Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Nicola Tuveri
I have always implicitly assumed Matt view, but I am happy to conform to what the consensus is. I believe this discussion is very useful and could contribute a new entry in the commiter guidelines. Nicola On Fri, May 24, 2019, 07:21 Matt Caswell wrote: > > > On 24/05/2019 15:10, Richard Levitt

Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Matthias St. Pierre
I forgot one word: On 24.05.19 17:45, Matthias St. Pierre wrote: (Otherwise, the missing approvers need to be from the Reviewed-by list and additional approvals would be needed). need to be _removed_ from the Reviewed-by list

Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Matthias St. Pierre
On 24.05.19 16:54, Richard Levitte wrote: On Fri, 24 May 2019 16:39:51 +0200, Matt Caswell wrote: On 24/05/2019 15:30, Richard Levitte wrote: Not in practice. We *do* ask on the PR in question if it should be cherry-picked to 1.1.1 and seek approval for that action, but then it hasn't at

Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Richard Levitte
On Fri, 24 May 2019 16:39:51 +0200, Matt Caswell wrote: > > > > On 24/05/2019 15:30, Richard Levitte wrote: > > > > Not in practice. We *do* ask on the PR in question if it should be > > cherry-picked to 1.1.1 and seek approval for that action, but then it > > hasn't at all been clear what sho

Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Matt Caswell
On 24/05/2019 15:30, Richard Levitte wrote: > On Fri, 24 May 2019 16:20:59 +0200, > Matt Caswell wrote: >> On 24/05/2019 15:10, Richard Levitte wrote: >>> If we go with the idea that an approval also involves approving what >>> branches it goes to, then what happens if someone realises after som

Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Richard Levitte
On Fri, 24 May 2019 16:20:59 +0200, Matt Caswell wrote: > On 24/05/2019 15:10, Richard Levitte wrote: > > If we go with the idea that an approval also involves approving what > > branches it goes to, then what happens if someone realises after some > > time that a set of commits (a PR) that was app

Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Dmitry Belyavsky
Hello, On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 5:21 PM Matt Caswell wrote: > > On 24/05/2019 15:10, Richard Levitte wrote: > > If we go with the idea that an approval also involves approving what > > branches it goes to, then what happens if someone realises after some > > time that a set of commits (a PR) that

Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Matt Caswell
On 24/05/2019 15:10, Richard Levitte wrote: > Not sure I see it as picking nits, it's rather about some fundamental > difference in what we thinking we're approving, and how we actually > act around that. > > My idea has always been that I approve a code change, i.e. essentially > a patch or a

Re: AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Richard Levitte
Not sure I see it as picking nits, it's rather about some fundamental difference in what we thinking we're approving, and how we actually act around that. My idea has always been that I approve a code change, i.e. essentially a patch or a set of patches, without regard for exact branches it ends u

AW: [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

2019-05-24 Thread Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
Matt and Richard, I think you are mixing up cherry-picking and nit-picking here. (Sorry for the pun ;-) Matthias > To be picky, may I assume that you meant a reviewed-by tag for you > > should be *added*? The commit itself (its contents) having been > > reviewed by those already there, I cannot