[OAUTH-WG] Authorization server SHOULD NOT process repeated authorization requests automatically

2023-04-18 Thread M Hickford
RFC 6749 discusses client impersonation https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.2 > The authorization server SHOULD NOT process repeated authorization > requests automatically (without active resource owner interaction) > without authenticating the client or relying on other

Re: [OAUTH-WG] Ambiguity in draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-08 when code_challenge is omitted

2023-04-10 Thread M Hickford
On Wed, 5 Apr 2023 at 08:00, M Hickford wrote: > > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-08.html#name-countermeasures-2 > says > > > To prevent injection of authorization codes into the client, using code_challenge and code_verifier is REQUIRED for clients,

[OAUTH-WG] Authorization server antipattern: not recording client type

2023-04-10 Thread M Hickford
OAuth defines two client types, confidential and public. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-2.1 > The client type designation is based on the authorization server's definition > of secure authentication and its acceptable exposure levels of client > credentials. The

[OAUTH-WG] Scoring OAuth authorization servers on best practices

2023-04-06 Thread M Hickford
Has anyone tried scoring how well public OAuth authorization servers follow tbe best practices described in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics ? I scored some software forges including GitHub, GitLab, BitBucket on a subset of best practices

[OAUTH-WG] Ambiguity in draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-08 when code_challenge is omitted

2023-04-05 Thread M Hickford
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-08.html#name-countermeasures-2 says > To prevent injection of authorization codes into the client, using > code_challenge and code_verifier is REQUIRED for clients, and authorization > servers MUST enforce their use unless both of the