On 08/02/18 05:23 PM, Vakul Garg wrote:
> > I agree that Boris' patch does what you say it does - it sets keys
> > immediately
> > after CCS instead of after FINISHED message. I disagree that the kernel tls
> > implementation currently requires that specific ordering, nor do I think
> > that it
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Watson [mailto:davejwat...@fb.com]
> Sent: Thursday, August 2, 2018 2:17 AM
> To: Vakul Garg
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org; Peter Doliwa ; Boris
> Pismenny
> Subject: Re: Security enhancement proposal for kernel TLS
>
>
On 07/31/18 10:45 AM, Vakul Garg wrote:
> > > IIUC, with the upstream implementation of tls record layer in kernel,
> > > the decryption of tls FINISHED message happens in kernel. Therefore
> > > the keys are already being sent to kernel tls socket before handshake is
> > completed.
> >
> > This
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Watson [mailto:davejwat...@fb.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 31, 2018 2:46 AM
> To: Vakul Garg
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org; Peter Doliwa ; Boris
> Pismenny
> Subject: Re: Security enhancement proposal for kernel TLS
>
> On 07
On 07/30/18 06:31 AM, Vakul Garg wrote:
> > It's not entirely clear how your TLS handshake daemon works - Why is
> > it necessary to set the keys in the kernel tls socket before the handshake
> > is
> > completed?
>
> IIUC, with the upstream implementation of tls record layer in kernel, the
>
Sorry for a delayed response.
Kindly see inline.
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Watson [mailto:davejwat...@fb.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, July 25, 2018 9:30 PM
> To: Vakul Garg
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org; Peter Doliwa ; Boris
> Pismenny
> Subject: Re: Security
You would probably get more responses if you cc the relevant people.
Comments inline
On 07/22/18 12:49 PM, Vakul Garg wrote:
> The kernel based TLS record layer allows the user space world to use a
> decoupled TLS implementation.
> The applications need not be linked with TLS stack.
> The TLS
