RE: OpenSSL 0.9.8n v. VMS

Hello, I just simply can not believe, that in an open source project, vital, port related changes needs to be submitted so many times... and nothing happens. I suggest taking Steven M. Schweda into the OpenSSL project team with shared OpenVMS responsibility (and commit rights) beside Richard

Re: [openssl.org #2045] [PATCH] Use Intel AES-NI automatically where available.

On Mon, 2009-09-14 at 23:13 +0200, David Woodhouse via RT wrote: I'm a little confused about the way Intel AES-NI is supported in OpenSSL HEAD. This is just a feature of new CPUs, like SSE is. Yet SSE support is directly included in the normal assembly routines for x86, while AES-NI is

TLS session resumption finished messages

Hi, I've recently finished my own from scratch, mini-scaled TLS 1.1 protocol implementation. Now, I want to add session resumption capability for it (not for the new specification). but couldn't find enough information even from the standard. My question, what are the handshake messages going to

[openssl.org #2202] OpenSSL 0.9.8n v. VMS

My knowledge of VMS is minimal so I've just applied this patch as is. I made one change to stop libeay.num being overwritten on the next make update. Those hacks in mkdef.pl to manually add symbol information look like they should be handled more cleanly at some point. Steve. -- Dr Stephen N.

RE: [openssl.org #2192] [PATCH] chil engine displays weird prompts to the end user

I've tested todays snapshot and I can confirm that all issues are resolved. Kind Regards Jaroslav Imrich Disig, a.s. Zahradnicka 151, 821 08 Bratislava 2 jaroslav.imr...@disig.sk www.disig.sk __ OpenSSL Project

libcrypto safe for library use?

The threads(3) manpage states that to use OpenSSL in multi-threaded applications then locking callback functions must be set otherwise random crashes may occur. This poses a challenge when using OpenSSL in a library which should be MT safe. There is no safe way to set the locking callbacks

RE: [openssl.org #2192] [PATCH] chil engine displays weird prompts to the end user

I've tested todays snapshot and I can confirm that all issues are resolved. Kind Regards Jaroslav Imrich Disig, a.s. Zahradnicka 151, 821 08 Bratislava 2 jaroslav.imr...@disig.sk www.disig.sk :��IϮ��r�m (Z+�7�zZ)���1���x��hW^��^��%����jם.+-1�ځ��j:+v���h�

[openssl.org #2203] [PATCH] fix fallback to default verify paths

--- apps/s_client.c | 17 - 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c index 484d009..3f57a5d 100644 --- a/apps/s_client.c +++ b/apps/s_client.c @@ -904,12 +904,19 @@ bad: if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,cert,key))

[openssl.org #2204] Contribution [OS: all] [Version openssl-0.9.8m]

Dear Sir, I would like to make this contribution to openssl Feature implemented: aes key wrapper for all key sizes(RFC 5649) Thanks /* crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (st...@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project. * Modified by Attaullah Baig

RE: [openssl.org #2045] [PATCH] Use Intel AES-NI automatically where available.

Though I am not a member of the OpenSSL team, I totally agree with you. As for the AES, the Westmere CPUs have also a new instruction for the GHASH (pclmulqdq / _mm_clmulepi64_si128). This as well is only available as intrinsic or in native assembler. So, when I offered some weeks ago a

[openssl.org #2205] bug report: ECDSA in TLS handshake

Hi, I'd like to submit bug report for OpenSSL version 1.x and up, all platforms supporting ECDSA in TLS handshake in version 1.0.0 there were new digest algorithms introduced NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512 in addition to

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

OpenSSL wrote: Record of death vulnerability in OpenSSL 0.9.8f through 0.9.8m How comes the vulnerability doesn't touch 0.9.8e though the patched file wasn't modified between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f ? But that code was modified between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e, see this patch :

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

On Mar 25, 2010, at 6:33 PM, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote: OpenSSL wrote: Record of death vulnerability in OpenSSL 0.9.8f through 0.9.8m How comes the vulnerability doesn't touch 0.9.8e though the patched file wasn't modified between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f ? But that code was modified between

RE: OpenSSL Security Advisory

Am I reading the changes file correctly: if you don't use Kerberos, then this vulnerability doesn't apply? Thanks, Paul ___ Paul A. Suhler | Firmware Engineer | Quantum Corporation | Office: 949.856.7748 | paul.suh...@quantum.com

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory: Record of death

On Thu, Mar 25, 2010, Bodo Moeller wrote: Record of death vulnerability in OpenSSL 0.9.8f through 0.9.8m No, it's not a mistake -- it's code elsewhere that no longer tolerates the coarse logic we are changing in the patch, which has been around forever. Could you please elaborate? I'm

Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory

On Thu, Mar 25, 2010, Paul Suhler wrote: Am I reading the changes file correctly: if you don't use Kerberos, then this vulnerability doesn't apply? There are two separate issues. CVE-2010-0740 applies to 0.9.8m SSL/TLS and has nothing to do with Kerberos. That is why we made the special

RE: libcrypto safe for library use?

Mark Phalan wrote: The threads(3) manpage states that to use OpenSSL in multi-threaded applications then locking callback functions must be set otherwise random crashes may occur. That is correct. This poses a challenge when using OpenSSL in a library which should be MT safe. There is no