Re: [PATCH] add --reject-with tcp-synack to REJECT

2002-04-02 Thread Henrik Nordstrom
On Tuesday 02 April 2002 19:15, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You can't tell me that many uses of this patch are antisocial. In fact, in its intended use, it would've substantially reduced the amount of antisocial packets leaving my network. This is a tool with interesting uses that the

[PATCH] LOG target @ tunnel interfaces (SIT only)

2002-04-02 Thread Andras Kis-Szabo
Hi, Original report: Peter Bieringer The LOG target prints out a long garbage on a tunnel interface. The wrong message: MAC=45:00:00:7c:7f:ed:00:00:11:29:cd:54:yy:yy:yy:yy:xx:xx:xx:xx:60:00:00:00:00:40:3a:36:20:01:02:00:00:00 The origin of the problem: When a packet arrives to a tunnel

Re: [PATCH] add --reject-with tcp-synack to REJECT

2002-04-02 Thread Henrik Nordstrom
On Tuesday 02 April 2002 23:40, Aaron Hopkins wrote: And this was the method we employed. This involves adding a filter for each offending IP. On a large network with new attack nodes coming up every few seconds, its not necessarily possible to catch them all quickly. For this purpose we

Re: Bandwidth limiting....

2002-04-02 Thread Brian J. Murrell
On Tue, Apr 02, 2002 at 06:04:24PM +0200, Maciej Soltysiak wrote: No. If you drop packets randomly you will break existing connetions. No you won't. Not on a working (read: bug free) TCP stack you won't anyway. TCP was designed to handle unreliable networks where packet loss happens. If