The DTLS packet reassembly code has a performance problem that could result in
a DoS attack being possible.
The DTLS packet reassembly uses the data structure defined in ssl/pqueue.c for
the purpose (it is the only user of this data structure that I can find). This
source file implements a
On Thu Jun 02 15:50:31 2016, stef...@sdaoden.eu wrote:
> Hello.
>
> I have never seen something like this:
>
> Parser.c: loadable library and perl binaries are mismatched (got
> handshake key 0xdb00080, needed 0xdb80080)
>
> This is v5.24 on a Linux system, and it flawless afaik.
Are you sure
On Thu Jun 02 15:50:31 2016, stef...@sdaoden.eu wrote:
> Oh yes, please!
The 'install' target calls three other targets:
install_sw
install_ssldirs
install_docs
So if you simple do 'make install_sw' or 'nmake install_sw', I think you'll get
what you want.
Closing this ticket.
--
Richard
Yep:
-rw--- 1 steffen steffen 1848 Jun 2 14:46 VhXl383LiQ
-rw--- 1 steffen steffen 1612 Jun 2 14:46 F1RkvxEZi0
-rw--- 1 steffen steffen 1848 Jun 2 14:46 qg_wML0XIF
-rw--- 1 steffen steffen 1848 Jun 2 14:46 4MUN7KIs69
-rw--- 1 steffen steffen 1840 Jun 2
Oh yes, please!
--steffen
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Ticket here: http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=4555
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Hello.
I have never seen something like this:
Parser.c: loadable library and perl binaries are mismatched (got handshake
key 0xdb00080, needed 0xdb80080)
This is v5.24 on a Linux system, and it flawless afaik.
Thanks.
--steffen
--
Ticket here:
On 02/06/16 14:33, Alfred E. Heggestad wrote:
>
>
> On 01/06/16 13:58, Matt Caswell wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01/06/16 11:15, Alfred E. Heggestad wrote:
>>> hi,
>>>
>>> we are using DTLS from OpenSSL to implement DTLS-SRTP in our
>>> product (Wire.com) .. The code and implementation works really well
On 01/06/16 13:58, Matt Caswell wrote:
On 01/06/16 11:15, Alfred E. Heggestad wrote:
hi,
we are using DTLS from OpenSSL to implement DTLS-SRTP in our
product (Wire.com) .. The code and implementation works really well
and is very robust. We are using OpenSSL version 1.0.2g
since our
It looks like a lot of these warnings are bogus. For example ct_validation is
only ever set to 0 or 1 yet it throws out a warning with if(ct_vlidation) in
one place while not warning about a similar expression just above it.
I tidied up ocsp_prn.c which avoided the warning in that file: though
>>> I'm getting:
>>> crypto/chacha/chacha-s390x.S: Assembler messages:
>>> crypto/chacha/chacha-s390x.S:7: Error: Unrecognized opcode: `clgije'
>>>
>>>
>>> A full build log is available on:
>>> https://buildd.debian.org/status/fetch.php?pkg=openssl=s390x=1.1.0~pre5-1=1464594754
>>
>> It's overly
In s_client.c (function psk_client_db), the "-psk" value is converted
from hexadecimal to binary by converting to a BN using BN_hex2bn() [line
285] and then from BN to binary using BN_bn2bin [line 301].
This means that it is not possible to input a key where the first byte
is zero.
e.g.
If the
On Wed, Jun 01, 2016, Mody, Darshan (Darshan) wrote:
>
> Does Openssl allows NULL ciphers when we put openssl in FIPS mode?
>
If you mean NULL ciphersuites then yes though they're not enabled by default
just like non-FIPS mode.
Steve.
--
Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
When it is expected to release now?
Regards
Nikhil
-Original Message-
From: openssl-dev [mailto:openssl-dev-boun...@openssl.org] On Behalf Of Salz,
Rich
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2016 6:46 PM
To: openssl-dev@openssl.org; openssl-us...@openssl.org
Subject: [openssl-dev] 1.1 release being
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