Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-09-26 Thread David Woodhouse
On Mon, 2016-09-26 at 10:35 +, OpenSSL wrote: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 23rd September 2016 by Robert ÅšwiÄ™cki Found by whom? Welcome to the 21st century...  :) -- dwmw2 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-03-02 Thread Hubert Kario
On Tuesday 01 March 2016 19:50:51 Nounou Dadoun wrote: > I'm interested in your tlsfuzzer tool (of which this appears to be a > part), is there a larger test suite available? Is there any > documentation out there? > Thanks again .. N No, for now there isn't one. The plan is to have a full

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-03-01 Thread Nounou Dadoun
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 7:22 AM To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory Scripts to verify that a server is not vulnerable to DROWN. -- Regards, Hubert Kario Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-03-01 Thread Hubert Kario
Scripts to verify that a server is not vulnerable to DROWN. Two scripts are provided to verify that SSLv2 and all of its ciphers are disabled and that export grade SSLv2 are disabled and can't be forced by client. Reproducer requires Python 2.6 or 3.2 or later, you will also need git to

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-02-02 Thread Rainer Jung
Hi there, reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical inconsistency. First: OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: ... - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate and so it will always reuse it. This is only supported in 1.0.2. and

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-02-02 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Tue, Feb 02, 2016 at 10:34:32PM +0100, Rainer Jung wrote: > Hi there, > > reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical > inconsistency. > > First: > > OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: > ... > - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-02-02 Thread Matt Caswell
On 02/02/16 21:34, Rainer Jung wrote: > Hi there, > > reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical > inconsistency. > > First: > > OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: > ... > - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate > and so it

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-02-02 Thread Rainer Jung
Am 03.02.2016 um 00:30 schrieb Kurt Roeckx: On Tue, Feb 02, 2016 at 10:34:32PM +0100, Rainer Jung wrote: Hi there, reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical inconsistency. First: OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if: ... - Static DH ciphersuites are used.

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2016-01-29 Thread Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
+1 Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network.   Original Message   From: Hanno Böck Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 06:18 To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Reply To: openssl-dev@openssl.org Cc: open...@openssl.org Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-07-09 Thread Salz, Rich
This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o. In other words, if you are not using those specific releases -- i.e., the ones that came out less than 30 days ago -- you do not need to upgrade. ___ openssl-dev mailing list

Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory

2015-06-11 Thread Steffen Nurpmeso
Huhu!! |Fixes for this issue were developed by Emilia Käsper and Kurt Roeckx I just want to mention these «UTF-8 re-encoded as UTF-8» issues, which may be acceptable for names of males, but, but *particularly* with respect to the natural beauty of the affected person… On the other hand i