From: Mingli Yu <mingli...@windriver.com>
Wait to fail invalid usernames to fix
CVE-2018-15599
Rework 0006-dropbear-configuration-file.patch
to fix fuzz warnings
Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli...@windriver.com>
---
meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc | 1 +
.../0006-dropbear-configuration-file.patch | 23 +-
.../dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch | 236 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc
b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc
index b634e0e..dc24ea7 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ RPROVIDES_${PN} = "ssh sshd"
DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'libpam', '', d)}"
SRC_URI = "http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/dropbear-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
+ file://CVE-2018-15599.patch \
file://0001-urandom-xauth-changes-to-options.h.patch \
file://0007-fix-localoptions-search-path.patch \
file://init \
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/0006-dropbear-configuration-file.patch
b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/0006-dropbear-configuration-file.patch
index fa4c8d0..deed78f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/0006-dropbear-configuration-file.patch
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/0006-dropbear-configuration-file.patch
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] dropbear configuration file
+From e3a5db1b6d3f6382a15b2266458c26c645a10f18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mingli Yu <mingli...@windriver.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 15:54:00 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] dropbear configuration file
dropbear: Change the path ("/etc/pam.d/sshd" as default) to find a pam
configuration file \
to "/etc/pam.d/dropbear for dropbear when enabling pam supporting"
@@ -7,12 +10,17 @@ Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration]
Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.j...@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaofeng Yan <xiaofeng....@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli...@windriver.com>
---
-diff -Naur dropbear-2013.60-orig/svr-authpam.c dropbear-2013.60/svr-authpam.c
---- dropbear-2013.60-orig/svr-authpam.c 2013-10-16 16:34:53.000000000
+0200
-+++ dropbear-2013.60/svr-authpam.c 2013-10-21 17:04:04.969416055 +0200
-@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
- userData.passwd = password;
+ svr-authpam.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c
+index d201bc9..165ec5c 100644
+--- a/svr-authpam.c
++++ b/svr-authpam.c
+@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) {
+ }
/* Init pam */
- if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) !=
PAM_SUCCESS) {
@@ -20,3 +28,6 @@ diff -Naur dropbear-2013.60-orig/svr-authpam.c
dropbear-2013.60/svr-authpam.c
dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s",
rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
goto cleanup;
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch
b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..912545c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+From 256e2abb8150f9fea33cd026597dbe70f0379296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Johnston <m...@ucc.asn.au>
+Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 23:43:12 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Wait to fail invalid usernames
+
+Wait to fail invalid usernames
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/5d2d1021ca00]
+CVE: CVE-2018-15599
+Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli...@windriver.com>
+---
+ auth.h | 6 +++---
+ svr-auth.c | 19 +++++--------------
+ svr-authpam.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ svr-authpasswd.c | 27 ++++++++++++++-------------
+ svr-authpubkey.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+index da498f5..98f5468 100644
+--- a/auth.h
++++ b/auth.h
+@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request(void);
+ void send_msg_userauth_failure(int partial, int incrfail);
+ void send_msg_userauth_success(void);
+ void send_msg_userauth_banner(const buffer *msg);
+-void svr_auth_password(void);
+-void svr_auth_pubkey(void);
+-void svr_auth_pam(void);
++void svr_auth_password(int valid_user);
++void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user);
++void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user);
+
+ #if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
+ int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(void);
+diff --git a/svr-auth.c b/svr-auth.c
+index 64d97aa..1f364ca 100644
+--- a/svr-auth.c
++++ b/svr-auth.c
+@@ -149,10 +149,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
+ if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
+ strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
+ AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
+- if (valid_user) {
+- svr_auth_password();
+- goto out;
+- }
++ svr_auth_password(valid_user);
++ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -164,10 +162,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
+ if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
+ strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
+ AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
+- if (valid_user) {
+- svr_auth_pam();
+- goto out;
+- }
++ svr_auth_pam(valid_user);
++ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -177,12 +173,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
+ if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN &&
+ strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY,
+ AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN) == 0) {
+- if (valid_user) {
+- svr_auth_pubkey();
+- } else {
+- /* pubkey has no failure delay */
+- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
+- }
++ svr_auth_pubkey(valid_user);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ #endif
+diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c
+index 05e4f3e..d201bc9 100644
+--- a/svr-authpam.c
++++ b/svr-authpam.c
+@@ -178,13 +178,14 @@ pamConvFunc(int num_msg,
+ * Keyboard interactive would be a lot nicer, but since PAM is synchronous, it
+ * gets very messy trying to send the interactive challenges, and read the
+ * interactive responses, over the network. */
+-void svr_auth_pam() {
++void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) {
+
+ struct UserDataS userData = {NULL, NULL};
+ struct pam_conv pamConv = {
+ pamConvFunc,
+ &userData /* submitted to pamvConvFunc as appdata_ptr */
+ };
++ const char* printable_user = NULL;
+
+ pam_handle_t* pamHandlep = NULL;
+
+@@ -204,12 +205,23 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
+
+ password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
+
++ /* We run the PAM conversation regardless of whether the username is
valid
++ in case the conversation function has an inherent delay.
