Re: [openssl-users] FIPS: Common method executed in case of error
From: Dr. Stephen Henson st...@openssl.org Date: 03/10/15 20:04 I mean you could add a callback to FIPS_mode_set using FIPS_post_set_callback: see the fips_test_suite.c application for an example. The supplied callback is called during each POST, continuous RNG and pairwise consistency checks. The op value is set to FIPS_POST_FAIL if any test fails. This is basically what was also suggested by Henrik in a related thread recently, which I understood being implemented in an application. The variation here would be that the callback is part of the library, located in FIPS_mode_set() in o_fips.c, with the callback itself being defined elsewhere in the same file. A potentially useful case for some applications that do not need to be further modified would be for the library to automatically know that it has to run in FIPS mode. Eg. to automatically call FIPS_mode_set() at load time, based on a env. var. or some other external sign. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
[openssl-users] FIPS: Common method executed in case of error
Hello, Is there a method that is always in the path of execution when a crypto error occurs ? The reason for asking is that I would like to very slightly modify the OpenSSL FIPS version so that it will write a file in tmpfs when an error occurs. That place will be observed by another app using inotify. Granted, modifying OpenSSL FIPS will void its FIPS certification. But then, the whole unit will be validated. Having a single place to modify would be quite an extraordinary thing. I have asked recently about a related topic and got some replies regarding the modification of applications, although modifying the library would provide a single package to modify. Steve has replied that indeed the validation will be lost - I wonder if that would have any impact on the total validation costs for a whole unit, OS and apps ? Would a non-modified FIPS OpenSSL library reduce the validation costs ? Any comments and suggestions welcomed, regards. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS: Common method executed in case of error
From: Steve Marquess marqu...@openssl.com Date: 03/10/15 08:56 Hello, Thanks for your reply. You're talking about a Level 2 validation (or higher)? You most definitely do *not* want to include the OS or applications in the cryptographic module boundary for Level 1. It's a level 2. The behaviour of the unit as a whole is validated. As an example amongst many, there will be no Linux console prompt available in FIPS mode. I think you're going to be shocked at the cost (in time and money) to validate a hacked OpenSSL FIPS module, compared to using it as-is or a change letter update. That brings a question. I'm currently using 1.0.1k with the 2.0 FIPS module for development purposes. This may seem a bit blunt, but, is it possible at all to use 1.0.1k to benefit from the FIPS validation ? Based on recent comments I would think not. Going back to a pre-heartbleed version ? Is there any way to benefit from the gained OpenSSL FIPS validation at all ? That's because the CMVP has introduced a number of new requirements since the current FIPS module was validated (in 2012), and any new validation will now need to satisfy those. Again, is there any benefit to be gained from using a once validated OpenSSL FIPS ? What would be the bugs fixed/ security updates trade-off ? That means not only non-trivial code hacks unrelated to yours, but also a new paper shuffle for the arm waving (DTR) components of the validation process. The cost of the latter dwarfs the former; which is why we have not attempted a new validation ourselves. Hmmm... If this goes through, would it be possible for OpenSSL to benefit from any validation our unit can get ? But, that cost could be dwarfed in turn by that of a Level 2 or 3 validation of a turnkey system including OS and apps. Thanks again for your comments, much appreciated. Regards. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS: Common method executed in case of error
On 03/10/2015 08:20 AM, jonetsu wrote: ... Steve has replied that indeed the validation will be lost - I wonder if that would have any impact on the total validation costs for a whole unit, OS and apps ? You're talking about a Level 2 validation (or higher)? You most definitely do *not* want to include the OS or applications in the cryptographic module boundary for Level 1. Would a non-modified FIPS OpenSSL library reduce the validation costs ? I think you're going to be shocked at the cost (in time and money) to validate a hacked OpenSSL FIPS module, compared to using it as-is or a change letter update. That's because the CMVP has introduced a number of new requirements since the current FIPS module was validated (in 2012), and any new validation will now need to satisfy those. That means not only non-trivial code hacks unrelated to yours, but also a new paper shuffle for the arm waving (DTR) components of the validation process. The cost of the latter dwarfs the former; which is why we have not attempted a new validation ourselves. But, that cost could be dwarfed in turn by that of a Level 2 or 3 validation of a turnkey system including OS and apps. -Steve M. -- Steve Marquess OpenSSL Software Foundation, Inc. 1829 Mount Ephraim Road Adamstown, MD 21710 USA +1 877 673 6775 s/b +1 301 874 2571 direct marqu...@opensslfoundation.com marqu...@openssl.com gpg/pgp key: http://openssl.com/docs/0x6D1892F5.asc ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS: Common method executed in case of error
