[FIPS] is EVP_des_ede_ecb permitted ?

Dear team In FIPS mode is the cipher "EVP_des_ede_ecb" permitted or not ? If i check the openssl.org fipscansitor code then in the file fips_des_selftest.c , I can see that the self test for only EVP_des_ede3_ecb is being done . In Centos openssl code (openssl-1.0.2k-19.el7.src.rpm) , in

[openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow

Dear team In AES-GCM mode i know that the final counter will be [4 bytes salt which is negotiated between client and serevr ] + [8 bytes of random bytes which are generated using RAND_bytes (nounce_explicit). nounce] + [32 bit counter ] nounce_explicit will be

[openssl-users] POODLE attack on TLS1.2

Dear Team In https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POODLE , It is mentioned that POODLE attack is possible aganist *TLS *also . has this issue been alredy addressed in openssl . Thanks and regards Akshar -- openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe:

[openssl-users] [FIPS compliance] ssl reneg when counter overflows(AES_GCM)

Dear team as per the documnet http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf page 150 , Its mentioned The implementation of the nonce_explicit management logic inside the module shall ensure that when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum

[openssl-users] [FIPS compliance] ssl reneg when counter overflows(AES_GCM)

Dear team as per the documnet http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf page 150 , Its mentioned The implementation of the nonce_explicit management logic inside the module shall ensure that when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum