On 06/10/2011 07:08 PM, Martin Paljak wrote:
> On Jun 10, 2011, at 13:11 , Stef Walter wrote:
>> After sleeping on this idea, I realized it won't work in certain
>> cases. In particular when the key has CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE and
>> requires C_Login with CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC.
> This is hardly the
Le 13/06/2011 01:19, Martin Paljak a écrit :
> Viktor and Andre and Juan Antonio (DNIe) are persons who come to mind as
> people needing builders as well, but there are no known Git repositories at
> the moment.
I forked your repository, thanks for your work,
Viktor.
Check out this article:
http://forums.oracle.com/forums/thread.jspa?messageID=6386364
It implies that the first slot will be used unless debug is on.
Any empty first slot could be a problem, as the OpenSC hot-plug
slot could be empty.
If this is the problem, try setting in the opensc.conf
plu
On 6/12/2011 6:57 AM, Viktor Tarasov wrote:
> Le 12/06/2011 05:29, Douglas E. Engert a écrit :
>> On 6/11/2011 12:31 PM, Viktor Tarasov wrote:
>>> Le 10/06/2011 19:06, Martin Paljak a écrit :
Hello,
On Jun 10, 2011, at 19:46 , webmas...@opensc-project.org wrote:
> pkcs11:
On Sun, Jun 12, 2011 at 6:29 AM, Douglas E. Engert wrote:
> The application should not depend on the flags in PKCS#15, but only depend on
> the certificate or other signed objects that can be read from the card and
> the ability
> of the card to do the crypto.
Right.
Only authenticated fields (s
Le 13/06/2011 16:40, Douglas E. Engert a écrit :
>
>
> On 6/12/2011 6:57 AM, Viktor Tarasov wrote:
>> Le 12/06/2011 05:29, Douglas E. Engert a écrit :
>>> On 6/11/2011 12:31 PM, Viktor Tarasov wrote:
Le 10/06/2011 19:06, Martin Paljak a écrit :
> Hello,
>
>
> On Jun 10, 2011, a
On Mon, Jun 13, 2011 at 6:56 PM, Viktor Tarasov
wrote:
> It's going about defining the OpenSC vendor specific attribute.
> In complete accordance with the PKCS#11.
> Vendor defined CKA_ attribute fits the PKCS#11 specification.
I don't like adding vendor specific CKA_ attributes into opensc
With all of this discussion about the non-repudiation flags
in PKCS#15 vs PKCS#11, it appears to me that RSA may have intended
for a non-repudiation flag at one time, but did not implement it
in PKCS#11.
As I recall from my PKIX IETF meetings, non-repudiation was a hot
topic. From a legal view poi
