[openssl.org #542] 0.9.7a: doc/apps/pod page omissions

2003-03-19 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED] via RT
doc/apps/s_client.pod: The following command option is not mentioned -starttls prot - use the STARTTLS command before starting TLS for those protocols that support it, where 'prot' defines which one to assume. Currently, only smtp is

Re: Thread Question

2003-03-19 Thread Verdon Walker
While that (not simultaneously accessing the same structure from different threads) is certainly understandable, it is often the case that an SSL implementation will mimic a socket implementation. In fact, the clear socket implementation is always a candidate for SSL work and it is perfectly

Re: Thread Question

2003-03-19 Thread David Schwartz
On Wed, 19 Mar 2003 09:51:20 -0700, Verdon Walker wrote: We have one thread wanting to write a large amount of data (say 2 Meg). OpenSSL will break that data up into 16k chunks, SSLize them and write each separately. During the process, it is using the rwstate in the SSL structure to indicate the

Re: [CVS] OpenSSL: OpenSSL_0_9_7-stable: openssl/ CHANGES openssl/crypto/r...

2003-03-19 Thread Götz Babin-Ebell
Hello Bodo, Bodo Moeller wrote: Server: cvs.openssl.org Name: Bodo Moeller Root: /e/openssl/cvs Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Module: openssl Date: 19-Mar-2003 19:58:56 Branch: OpenSSL_0_9_7-stable Handle:

Re: Thread Question

2003-03-19 Thread Verdon Walker
First, thank you for your responses. I appreciate the feedback, but I don't think I understand the points you are making in your last email. Perhaps, I did not explain myself well enough, but the idea of allowing long operations to be cancelled is hardly rare. Suppose for example, you want to

Re: Thread Question

2003-03-19 Thread David Schwartz
On Wed, 19 Mar 2003 16:53:32 -0700, Verdon Walker wrote: First, thank you for your responses. I appreciate the feedback, but I don't think I understand the points you are making in your last email. Perhaps, I did not explain myself well enough, but the idea of allowing long operations to be

[OpenSSL Advisory] Klima-Pokorny-Rosa attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding

2003-03-19 Thread Bodo Moeller
OpenSSL Security Advisory [19 March 2003] Klima-Pokorny-Rosa attack on RSA in SSL/TLS === Czech cryptologists Vlastimil Klima, Ondrej Pokorny, and Tomas Rosa have come up with an extension of the Bleichenbacher attack on RSA with PKCS #1 v1.5 padding as