++ Use ses.authstate.username rather than ses.authstate.pw_name.
++ After PAM succeeds we then check the valid_user flag too */
++
+ /* used to pass data to the PAM conversation function - don't bother
with
+ * strdup() etc since these are touched only by our own conversation
+ * function (above) which takes care of it */
+- userData.user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
++ userData.user = ses.authstate.username;
+ userData.passwd = password;
+
++ if (ses.authstate.pw_name) {
++ printable_user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
++ } else {
++ printable_user = "<invalid username>";
++ }
++
+ /* Init pam */
+ if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) !=
PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s",
+@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
+ rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
+ "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
+- ses.authstate.pw_name,
++ printable_user,
+ svr_ses.addrstring);
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
+ goto cleanup;
+@@ -253,12 +265,18 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
+ rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
+ "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
+- ses.authstate.pw_name,
++ printable_user,
+ svr_ses.addrstring);
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
++ if (!valid_user) {
++ /* PAM auth succeeded but the username isn't allowed in for
another reason
++ (checkusername() failed) */
++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
++ }
++
+ /* successful authentication */
+ dropbear_log(LOG_NOTICE, "PAM password auth succeeded for '%s' from %s",
+ ses.authstate.pw_name,
+diff --git a/svr-authpasswd.c b/svr-authpasswd.c
+index bdee2aa..69c7d8a 100644
+--- a/svr-authpasswd.c
++++ b/svr-authpasswd.c
+@@ -48,22 +48,14 @@ static int constant_time_strcmp(const char* a, const char*
b) {
+
+ /* Process a password auth request, sending success or failure messages as
+ * appropriate */
+-void svr_auth_password() {
++void svr_auth_password(int valid_user) {
+
+ char * passwdcrypt = NULL; /* the crypt from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow
*/
+ char * testcrypt = NULL; /* crypt generated from the user's password
sent */
+- char * password;
++ char * password = NULL;
+ unsigned int passwordlen;
+-
+ unsigned int changepw;
+
+- passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
+-
+-#ifdef DEBUG_HACKCRYPT
+- /* debugging crypt for non-root testing with shadows */
+- passwdcrypt = DEBUG_HACKCRYPT;
+-#endif
+-
+ /* check if client wants to change password */
+ changepw = buf_getbool(ses.payload);
+ if (changepw) {
+@@ -73,12 +65,21 @@ void svr_auth_password() {
+ }
+
+ password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
+-
+- /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
+- testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
++ if (valid_user) {
++ /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
++ passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
++ testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
++ }
+ m_burn(password, passwordlen);
+ m_free(password);
+
++ /* After we have got the payload contents we can exit if the username
++ is invalid. Invalid users have already been logged. */
++ if (!valid_user) {
++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (testcrypt == NULL) {
+ /* crypt() with an invalid salt like "!!" */
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "User account '%s' is locked",
+diff --git a/svr-authpubkey.c b/svr-authpubkey.c
+index aa6087c..ff481c8 100644
+--- a/svr-authpubkey.c
++++ b/svr-authpubkey.c
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int checkfileperm(char * filename);
+
+ /* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as
+ * appropriate */
+-void svr_auth_pubkey() {
++void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) {
+
+ unsigned char testkey; /* whether we're just checking if a key is
usable */
+ char* algo = NULL; /* pubkey algo */
+@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ void svr_auth_pubkey() {
+ keybloblen = buf_getint(ses.payload);
+ keyblob = buf_getptr(ses.payload, keybloblen);
+
++ if (!valid_user) {
++ /* Return failure once we have read the contents of the packet
++ required to validate a public key.
++ Avoids blind user enumeration though it isn't possible to
prevent
++ testing for user existence if the public key is known */
++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ /* check if the key is valid */
+ if (checkpubkey(algo, algolen, keyblob, keybloblen) ==
DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
--
2.7.4
--
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