the patch for net/ipv4/tcp_input.c? If yes, how
should I proceed? Should I send the whole patch to you or is it OK to send
to Pablo?
Best regards,
Jozsef
On Mon, 28 Mar 2016, Baozeng Ding wrote:
>
>
> On 2016/3/28 10:35, Baozeng Ding wrote:
> >
> >
On 2016/3/28 10:35, Baozeng Ding wrote:
On 2016/3/28 6:25, Jozsef Kadlecsik wrote:
On Mon, 28 Mar 2016, Jozsef Kadlecsik wrote:
On Sun, 27 Mar 2016, Baozeng Ding wrote:
The following program triggers stack-out-of-bounds in tcp_packet. The
kernel version is 4.5 (on Mar 16 commit
09fd671cc
On Mon, 28 Mar 2016, Jozsef Kadlecsik wrote:
> On Sun, 27 Mar 2016, Baozeng Ding wrote:
>
> > The following program triggers stack-out-of-bounds in tcp_packet. The
> > kernel version is 4.5 (on Mar 16 commit
> > 09fd671ccb2475436bd5f597f751ca4a7d177aea).
> > Uncovered with syzkaller. Thanks.
> >
On Sun, 27 Mar 2016, Baozeng Ding wrote:
> The following program triggers stack-out-of-bounds in tcp_packet. The
> kernel version is 4.5 (on Mar 16 commit
> 09fd671ccb2475436bd5f597f751ca4a7d177aea).
> Uncovered with syzkaller. Thanks.
>
> =
Hi all,
The following program triggers stack-out-of-bounds in tcp_packet. The
kernel version is 4.5 (on Mar 16 commit
09fd671ccb2475436bd5f597f751ca4a7d177aea).
Uncovered with syzkaller. Thanks.
==
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in
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