From: openssl-users On Behalf Of Dr. Stephen Henson
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2015 17:24
On Fri, Feb 20, 2015, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
I'd like to use ASN1_item_d2i_bio() (or something similar) to parse an
incoming message. However, given that types like ASN1_OCTET_STRING
have (essentially) unbounded length, how do I prevent an attacker from
DOS'ing via OOM?
Is there some way to set a max packet size?
No there isn't but if the input is in DER form you can peek the first few
bytes and get the tag+length fields to determine the size of the
structure. If
the input uses indefinite length encoding that isn't possible however.
Some other possibilities:
If the bio is memBIO or fileBIO its input size is known before you start,
at least if it contains only one root item. More generally you could layer
a simple filter BIO that limits total reads to a chosen amount like 1M,
probably measured from a CTRL operation -- or a more complex one
that looks dynamically at your memory-used and/or memory-available
and chooses whether/when to force EOF, but that would be dependent
on your particular platform and not portable.
Alternatively or in addition, OpenSSL allows you to provide your own
malloc/realloc/free implementations used instead of the standard ones.
But these are used for *all* OpenSSL heap allocations, so you might need
some care to count the space used for or at least during a d2i
as opposed to other purposes and times.
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