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OpenSSL Security Advisory [07 Dec 2017]
Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737)
==
Severity: Moderate
OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [02 Nov 2017]
bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736)
==
Severity: Moderate
There is a carry propagating bug in
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [16 Feb 2017]
Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash (CVE-2017-3733)
Severity: High
During a renegotiation handshake if the
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 Jan 2017]
Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731)
=
Severity: Moderate
If an SSL/TLS server or
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [10 Nov 2016]
ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow (CVE-2016-7054)
==
Severity: High
TLS connections using
On Mon, 2016-09-26 at 10:35 +, OpenSSL wrote:
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 23rd September 2016 by Robert Święcki
Found by whom? Welcome to the 21st century... :)
--
dwmw2
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [26 Sep 2016]
This security update addresses issues that were caused by patches
included in our previous security update, released on 22nd September
2016. Given the Critical
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [22 Sep 2016]
OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304)
=
Severity: High
A malicious
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [3rd May 2016]
Memory corruption in the ASN.1 encoder (CVE-2016-2108)
==
Severity: High
This issue affected versions of OpenSSL
On Tuesday 01 March 2016 19:50:51 Nounou Dadoun wrote:
> I'm interested in your tlsfuzzer tool (of which this appears to be a
> part), is there a larger test suite available? Is there any
> documentation out there?
> Thanks again .. N
No, for now there isn't one. The plan is to have a full
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 7:22 AM
To: openssl-dev@openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
Scripts to verify that a server is not vulnerable to DROWN.
--
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o
Scripts to verify that a server is not vulnerable to DROWN.
Two scripts are provided to verify that SSLv2 and all of its ciphers are
disabled and that export grade SSLv2 are disabled and can't be forced by
client.
Reproducer requires Python 2.6 or 3.2 or later, you will also need git
to
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [1st March 2016]
=
NOTE: With this update, OpenSSL is disabling the SSLv2 protocol by default, as
well as removing SSLv2 EXPORT ciphers. We strongly advise against the use of
SSLv2
Hi there,
reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical
inconsistency.
First:
OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if:
...
- Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate
and so it will always reuse it. This is only supported in 1.0.2.
and
On Tue, Feb 02, 2016 at 10:34:32PM +0100, Rainer Jung wrote:
> Hi there,
>
> reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical
> inconsistency.
>
> First:
>
> OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if:
> ...
> - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the
On 02/02/16 21:34, Rainer Jung wrote:
> Hi there,
>
> reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical
> inconsistency.
>
> First:
>
> OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if:
> ...
> - Static DH ciphersuites are used. The key is part of the certificate
> and so it
Am 03.02.2016 um 00:30 schrieb Kurt Roeckx:
On Tue, Feb 02, 2016 at 10:34:32PM +0100, Rainer Jung wrote:
Hi there,
reading the last advisory again, I noticed, that there's one logical
inconsistency.
First:
OpenSSL before 1.0.2f will reuse the key if:
...
- Static DH ciphersuites are used.
+1
Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone on the Verizon Wireless 4G LTE network.
Original Message
From: Hanno Böck
Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 06:18
To: openssl-dev@openssl.org
Reply To: openssl-dev@openssl.org
Cc: open...@openssl.org
Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] OpenSSL Security Advisory
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [28th Jan 2016]
=
NOTE: SUPPORT FOR VERSION 1.0.1 WILL BE ENDING ON 31ST DECEMBER 2016. NO
SECURITY FIXES WILL BE PROVIDED AFTER THAT DATE. UNTIL THAT TIME SECURITY FIXES
ONLY ARE
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [9 Jul 2015]
===
Alternative chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
==
Severity: High
During certificate verification, OpenSSL
This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o.
In other words, if you are not using those specific releases -- i.e., the ones
that came out less than 30 days ago -- you do not need to upgrade.
___
openssl-dev mailing list
Huhu!!
|Fixes for this issue were developed by Emilia Käsper and Kurt Roeckx
I just want to mention these «UTF-8 re-encoded as UTF-8» issues,
which may be acceptable for names of males, but, but
*particularly* with respect to the natural beauty of the affected
person… On the other hand i
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [11 Jun 2015]
===
DHE man-in-the-middle protection (Logjam)
A vulnerability in the TLS protocol allows a
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [19 Mar 2015]
===
OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS (CVE-2015-0291)
=
Severity: High
If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [08 Jan 2015]
===
DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record (CVE-2014-3571)
===
Severity: Moderate
A carefully crafted DTLS
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