Re: [OpenAFS] SUN Solaris package for Openafs.

2004-04-07 Thread Sergio Gelato
* Jimmy Engelbrecht [2004-04-07 18:44:04 +0200]: Derrick J Brashear [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Are the packaging scripts worth integrating into src/packaging? What script ? :-) So it sounds like there is more work to be done. To really fit into the Solaris way of doing things, one should

Re: [OpenAFS] SUN Solaris package for Openafs.

2004-04-07 Thread Jeffrey Hutzelman
On Wednesday, April 07, 2004 23:26:33 +0200 Sergio Gelato [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Many Solaris package sets are also split along *u/*r (User/Root) lines, with the *r package usually including startup scripts and/or configuration files. I'm not sure this is useful for OpenAFS, though (unlike the

Re: [OpenAFS] SUN Solaris package for Openafs.

2004-04-07 Thread Derek Atkins
Russ Allbery [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I think what we're hearing is not that this really bothers people inherently, but that the documentation really needs to reflect the paths so that people don't get confused. I think the paths can mostly be REMOVED from the documentation.. Or have a

Re: [OpenAFS] Kerberos 5 cache in /tmp

2004-04-07 Thread Rodney M Dyer
At 06:26 PM 4/7/2004, you wrote: Not that an in-memory credential cache would make any difference in this situation. If you have root privs you can access it. This is true on Windows as well. If you are SYSTEM you can do whatever you want. True. But that problem only occurs because the

RE: [OpenAFS] SUN Solaris package for Openafs.

2004-04-07 Thread ted creedon
The web pages can be generated from Tex but they are static, otherwise it is fairly easy to define what flavor of path is required with Tex variables. tedc -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Russ Allbery Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 3:28

Re: [OpenAFS] SUN Solaris package for Openafs.

2004-04-07 Thread Russ Allbery
Sergio Gelato [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: -- a separate package for the 64-bit components (kernel module), to be omitted on pure 32-bit installs (and for OpenAFS there is the additional choice of full vs. nonfs modules, which may justify another pair of packages); I have heard that Solaris 10

RE: [OpenAFS] SUN Solaris package for Openafs.

2004-04-07 Thread ted creedon
Correct and the file structures could be in an appendix.. There's a lot of other references to paths besides the executables. Figuring out where this all is located and setting the partitions up is 1/2 the problem - if you're learning. tedc -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: [OpenAFS] Kerberos 5 cache in /tmp

2004-04-07 Thread Hendrik Hoeth
Thus spake Rodney M Dyer ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): True. But that problem only occurs because the kernel code allows all memory to be read by root. It would be nice if all OS's has a protected store memory area who's sections could only be mapped to each authenticated user. And who compiles and

Re: [OpenAFS] Kerberos 5 cache in /tmp

2004-04-07 Thread Rodney M Dyer
At 07:17 PM 4/7/2004, you wrote: Thus spake Rodney M Dyer ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): True. But that problem only occurs because the kernel code allows all memory to be read by root. It would be nice if all OS's has a protected store memory area who's sections could only be mapped to each

Re: [OpenAFS] SUN Solaris package for Openafs.

2004-04-07 Thread Renato Arruda
Derrick J Brashear wrote: On Wed, 7 Apr 2004, Jimmy Engelbrecht wrote: Derrick J Brashear [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Are the packaging scripts worth integrating into src/packaging? What script ? :-) remind me to beat you senseless next time i see you. that, or chlorinate your

Re: [OpenAFS] Kerberos 5 cache in /tmp

2004-04-07 Thread John Rudd
On Apr 7, 2004, at 12:41 PM, Jeffrey Hutzelman wrote: This property is not new with krb5. It follows directly from the UNIX security architecture. If you do not trust the people who have privileged access to your machine, then you have already lost. I wonder how capability based OS'es might

Re: [OpenAFS] Kerberos 5 cache in /tmp

2004-04-07 Thread John Rudd
On Apr 7, 2004, at 3:58 PM, Rodney M Dyer wrote: At 06:26 PM 4/7/2004, you wrote: Not that an in-memory credential cache would make any difference in this situation. If you have root privs you can access it. This is true on Windows as well. If you are SYSTEM you can do whatever you want.

Re: [OpenAFS] Kerberos 5 cache in /tmp

2004-04-07 Thread Kris Van Hees
On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 07:50:30PM -0700, John Rudd wrote: Capabilities solve that problem. With a capability OS, all OS objects (processes, files, directories, device drivers, etc.) are distinct entities that have a unique identity and a unique set of capabilities. The capability is

Re: [OpenAFS] Kerberos 5 cache in /tmp

2004-04-07 Thread John Rudd
On Apr 7, 2004, at 8:07 PM, Kris Van Hees wrote: On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 07:50:30PM -0700, John Rudd wrote: Capabilities solve that problem. Either way, as long as you have the ability to compile and install your own kernel, there isn't anything that can be done. Yes, capabilities doesn't

Re: [OpenAFS] IFS and /afs on Windows

2004-04-07 Thread Jeffrey Altman
Jason C. Wells wrote: Will the "Convert to IFS" statement result in being able to use proper global root convention, namely /afs? If so, Yay! THanks, Jason I doubt we will ever get /afs unless it is /afs off of some drive letter. The closest we can get would be a UNC name of