Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3592] bug report. Crash. Critical? Security bug?

2014-12-15 Thread Вячеслав Бадалян via RT
Hello. We got openssl assert on header len... sorry i can't send it to you becouse i delete screen log :( 2014-12-14 4:07 GMT+03:00 Вячеслав Бадалян v.badal...@open-bs.ru: We got openssl assert. 13 дек. 2014 г. 17:49 пользователь Вячеслав Бадалян v.badal...@open-bs.ru написал: Thanks! I

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3592] bug report. Crash. Critical? Security bug?

2014-12-15 Thread Вячеслав Бадалян via RT
On vagrind we got this ==48882== Thread 40: ==48882== Invalid write of size 8 ==48882==at 0x4A0B4BC: memset (vg_replace_strmem.c:1094) ==48882==by 0x34354DAB63: BUF_MEM_grow_clean (buffer.c:152) ==48882==by 0x34354DC512: mem_write (bss_mem.c:189) ==48882==by 0x34354DB746:

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3592] bug report. Crash. Critical? Security bug?

2014-12-15 Thread Вячеслав Бадалян via RT
Got assert d1_both.c(296): OpenSSL internal error, assertion failed: s-init_num == (int)s-d1-w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 2014-12-15 15:19 GMT+03:00 Вячеслав Бадалян v.badal...@open-bs.ru: On vagrind we got this ==48882== Thread 40: ==48882== Invalid write of size 8 ==48882==

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3621] Support legacy CA removal, ignore unnecessary intermediate CAs in SSL/TLS handshake by default

2014-12-15 Thread Hubert Kario via RT
On Friday 05 December 2014 15:18:30 you wrote: When discussing this issue, my colleague Hubert Kario made me aware of a flag offered by e.g. the openssl s_client utility: -trusted_first. When using -trusted_first, the server verification works successfully in the above scenario. Given that

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3621] Support legacy CA removal, ignore unnecessary intermediate CAs in SSL/TLS handshake by default

2014-12-15 Thread Salz, Rich
For what it's worth, I have tested the Alexa top 1 million servers with the - trusted_first option and haven't found a single server that looses its trusted status, on the other hand, good few percent of servers do gain it. It's worth a great deal. Thanks! I love fact-based analysis. :)

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3621] Support legacy CA removal, ignore unnecessary intermediate CAs in SSL/TLS handshake by default

2014-12-15 Thread Salz, Rich via RT
For what it's worth, I have tested the Alexa top 1 million servers with the - trusted_first option and haven't found a single server that looses its trusted status, on the other hand, good few percent of servers do gain it. It's worth a great deal. Thanks! I love fact-based analysis. :)

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3621] Support legacy CA removal, ignore unnecessary intermediate CAs in SSL/TLS handshake by default

2014-12-15 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 09:23:26AM -0500, Salz, Rich wrote: For what it's worth, I have tested the Alexa top 1 million servers with the - trusted_first option and haven't found a single server that looses its trusted status, on the other hand, good few percent of servers do gain it.

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3621] Support legacy CA removal, ignore unnecessary intermediate CAs in SSL/TLS handshake by default

2014-12-15 Thread Tomas Mraz
On Po, 2014-12-15 at 14:48 +, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 09:23:26AM -0500, Salz, Rich wrote: For what it's worth, I have tested the Alexa top 1 million servers with the - trusted_first option and haven't found a single server that looses its trusted

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3621] Support legacy CA removal, ignore unnecessary intermediate CAs in SSL/TLS handshake by default

2014-12-15 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 05:24:03PM +0100, Tomas Mraz wrote: This can break DANE TLSA verification, because the site's designated trust anchor might no longer be in the shorter constructed chain. [Postfix not affected] Please enlighten me how this case could be broken by this change of

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3629] Bug report: run in speed.c should be declared as volatile

2014-12-15 Thread Lawrence via RT
Great, thanks. -Original Message- From: Kurt Roeckx via RT [mailto:r...@openssl.org] Sent: Thursday, December 11, 2014 1:24 PM To: lawre...@codeaurora.org Cc: openssl-dev@openssl.org Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3629] Bug report: run in speed.c should be declared as volatile

[openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3635] Build error with 1.0.2-beta3

2014-12-15 Thread Richard Levitte via RT
I'm having a look at this (going through all xxx_DEBUG, might as well while I'm at it) On Fri Dec 12 20:06:48 2014, st...@stecksoft.com wrote: Hi, I'm trying to build 1.0.2-beta3 on Fedora 20 x86_64. I've configured with some xxx_DEBUG flags, which results in a compile failure in

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3635] Build error with 1.0.2-beta3

2014-12-15 Thread Paul A. Steckler via RT
Thanks! -- Paul On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 2:09 PM, Richard Levitte via RT r...@openssl.org wrote: I'm having a look at this (going through all xxx_DEBUG, might as well while I'm at it) On Fri Dec 12 20:06:48 2014, st...@stecksoft.com wrote: Hi, I'm trying to build 1.0.2-beta3 on Fedora

Re: [openssl-dev] [openssl.org #3607] nistz256 is broken.

