[PATCH] Add AES-ECB modes to eng_cryptodev.c

2013-11-01 Thread Joshua Datko
Attached is a patch to added AES-ECB modes (128, 192, 256) to
eng_cryptodev.c (and some whitespace cleanup).  I also have a backported
1.0.1e if you guys want that as well.  The attached patch is from git
master.

I started adding other modes (CTR), but the tests were failing, so I
decided to submit what I believe to be working.

Thanks,

Josh


eng_cryptodev.patch
Description: Binary data


Re: [openssl.org #3151] Bug report: openssl-1.0.1e-28.fc19.i686 on Fedora 19: OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid() misdetects RDRAND instruction on old Cyrix M II i686 CPU

2013-11-01 Thread Tomas Mraz
On Čt, 2013-10-31 at 22:05 +0100, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
 On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 09:33:05AM +0100, Andre Robatino via RT wrote:
  I have an old i686 machine with a Cyrix M II CPU running Fedora 19. The
  latest version of openssl (openssl-1.0.1e-28.fc19.i686) doesn't work
  properly with it due to OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid() misdetecting the RDRAND
  instruction (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1022346 ).
  All previous versions (up to openssl-1.0.1e-4.fc19.i686) worked
  properly. I was advised to create an upstream ticket. The listed bug
  report contains /proc/cpuinfo output and a gdb stack trace.
 
 This is a duplicate of ticket #3005
 
 This has been fixed after the 1.0.1e release in:
 http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=5702e965d759dde8a098d8108660721ba2b93a7d
 
 But if -4 worked and -28 fails, you really should look what
 fedora changed between those releases.

The -4 worked because the RDRAND engine was erroneously completely
disabled in the Fedora build. Only after the enablement of it the bug in
the CPU detection could manifest.

-- 
Tomas Mraz
No matter how far down the wrong road you've gone, turn back.
  Turkish proverb
(You'll never know whether the road is wrong though.)

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ECDHE problem with 1.0.2-dev

2013-11-01 Thread Rob Stradling
Hi.  When I build the latest development version of httpd or nginx 
against the OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable branch, the ECDHE-RSA and ECDHE-ECDSA 
ciphers don't work.  With both webservers, I can get these ciphers to 
work by either...

  1. Deleting: SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
  or
  2. Adding: SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1);

Should it still be possible to manually configure ECDH keys using 
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh() in 1_0_2?
If so, any ideas why it isn't working?  Is there a bug in 
OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable?  Or are both httpd and nginx doing something wrong?


Or, is SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1); the only supported way of doing 
it in 1_0_2?


Thanks.

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research  Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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Re: ECDHE problem with 1.0.2-dev

2013-11-01 Thread Dr. Stephen Henson
On Fri, Nov 01, 2013, Rob Stradling wrote:

 Hi.  When I build the latest development version of httpd or nginx
 against the OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable branch, the ECDHE-RSA and
 ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers don't work.  With both webservers, I can get
 these ciphers to work by either...
   1. Deleting: SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
   or
   2. Adding: SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1);
 
 Should it still be possible to manually configure ECDH keys using
 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh() in 1_0_2?
 If so, any ideas why it isn't working?  Is there a bug in
 OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable?  Or are both httpd and nginx doing something
 wrong?
 

I think it's a bug in OpenSSL 1.0.2. It shouldn't break anything that works in
previous versions, at least not without a very good reason.

I'll look into it.

 Or, is SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1); the only supported way of
 doing it in 1_0_2?
 

It's the preferred way as it just does the right thing.

Steve.
--
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Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org
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Re: ECDHE problem with 1.0.2-dev

2013-11-01 Thread Piotr Sikora
Hey,

 I think it's a bug in OpenSSL 1.0.2. It shouldn't break anything that works in
 previous versions, at least not without a very good reason.

 I'll look into it.

I already reported / patched this a while ago (with no response):
https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3103

 It's the preferred way as it just does the right thing.

It always choses the strongest curve supported by both sides, which
isn't always preferred (IMHO).

Best regards,
Piotr Sikora
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[openssl.org #3103] [PATCH] Set TLS EC curve_id from EC group alone.

2013-11-01 Thread Stephen Henson via RT
On Fri Aug 02 10:23:33 2013, pi...@cloudflare.com wrote:
 Hello,
 attached patch fixes the issue with dropped support for EC cipher
 suites in software that uses SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE after upgrading to
 OpenSSL-1.0.2+.


Fixed now, thanks for the report.

Steve.
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Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org

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Re: ECDHE problem with 1.0.2-dev

2013-11-01 Thread Dr. Stephen Henson
On Fri, Nov 01, 2013, Piotr Sikora wrote:

 Hey,
 
  I think it's a bug in OpenSSL 1.0.2. It shouldn't break anything that works 
  in
  previous versions, at least not without a very good reason.
 
  I'll look into it.
 
 I already reported / patched this a while ago (with no response):
 https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3103
 

Oops sorry missed that.

  It's the preferred way as it just does the right thing.
 
 It always choses the strongest curve supported by both sides, which
 isn't always preferred (IMHO).
 

It picks the highest preference curve supported by both sides, which is
usually the strongest curve but it doesn't have to be.

Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org
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