On Fri, Sep 27, 2002 at 07:10:18PM -0500, Ben Lindstrom wrote:
FIPS 140 is linked to C2 security from the looks of it. And from my
skimming it looks like OpenSSL would need to get NIST approval for their
general crypto, their digital signatures, and more than likely thier MAC
code.
FIPS
On Tue, Nov 13, 2007 at 03:37:42PM -0800, Rodney Thayer wrote:
wasn't one of these MS RNG's tested via FIPS at some point?
This seems likely. FIPS 140-2 cert #103 seems like the relevant cert
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/1401val2000.htm#103
Further, the pseudocode
On Tue, Jul 08, 2008 at 03:27:08PM +0530, Nilay Tripathi wrote:
Generating 'p' randomly as a safe prime and using 'g' order as 5, the
keys generated are not consistently passing Sec 5.6.2.4 KAT test.
It would be a good idea for you to understand why this is, rather than
just iterate until it
On Tue, Jul 8, 2008 at 4:06 AM, Nilay Tripathi wrote:
I am using openssl fips 1.1.2 stack. Can someone please help me with some
source for DH KDF specified in Sec 5.8 of SP800_56A doc.
On Tue, Jul 08, 2008 at 04:58:12AM -0700, Kyle Hamilton responded:
With the caveat that any changes you make
On Wed, Jul 09, 2008 at 05:53:42PM +0530, Nilay Tripathi wrote:
As a solution, since g is supposed to fall in the multiplicative group of
order q OR 2q, the g can be therefore adjusted such that it satisfies either
of [g^q mod p = 1] or [g^2q mod p = 1].
When p is a safe prime, a few things