2014-12-15 Thread Adam Langley via RT
On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Adam Langley a...@google.com wrote: Thanks. So far that version is good to ~1B random tests. I'll leave it going until Monday. It's good for ~6B random tests. Of course, that's not as compelling for 64-bit code as it would be for 32-bit, but I think we can

[openssl-dev] Circumstances cause CBC often to be preferred over GCM modes

2014-12-15 Thread Hanno Böck
Hi, Sorry for crossposting this to three lists but I feel this is a multi-software-issue and I feel all software involved need to find a way to resolve this. I feel the current software setting of tls server configs and browsers leads to the unoptimal result that often CBC modes are preferred

Re: [openssl-dev] Circumstances cause CBC often to be preferred over GCM modes

2014-12-15 Thread Salz, Rich
Is this a theoretical issue, or have you seen it in widespread use? I thought most servers these days picked what they wanted, and used the client ordering as a suggestion, at best. -- Principal Security Engineer, Akamai Technologies IM: rs...@jabber.me Twitter: RichSalz

Re: [openssl-dev] Circumstances cause CBC often to be preferred over GCM modes

2014-12-15 Thread Hanno Böck
On Mon, 15 Dec 2014 20:31:53 -0500 Salz, Rich rs...@akamai.com wrote: Is this a theoretical issue, or have you seen it in widespread use? www.openssl.org would be an example where you can see it live and real :-) -- Hanno Böck http://hboeck.de/ mail/jabber: ha...@hboeck.de GPG: BBB51E42

Re: [openssl-dev] Circumstances cause CBC often to be preferred over GCM modes

2014-12-15 Thread Hanno Böck
On Mon, 15 Dec 2014 17:36:40 -0800 Ryan Sleevi rsle...@chromium.org wrote: * Server operator uses apache+openssl wiht cipher string HIGH:!MEDIUM:!LOW:!aNULL@STRENGTH. This seems reasonable. Only HIGH security ciphers and sort them by strength. * Browser (Chrome or Firefox) will take

Re: [openssl-dev] Circumstances cause CBC often to be preferred over GCM modes

2014-12-15 Thread Hanno Böck
On Mon, 15 Dec 2014 18:07:15 -0800 Ryan Sleevi rsle...@chromium.org wrote: I fear you may have misread again. SSLHonorCipherOrder is on by default, and respects the client preferences. The mainstream clients generally prefer GCM over CBC, ergo, honoring the cipher order is the right thing.

Re: [openssl-dev] Circumstances cause CBC often to be preferred over GCM modes

2014-12-15 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 02:18:40AM +0100, Hanno B?ck wrote: Firefox and Chrome support authenticated encryption via TLS 1.2 and GCM these days. However they have for some reason decided not to support AES-256 but only AES-128. In which case, they will never use AES-256, and yet: This is in

Re: [openssl-dev] Circumstances cause CBC often to be preferred over GCM modes

2014-12-15 Thread Hanno Böck
On Tue, 16 Dec 2014 03:09:53 + Viktor Dukhovni openssl-us...@dukhovni.org wrote: On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 02:18:40AM +0100, Hanno B?ck wrote: Firefox and Chrome support authenticated encryption via TLS 1.2 and GCM these days. However they have for some reason decided not to support

Re: [openssl-dev] Circumstances cause CBC often to be preferred over GCM modes

2014-12-15 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 04:23:24AM +0100, Hanno B?ck wrote: On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 02:18:40AM +0100, Hanno B?ck wrote: Firefox and Chrome support authenticated encryption via TLS 1.2 and GCM these days. However they have for some reason decided not to support AES-256 but only

[openssl-dev] Retrieving DSA public key (Y) in ASN.1 format

2014-12-15 Thread Philip Prindeville
Is there an easy way to get at the parameter ‘y’ (DSA-pub_key, which is a BIGNUM *) in ASN.1 format? (See (2) below…) Better yet, how to take that and pass it to ASN_item_digest()? Also, there’s some confusion (at least for me) about what constitutes DSAPublicKey. According to RFC-5912 you