Re: Increment certificate serial numbers randomly

2014-04-30 Thread Walter H.
On 30.04.2014 03:57, Nikolay Elenkov wrote: What hasn't been suggested is giving each server, etc. its own sub-CA signed by the root. Then there won't be a need to have the root key at multiple places and not problems with serial. Additionally, clients will only have to install and trust the

TLSv1 Record Layer: Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version)

2014-04-30 Thread zyf01...@gmail.com
This time the client hello and server hello is done,but when client key exchange the server reply Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version).Shows bellow, what wrong with this? And I kown this alert means the client is not using the same protocol, but why client hello ,and server

Re: Increment certificate serial numbers randomly

2014-04-30 Thread Walter H.
On 29.04.2014 22:32, Tim Hudson wrote: On 30/04/2014 6:05 AM, Walter H. wrote: On 29.04.2014 21:38, d...@deadhat.com mailto:d...@deadhat.com wrote: This all seems unecessarily complex. Make the serial number a 256 bit or greater true random number. There will be no collisions. the serial

Re: TLSv1 Record Layer: Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version)

2014-04-30 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 3:04 AM, zyf01...@gmail.com zyf01...@gmail.comwrote: This time the client hello and server hello is done,but when client key exchange the server reply Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version).Shows bellow, what wrong with this? And I kown this alert means

Re: Increment certificate serial numbers randomly

2014-04-30 Thread Mat Arge
Some standards (like the CA/Browser Forum guidelines) request a certain amount of entropy (like 20 bits) to be contained within the serial number. Is there some sort of best-practice for incorporating this small amount of real random data into a larger unique serial number? cheers Mat On

Re: Re: TLSv1 Record Layer: Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version)

2014-04-30 Thread zyf01...@gmail.com
On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 3:04 AM, zyf01...@gmail.com zyf01...@gmail.comwrote: This time the client hello and server hello is done,but when client key exchange the server reply Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version).Shows bellow, what wrong with this? And I kown this alert means

Re: Re: TLSv1 Record Layer: Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version)

2014-04-30 Thread zyf01...@gmail.com
I have tryed, it works well. So ,what wrong with my appliction? zyf01...@gmail.com  From: Jeffrey WaltonDate: 2014-04-30 15:27To: OpenSSL Users ListSubject: Re: TLSv1 Record Layer: Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Protocol Version) On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 3:04 AM, zyf01...@gmail.com

Re: Windows CE (VC-CE) Compilation problem !

2014-04-30 Thread Geoffrey Coram
I use wcecompat with OpenSSL for WinCE 2.11; I haven't tried building for a later version of WinCE, and I use an older compiler. There's some basic problem with your build; it looks like something as basic as using a C compiler to compile C++ and getting tripped up on new syntax. Are you

donation thank you - Hitomi Kimura

2014-04-30 Thread Steve Marquess
I would like to publicly thank Hitomi Kimura for his recent personal donation of US$500 to the OpenSSL project. He notes that he is a long time OpenSSL user and that for his job as an information security engineer in Japan he has distributed tens of thousands of client certificates. -Steve M. --

Question about rationale for function X509_check_akid()

2014-04-30 Thread Stephan Mühlstrasser
I'm using a verify callback function set via X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func() to customize the behavior of X509_verify_cert(). For example errors related to the fact that no complete chain to a trusted root can be built are ignored, in order to still allow validation of other properties of

Re: Question about rationale for function X509_check_akid()

2014-04-30 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 03:44:51PM +0200, Stephan M?hlstrasser wrote: Shouldn't it only return X509_V_OK if at least one of the three tests Check key ids (if present), Check serial number and Check issuer name actually was performed? Don't know about the CRL code path, but the same function

donation - Nokia, our first Platinum Sponsor

2014-04-30 Thread Steve Marquess
It is my great pleasure to announce that Nokia (http://company.nokia.com/en), formerly Nokia Solutions and Networks (NSN), has signed on as the first ever Platinum Sponsor of OpenSSL. Their press release:

Re: donation - Nokia, our first Platinum Sponsor

2014-04-30 Thread Luis Rocha
Wow - congrats! Good and positive outcomes of Hearbleed : ) On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 12:52 AM, Steve Marquess marqu...@opensslfoundation.com wrote: It is my great pleasure to announce that Nokia (http://company.nokia.com/en), formerly Nokia Solutions and Networks (NSN), has signed on as the