On Tue, Mar 10, 2015, jonetsu wrote: Hello, Is there a method that is always in the path of execution when a crypto error occurs ? The reason for asking is that I would like to very slightly modify the OpenSSL FIPS version so that it will write a file in tmpfs when an error occurs. That place will be observed by another app using inotify. Granted, modifying OpenSSL FIPS will void its FIPS certification. But then, the whole unit will be validated. Having a single place to modify would be quite an extraordinary thing. I have asked recently about a related topic and got some replies regarding the modification of applications, although modifying the library would provide a single package to modify. Steve has replied that indeed the validation will be lost - I wonder if that would have any impact on the total validation costs for a whole unit, OS and apps ? Would a non-modified FIPS OpenSSL library reduce the validation costs ? Any comments and suggestions welcomed, regards. Although you cannot modify the FIPS module itself without voiding the validation you *can* change the FIPS capable OpenSSL. You might (for example) change FIPS_mode_set() to always add a callback which logs any errors. Steve. -- Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer. Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS: Common method executed in case of error
Is there a method that is always in the path of execution when a crypto error occurs ? It looks like fips_set_selftest_fail() would be a likely candidate where to create an empty file on a tmpfs in order to let the OS know about the error. Comments and suggestions welcomed. Based on your experience with FIPS validation process, and many customers/sponsors, do you think that having a ever so slightly modified OpenSSL FIPS code would increase validation costs for a whole unit (OS and apps) ? Recently Steve, I think, has mentioned that the cost for an initial OpenSSL FIPS validation was well into the 6 numbers. Would this type of figure be added to a project if OpenSSL FIPS is modified ? I think the labs could go with a diff and see how simple the modification is. Regards. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS: Common method executed in case of error
From: Dr. Stephen Henson st...@openssl.org Date: 03/10/15 10:21 Although you cannot modify the FIPS module itself without voiding the validation you *can* change the FIPS capable OpenSSL. You might (for example) change FIPS_mode_set() to always add a callback which logs any errors. I see. So this would actually enable benefiting (saving validation costs) from an intact recent OpenSSL 1.0.1k with all security fixes. FIPS_mode_set() is very straightforward to patch although it would only catch startup errors. Not the eventual errors from tests that are executed before each crypto use. And not the continuous RNG tests. Within the scope of OpenSSL itself, there is a fips_cipher_abort() that is called for each algo. That macro could perhaps be a good place. Although it would still not catch continuous RNG test failures. Regards. ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
Re: [openssl-users] FIPS: Common method executed in case of error
On Tue, Mar 10, 2015, jonetsu wrote: From: Dr. Stephen Henson st...@openssl.org Date: 03/10/15 10:21 Although you cannot modify the FIPS module itself without voiding the validation you *can* change the FIPS capable OpenSSL. You might (for example) change FIPS_mode_set() to always add a callback which logs any errors. I see. So this would actually enable benefiting (saving validation costs) from an intact recent OpenSSL 1.0.1k with all security fixes. Only the FIPS module is validated: the FIPS capable OpenSSL uses it. So you can modify (within reason) the FIPS capable OpenSSL without affecting the validation . So you can use OpenSSL 1.0.1l or 1.0.2 with the FIPS module. FIPS_mode_set() is very straightforward to patch although it would only catch startup errors. Not the eventual errors from tests that are executed before each crypto use. And not the continuous RNG tests. I mean you could add a callback to FIPS_mode_set using FIPS_post_set_callback: see the fips_test_suite.c application for an example. The supplied callback is called during each POST, continuous RNG and pairwise consistency checks. The op value is set to FIPS_POST_FAIL if any test fails. Steve. -- Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer. Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org ___ openssl-users mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
