On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 09:28:28AM +, Salz, Rich wrote:
> I want to change the memory alloc/debug things.
>
> Right now there are several undocumented functions to allow you to
> swap-out the malloc/realloc/free routines, wrappers that call those
> routines, debug versions of those wrappers,
On 12/18/2015 1:00 AM, Alex william wrote:
I receive this error message:
segfault at efe000 ip 7ffb571e479c sp 7ffced00dcf0 error 4 in
libcrypto.so.1.0.0[7ffb57166000+1cb000]
And the collector stops immediately.
Has anyone encountered this error or can someone help please?
In my
Is there any current solution to have RSA 186-4 in OpenSSL FIPS (now, even if
this means an upgrade ?)
Thanks.
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> What would then be the permitting conditions to pursue a new validation ?
> If you don't mind me asking. I have read several notes you have on the
> subject and I agree that the whole thing is of Dedalus proportions. In a
> nutshell what would be these conditions ?
In a nutshell: someone
Sorry, I forgot: What about the code itself, if we do not mind the validation
? Is the 185-4 RSA compatible code present in any OpenSSL/FIPS module ?
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What would then be the permitting conditions to pursue a new validation ? If
you don't mind me asking. I have read several notes you have on the subject
and I agree that the whole thing is of Dedalus proportions. In a nutshell
what would be these conditions ?
Thanks, much appreciated.
--
On 12/18/2015 11:03 AM, jonetsu wrote:
> Is there any current solution to have RSA 186-4 in OpenSSL FIPS (now, even if
> this means an upgrade ?)
We aren't allowed to update existing validations to include that type of
"cryptographically significant" change, just like we aren't allowed to
fix
The 2.0.11 revision of the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v2.0 has been
approved:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm#2398
Note that this is the same module as for the #1747 and #2374
validations; the proliferation of validation numbers is due to the
"hostage"
On 12/18/2015 01:10 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
>> What would then be the permitting conditions to pursue a new
>> validation ? If you don't mind me asking. I have read several
>> notes you have on the subject and I agree that the whole thing is
>> of Dedalus proportions. In a nutshell what would be
Fair enough (in this context). But what about the code itself, is it ready
to be RSA 186-4 compliant ?
And, if we go through a validation, can OpenSSL benefit from it ?
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On 12/18/2015 12:58 PM, jonetsu wrote:
> Fair enough (in this context). But what about the code itself, is it ready
> to be RSA 186-4 compliant ?
We think we know how to write the code that would be necessary, for FIPS
186-4 and all the other new requirements, though you can never be sure
until
I think you would probably do better to contact support for wanguard
than for openssl. Possible issues could involve ABI incompatibility or
library selection incompatibility; since there's no way for us to know
how wanguard is structured (we can't track every product that uses
openssl), they're
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