David Bremner writes:
> It turns out the behaviour of inline functions in C header files is
> not a good idea, and can cause linking problems if the compiler
> decides not to inline them. In principle this is solvable by using a
> "static inline" declaration, but this potentially makes a copy
Add a simple S/MIME SignedData message, taken from an upcoming draft
of
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers/
RFC 8551 describes a SignedData, a one-part clearsigned object that is
more resistant to common patterns of MTA message munging than
multipart/signed
These tests describe some simple behavior we would expect to work if
we were to correctly index the cleartext of encrypted S/MIME messages
(PKCS#7 envelopedData).
Of course, they don't currently pass, so we mark them known-broken.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/T355-smime.sh | 22
Without this fix, we couldn't run both add_gnupg_home and
add_gpgsm_home in the same test script.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/test-lib.sh | 8
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/test-lib.sh b/test/test-lib.sh
index ac1b9315..d9997b27
This CA is useful for test suites and the like, but is not an
actually-secure CA, because its secret key material is also published.
I plan to use it for its intended purpose in the notmuch test suite.
It was copied from this Internet Draft:
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/test-lib.sh | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/test-lib.sh b/test/test-lib.sh
index 1ffedb25..31f37ed7 100644
--- a/test/test-lib.sh
+++ b/test/test-lib.sh
@@ -132,13 +132,13 @@ add_gnupg_home ()
The documentation for message mode clearly states that EasyPG (which
uses GnuPG) is the default and recommended way to use S/MIME with
mml-secure:
[0]
https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/message/Using-S_002fMIME.html
To ensure that this mode works, we just need to import the
Recognize the protected subject for S/MIME example protected header
messages.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/T356-protected-headers.sh | 38 +++---
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/T356-protected-headers.sh
GPGME has a strange failure mode when it is in offline mode, and/or
when certificates don't have any CRLs: in particular, it refuses to
accept the validity of any certificate other than a "root" cert.
This can be worked around by setting the `disable-crl-checks`
configuration variable for gpgsm.
When consuming a signed+encrypted S/MIME message generated by emacs,
we expect to see the same cryptographic properties for the message as
a whole. This is not done correctly yet, so the test is marked as
known broken.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/T355-smime.sh | 9 +
1
This is taken from the same Internet Draft that test/smime/ca.crt
comes from. See that draft for more details.
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dkg-lamps-samples-02.html#name-pkcs12-object-for-bob
We don't use it yet, but it will be used to decrypt other messages in
the test suite.
Note that we
GnuPG's gpgsm, like gpg, should always be used with --batch when it is
invoked in a non-interactive environment.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/test-lib.sh | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/test-lib.sh b/test/test-lib.sh
index
S/MIME messages that use PKCS#7 are not currently well-handled by
notmuch.
This series introduces a set of tests that cover such messages, most
of which are initially broken. A future (shorter) series will resolve
these tests.
Some S/MIME messages *are* handled correctly by notmuch already: in
This allows us to test S/MIME messages in other tests.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/T355-smime.sh | 13 -
test/test-lib.sh | 13 +
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/T355-smime.sh b/test/T355-smime.sh
index
These sample messages are taken directly from the Protected Headers
draft:
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-autocrypt-lamps-protected-headers-02.html
Note that this commit doesn't strictly pass the common git pre-commit
hook due to introducing some trailing whitespace. That's just the
nature of
This test does exactly what it says on the tin. It expects JSON data
to be parseable by Python, at least.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/test-lib.sh | 6 ++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/test/test-lib.sh b/test/test-lib.sh
index dd7fdfaa..6f47994e 100644
---
No functional change.
We no longer need to identify the key and cert to mml-mode when
sending an S/MIME message, so making a copy of key+cert.pem to
test_suite.pem is superfluous. Get rid of the extra file.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor
---
test/T355-smime.sh | 6 ++
1 file changed,
Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
> This CA is useful for test suites and the like, but is not an
> actually-secure CA, because its secret key material is also published.
>
> I plan to use it for its intended purpose in the notmuch test suite.
>
> It was copied from this Internet Draft:
>
>
On Mon 2020-04-27 22:21:36 +0300, Ciprian Dorin Craciun wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 9:21 PM Tomi Ollila wrote:
>>> [dkg wrote:]
>>> release, remove the suggestion to use a whitespace separator from the
>>> documentation, and eventually phase it out entirely in some future
>>> release.
>>
>>
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